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Abstract 
This dissertation examines wartime tactical adaptation and its relationship with 
operational performance and outcome, using case studies of mid-to-high intensity 
conflict during the Second World War. It asks: In what circumstances and in what 
ways does tactical adaptation contribute to operational success or failure? Also 
examined are what conditions cause wartime tactical adaptation to be more or less 
effective at changing performance, and how different types of adaptation cause 
different effects on outcome. The study begins by considering contemporary 
theories on military innovation, adaptation, and effectiveness. Then it builds upon 
this foundation through case studies of seven operations in Burma and India from 
1941–45. Three hypotheses are considered regarding types of adaptation under 
various conditions, to examine performance and effectiveness of British and 
Japanese forces, and how these factors contributed to operational success or failure. 
From these case studies the dissertation develops more general principles about how 
forces may adapt more effectively and efficiently during conflict, limitations 
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Chapter One 
Introducing Tactical Adaptation and Operational Success 
Following Japanese surrender in 1945, for several years in Vietnam the French 
military “outclassed their Vietnamese adversaries.”1 But by 1950 the cumulative 
effect of new Soviet and Chinese assistance in advisors, training camps, and modern 
weapons had combined to alter the balance of forces and enabled the Viet Minh to 
change primary combat purpose and battlefield goals.2 Vietnamese forces had 
expanded and transformed into regular army units, to include five 10,000-member 
infantry divisions and an artillery division, all designed and trained for open 
warfare. With this altered force, in late 1950 the Viet Minh overran France’s frontier 
posts and by December were poised for the potentially decisive battle of overtaking 
the Red River Delta.3 By this point the Viet Minh had endured setbacks and adjusted 
techniques, possessed new and increased resources, modernized equipment and 
weapons, incorporated new training and skills, reorganized into larger units 
designed for open warfare, and had transformed tactical methods in accordance with 
operational concepts for conventional warfare—all elements that seem to be 
reasonable criteria for wartime adaptation tailored to improve battlefield 
effectiveness. So, then what was the subsequent outcome at the Red River Delta 
against French defenders in 1951? 
 The operation was a complete failure, and a costly one. Over several months 
and three multi-division attacks, Viet Minh forces were “badly mauled” as they 
fought in the open delta, suffered over 12,000 casualties, and lost nearly half their 
combat divisions.4 Militarily, the operation failed to attain its goal of seizing the Red 
River Delta’s vital economic and population hub, and failed to end the war. 
                                                                                                                
 1  Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray, eds., Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex 
Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 
7. 
 2 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: 
Random House, 2007), p. 232. 
 3 Robert H. Scales Jr., Firepower in Limited War (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press Publication, 1993), pp. 36-37. 
 4 Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: Guerrillas and their 
Opponents since 1750 (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 116. Assessment of losing half the divisions is 
from Scales, 49. Reports of casualties vary, with Beckett citing 12,000, compared with 20,000 in 
Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History from Guerrilla Warfare from the Ancient Times to the 
Present (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, W.W. Norton & Company, 2013), p. 356. 
   6 
Politically, there was “no silver lining” in any larger gains for the offensive.5 What 
might this example suggest about analysing wartime adaptation and its relationship 
with operational outcome? 
 The Viet Minh example indicates how adaptive forces can fail. It suggests 
that, in some instances, wartime adaptation may entail new costs in resources and 
lives, possibly even contributing to battlefield failure. This scenario hints at how the 
relationship between wartime adaptation and operational outcome may be more 
complex than intuitively assumed. This case also indicates how the relationship 
between tactics and operations may benefit from their distinct examination. Of 
course, three years later the Viet Minh defeated France’s army, suggesting a 
shortcoming in any analysis that fails to consider larger context; but the 1951 loss 
entailed many significant costs, delivered a large setback, and the ultimate victory 
was not guaranteed. In other circumstances a campaign or war may unfold very 
differently. Therefore, an incomplete understanding about what wartime adaptation 
can or cannot deliver to battlefield performance risks future costs in resources and 
lives. In pursuit of this greater understanding, this project will examine the nature of 
wartime tactical adaptation and its relationship with combat operations, their 
performance, and outcome. 
 
Project Design, Scope, and Objectives 
To assess wartime tactical adaptation’s causal relationship with operational outcome 
during mid-to-high intensity ground combat, this study addresses the primary 
research question: When does tactical adaptation in warfare enable operational 
success or failure, and when does it make no difference? Also, two secondary 
questions are considered: What conditions cause wartime tactical adaptation to be 
more or less effective at changing operational performance? How do different types 
of adaptation cause different effects on operational outcome? These questions reflect 
this study’s argument that the causal relationship between wartime tactical 
adaptation and operational outcome remains insufficiently examined. Literature has 
focused on drawing out the distinction between adaptation and innovation, 
addressing a puzzle regarding how and when military organizations conduct major 
                                                                                                                
 5 Boot, Invisible Armies, 356. 
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change or transformation.6 Therefore, this research is distinct and may deliver an 
original and relevant contribution to the field of security studies since it examines 
the relationship between tactical adaptation and operational performance. This 
research gap persists despite increased academic analysis of wartime adaptation 
since the mid-2000s, delivering vital contributions to address omissions in this field 
of study.7  
For this project, the independent variable of tactical adaptation may be 
considered changed methods, techniques, or procedures to make people, units, or 
                                                                                                                
 6 Regarding major military change see Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of 
Military Change: Culture, Politics, and Technology (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2002); Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). For major innovation see Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: 
France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1984); see also Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military 
(Cornell, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). For post-Cold War transformation see Theo 
Farrell, Sten Rynning, and Terry Terriff, eds., Transforming Military Power since the Cold War 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). For the distinguishing features between innovation 
and adaptation, see Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand 
Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (August 2010), 
pp. 567-594. See also Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” The Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 5 (October 2006), pp. 905-934. 
 7 Sergio Catignani, “Coping With Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British 
Army?” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2014), pp. 30-64; Sergio Catignani, 
“‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in 
the British Army,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (August 2012), pp. 513-539; 
Farrell, “Improving in War”; Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James Russell, eds., Military 
Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2013); Grissom, “The 
Future of Military Innovation Studies”; Torunn Laugen Haaland, “The Limits to Learning in Military 
Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 39, No. 7 (July 2016), pp. 999-1022; Francis G. Hoffman, “Adapt, 
Innovate, and Adapt Some More,” Proceedings, United States Naval Institute, Vol. 140, Iss. 3 
(March 2014); Francis Hoffman, “The American Wolf Packs: A Case Study in Adaptation,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly, (1st Quarter 2016), pp.131-139; Nina Kollars, “War’s Horizon: Soldier-Led 
Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (3 January 2015), 
pp. 1-25; Nina Kollars, “Military Innovation’s Dialectic: Gun Trucks and Rapid Acquisition,” 
Security Studies, 23 (2014), pp. 787-813; Raphael Marcus, “Military Innovation and Tactical 
Adaptation in the Israel–Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF,” 
The Journal of Strategic Studies (August 2014), pp. 500-528; Raphael D. Marcus, “Learning ‘Under 
Fire’: Israel’s Improvised Military Adaptation to Hamas Tunnel Warfare,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies (April 2017), pp. 1-27; Niccolò Petrelli, “Deterring Insurgents: Culture, Adaptation and 
Evolution of Israeli Counterinsurgency, 1987–2005,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 
5, pp. 666-691; James A. Russell, “Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and 
Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (August 
2010), pp. 595-624; James Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency 
Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2011); Olivier Schmitt, “French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War: Looking 
Inward or Outward?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (August 2016), pp. 577-599; 
Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2015); Caitlin Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist 
Performance: Iraqi Battlefield Effectiveness in the Iran–Iraq War,” Security Studies, 22 (2013), pp. 
180-221. 
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equipment suitable for new combat purposes or different combat conditions in a 
repeated or shared manner.8 The dependent variable of operational success is 
considered the ability to achieve assigned missions with acceptable expenditures of 
material and human resources according to planned times.9 Success, therefore, is 
efficiently achieving objectives. To analyse and to measure these variables, this 
examination also uses the concepts of wartime performance, effectiveness, and 
outcome, terms which are related but not identical. Performance is a process of 
carrying out operations through battle and tactics, while effectiveness refers to a 
measure of quality that rates ability and performance.10 Outcome, then, is a result 
that entails goals, costs, and time, to which performance and effectiveness contribute 
and is labelled in this study as success or failure. 
 This study aims to contribute to the academic literature on military 
adaptation by targeting the sub-field currently pioneering research and analysis 
about wartime change. The research is unique by emphasizing the relationship 
between processes of tactical change with operational effectiveness and outcome. 
This project explores: how different types of tactical adaptation influence 
operational performance; what conditions or contexts cause tactical adaptation to 
change operational effectiveness; how tactical adaptation may compensate for 
surprise, setbacks, or mistakes during combat operations; and the relationship 
between tactical adaptation and operational outcome as measured by success or 
failure. Overall, this research will deliver opportunities for an enhanced 
                                                                                                                
 8 This definition emphasizes adaptation as a process, rather than the people who conduct its 
actions. Because change may come from various directions, people, or units, as discussed later and as 
displayed in the case studies, this perspective deliberately is constructed to isolate changes, to assess 
their impact, and to trace what made them change performance and contribute to outcome. 
 9 Definition slightly modifies that used by Peter Mansoor for “combat effectiveness”: “the 
ability of a military organization to achieve its assigned missions with the least expenditure of 
resources (both material and human) in the least amount of time.” Peter R. Mansoor, The GI 
Offensive in Europe: The Triumphs of American Infantry Divisions, 1941–1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1999), p. 3.  
 10 As discussed later in more detail, operational effectiveness is the ability of soldiers and 
units in performing battlefield tasks through a series of missions to destroy adversary forces and 
achieve physical objectives as designated by their commanders. This definition combines and 
modifies Ken Pollack’s “military effectiveness” and Stephen Biddle’s “military power” criteria. 
Pollack’s “military effectiveness” includes “the ability of soldiers and officers to perform on the 
battlefield, to accomplish military missions, and to execute the strategies devise by their political-
military leaders.” See Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 4. Biddle’s criteria includes “the ability 
to destroy hostile forces while preserving one's own; the ability to take and hold ground; and the time 
required to do so.” See Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern 
Battle (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 6. 
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understanding of tactical adaptation in ground warfare, and the relationship between 
tactical adaptation and operational performance. 
 A method of structured, focused comparison will analyse this project’s case 
studies.11 This design allows for the identification of variables which shape the 
outcome of operational success or failure, and then to consider causal patterns 
related to tactical adaptation which may produce different outcomes. The research is 
structured as it considers the same research question in each case to guide and 
standardize information regarding how and under what conditions tactical 
adaptation may shape operational outcome. The research design is comparative as it 
considers multiple case studies. It is focused by concentrating on how the 
independent variable of tactical adaptation relates to the intermediate variable of 
operational effectiveness and then to the dependent variable of operational success, 
examining only the specific aspects of the cases concerned with these variables. 
With this specific focus and common structure, built upon previous scholarship, the 
seven cases selected from the Second World War contain sufficient control, 
variation, and information for comparative analysis and to identify causal patterns.12 
 
Research Logic 
This project follows a common framework to identify adaptation and to evaluate its 
relationship with performance, effectiveness, and outcome. First, points of potential 
adaptation are identified: moments of surprise, setback, or opportunity, when forces 
or personnel may implement tactical change. These also include the decision not to 
change. Next is considered how adaptation addressed, or failed to address, the main 
challenge faced by fighting units as displayed during combat performance. Then, the 
impact of adaption on effectiveness is evaluated using indicators to rate 
effectiveness as low, intermediate, or high. Next, it is assessed how adaptation 
influenced effectiveness and whether it was increased, decreased, or unchanged. 
                                                                                                                
 11 For a discussion on the method of focused, structured comparison, see Andrew Bennett 
and Alexander L. George, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 67-72; Alexander L. George, “Knowledge for Statecraft: The 
Challenge for Political Science and History,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), 
pp. 44-52. This research project emulates the description and justification of focused, structured 
comparison used in Theo Farrell, Weapons Without A Cause: The Politics of Weapons Acquisition in 
the United States (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), pp. 17-18. 
 12 Specific cases and their justification are presented at the end of this chapter. 
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Finally, it is considered how adaptation contributed to the outcome of success or 
failure, and why. 
 The tentative research logic is that tactical adaptation alters operational 
effectiveness which shapes outcome. An intuitive hypothesis is that adaptation may 
increase effectiveness and thus contribute to operational success. However, the 
research design is structured to question this logic by asking whether it 
oversimplifies the relationship between adaptation and outcome or overstates its 
applicability. This project, then, posits that while tactical adaptation can enhance 
advantages or reduce setbacks, it cannot independently deliver success or prevent 
failure. If this argument proves valid then it can address misguided assumptions 
about what wartime adaptation may deliver, how different types of tactical change 
may be applied more effectively when facing operational challenges, and how 
solutions may be delivered more efficiently by planners or decision-makers. A basic 
chart with this research logic is listed below, including variables, their variance, and 
process for evaluating impact as will be elaborated in subsequent portions.  
 
Figure 1.1: Variables and Variations                                                                                      
Independent Variable: Intermediate Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 Tactical          Operational     Operational 
          Adaptation         Effectiveness        Success 
___________________________________________________________________ 
        Cause Success  
        Enable Success 
Increase Effectiveness Prevent Failure 
         Adapt or Not      —>    No change    —> Reduce Setbacks 
Decrease Effectiveness No Change 
        Exacerbate Setbacks 
        Contribute to Failure 
        Cause Failure 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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The primary drivers of wartime adaptation are considered to be operational 
setbacks and environmental challenges.13 Combat realities may fail to meet 
expectations due to an adversary’s surprising proficiency or novel methods, or one’s 
own forces may fail to perform as expected.14 In severe cases the inadequate 
performance may risk prospective defeat, which has been identified in organization 
theory as a fundamental driver for change since it can create new incentives while 
also revealing deficiencies in beliefs or practices previously favoured.15 The 
scenario of a military’s potential failure to conduct its core mission may cause it to 
re-examine fundamental tenets, or cause civilians to intervene in order to pressure 
for larger change.16 Additionally, combat may serve as an evaluation process for 
previously untested methods and techniques, creating new opportunities as “both old 
and innovative methods can be tested in combat and compared.”17 Of course, 
operational challenges often interact with environmental conditions, but 
environmental elements can present independent challenges as well. The diverse 
challenges from fighting in forests, desert, jungles, plains, or tundra present unique 
problems distinct from those imposed by an adversary. Overall these challenges and 
setbacks may be new or an intensification of others. 
 Failure to adapt appears to entail numerous risks. Most severely and 
intuitively, forces that fail to adapt may risk defeat if they cannot overcome 
deficiencies or setbacks in sufficient time to achieve objectives with sustainable 
costs.18 And while wartime enables the testing and evaluation of practices, forces 
still may fail to overcome operational or environmental challenges due to 
insufficient time, resources, or capacity to deliver an appropriate solution. Costs 
may aggregate or combine synergistically. Finally, fleeting opportunities may be 
lost. Yet adaptation entails risks as well. Exploration and experimentation require 
time and resources that may be unavailable or impractical. Additionally, when the 
potential cost of failure can be so severe then “militaries have a good reason to 
                                                                                                                
 13 Driver of operational challenges from Farrell, Osinga, Russell, 8-10. Farrell included 
environment as an operational challenge but here it is separated to focus on operations and tactics. 
 14 For a historical overview of operational pressures influencing military adaptation see 
Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear Of Change (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
 15 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 57. 
 16 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 57. 
 17 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 23. 
 18 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 22-23. 
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favour tried and tested ways of doing things.”19 Adaptation is almost never a risk-
free or cost-free endeavour. 
 
TACTICAL ADAPTATION: TENETS AND NEED 
What is Tactical Adaptation? 
Adaptation is related to military innovation but includes sufficiently distinct 
elements so that it may be examined as an independent variable. Military innovation 
may be considered a major change in how a force conceptualizes and conducts 
warfare, likely to produce a significant impact on battlefield performance.20 
Founded in the approach of Barry Posen,21 scholars generally define military 
innovation as a change in battlefield function of significant scope and impact that is 
“tacitly equated with greater military effectiveness.”22 Adaptation, then, generally 
occurs during wartime and entails a less-significant scope of change compared with 
innovation, although it may still deliver significant impact.23 At the tactical level, 
adaptation is most likely to deliver this larger impact through an accumulation of 
effects: “adapting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), can add up to 
significant change in a military’s capabilities or approach to operations.”24 As such, 
this project’s conceptualization of the relationship between adaptation and 
innovation reflects the presentation as each existing as two points of a sliding scale, 
where between the two it is not “feasible or fruitful to draw too fine a distinction.”25 
Across this scale, both innovation and adaptation are considered a subset of wartime 
change, with difference more in degree than in kind. 
 Throughout this examination, tactical adaptation is considered changed 
methods, techniques, or procedures to make people, units, or equipment suitable for 
new combat purposes or different combat conditions in a repeated or shared 
manner. For example, during the Second World War, U.S. light tanks in North 
                                                                                                                
 19 Farrell, “Improving in War,” 571. 
 20 A slight modification from the definition used by Marcus, “Military Innovation and 
Tactical Adaptation,” 503. 
 21 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. 
 22 Grissom, 907. For example, the development of aircraft carrier warfare for the Second 
World War. See Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power. Discussed later in this section, the 
concept of military innovation has expanded since the mid-2000s to include the subfield of wartime 
adaptation.  
 23 Theo Farrell, “Introduction: Military Adaptation in War,” in Farrell, Osinga, Russell, 6-7. 
 24 Farrell, in Farrell, Osinga, and Russell, 7. 
 25 Farrell, in Farrell, Osinga, and Russell, 7. 
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Africa adjusted tactics to target German Panzers’ vulnerable rears.26 Others 
emulated the change and it spread, delivering improved firepower and manoeuvre 
while remaining within the larger standard operational concept. Elsewhere, in 
northwest Europe, U.S. tanks stalled in France’s hedgerows, causing company-level 
personnel to attach metal teeth suited for breaching the terrain.27 This modification 
spread across First Army along with revised procedures for employing the improved 
mobility.28 Now after breaching the hedgerows, infantry and armour troops required 
altered tactics for use against the stout German defences, and adjusted training to 
deliver enhanced integration of combat arms.29 All these changes improved 
firepower and mobility, delivered significant gains in combat power, and 
contributed to success. Often, purpose and suitability cannot be fully separated as 
tactics include the technical application of combat power as well as how it is applied 
through position and movement.30 In the above examples, counter-tank warfare 
reflected an updated combat purpose for tank companies beyond simply supporting 
infantry, and the adjusted method for attacking Panzers overcame a U.S. 
shortcoming in firepower which effectively applied U.S. tanks’ guns. Similarly, 
faced with a new combat condition in hedgerows that presented both physical 
barriers and effective German defences, First Army modified tanks and altered 
techniques of units and personnel to overcome setbacks. 
In addition to the criteria of new purpose and suitability, changes must also 
be repeated or shared. This caveat indicates how adaptation entails a minimum 
longevity which distinguishes it from limited change. If a new method, technique, or 
                                                                                                                
 26 David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–
1945 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 189-190. 
 27 Paul Collier, Alastair Finlan, Mark Grove, Philip Grove, Russell Hart, Stephen Hart, Max 
Hastings, Robin Havers, David Horner, and Geoffrey Jukes, eds., The Second World War: A World 
In Flames (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2004), p. 390; Michael Doubler, Closing with the 
Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 1994), p. 45.  
 28 Doubler, Closing, 46; Sylvan, US Army Diaries, 14 July 1944, USAMHI; Bradley, A 
Soldier’s Story, 342; First Army Report, 5, pp. 200-201; cited in Michael Doubler, “Busting the 
Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France 6 June–31 July 1944,” Combat Studies 
Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College (November 1988), p. 17, footnote 34. 
 29 Doubler, “Busting,” 11; Doubler, Closing, 37-42. 
 30 Called the art and science of tactics: “The art of tactics lies in how we creatively form and 
apply military forces in a given situation. It involves creation, positioning, and maneuver of combat 
power…. The science of tactics lies in the technical application of combat power. It includes 
mastering the techniques and procedures that contribute to the development of warfighting skills such 
as marksmanship, navigation, gunnery, and close air support.” United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1-
3 Tactics (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1997), p. 4. 
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procedure is limited to a single instance or occurring in pure isolation then it would 
not be considered adaption. Consistent with the examples above, adjusted inter-tank 
gunnery techniques spread across units,31 tank modifications were shared through 
First Army by official order,32 and altered small-unit combined-arms techniques 
were disseminated through official pamphlets for training.33 These changes were 
shared and repeated across units for sustained periods of time, ensuring a longevity 
beyond the original moments.  
 
Intended Contribution regarding Adaptation and Performance 
Surveying the current field of security studies, this project posits that wartime 
tactical adaptation is insufficiently examined and therefore risks being incompletely 
or misunderstood. Scholarship during the Cold War and 1990s tended to emphasize 
major military innovation and force transformation, reflecting the primary concerns 
and challenges of great powers during that period. The result was significant 
contributions regarding innovation during times of war and peace. Later, as NATO 
and other militaries became increasingly engaged in conflict after 2001, new studies 
emerged to consider different contemporary concerns about challenges experienced 
during warfare, to include adaptation. However, the subfield remains far from a 
comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon. Specifically, much scholarship 
has emphasized counterinsurgency without thoroughly questioning the underlying 
assumptions associated with adaptation, or the topic’s relationship with campaigns 
and operations. Adaptation studies have tended to overlook the specific relationship 
between tactical change and operational performance. In response, this project will 
begin to address these shortcomings by delivering new insights regarding tactical 
adaptation through an examination of its relationship specifically related to 
operational performance and outcome. 
 This study’s contributions will build upon previous scholarship emphasizing 
military innovation, doctrinal change, and organizational development, upon which 
the subfield of military adaptation had grown. In general, previous writings often 
“took the form of grand historical narratives, operational histories, or bureaucratic-
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political case studies.”34 Then, in 1984, Barry Posen’s The Sources of Military 
Doctrine applied a social science approach and it “triggered the emergence of a new 
field, military innovation studies.”35 At this time, works emphasized large-scale 
changes and new ways for militaries to function, rather than adaptation.36 Also, 
changes during times of war remained under-analysed as studies tended to 
emphasize “military innovation in peacetime rather than in conflict.”37 From these 
examinations emerged two general shortcomings. First, adaptation was overlooked 
which resulted in an incomplete understanding of the phenomenon. Second, tactical 
changes were considered within larger categories of innovation or change so that 
analyses failed to isolate how tactical adaptation specifically influenced operations. 
 These omissions also created opportunities. In 2006, Adam Grissom 
identified how “none of the major models of military innovation” adequately 
addressed innovation from the “bottom-up”—the tactical level of warfare.38 Grissom 
assessed that the field of military innovation may be approaching a paradigm shift in 
assumptions and conceptual frameworks due to the insufficient attention delivered 
to innovation originating from tactics.39 He concluded that “there is an entire class 
of bottom-up innovations that have yet to be explored, understood, and explained,” 
and that “the door is open for an individual or group of scholars to make a major 
contribution to the field.”40 While studies had hinted at the importance of bottom-up 
innovation, “little progress has been made in a achieving a conceptual understanding 
of the phenomenon.”41 Subsequently, new scholars and policy analysts delivered 
increased attention to wartime adaptation but still without providing a 
comprehensive and specific conceptual understanding. This shortcoming was 
highlighted by the assessment, in 2013, that “few studies” had “explicitly considered 
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military adaptation.”42 Many contributions touching on tactical analysis from 2006–
10 tended to favour practical lessons from military officers, or policy 
recommendations from public intellectuals focused largely on counterinsurgency 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.43 Simultaneously, social science analyses pushed the 
subfield of military adaptation into a realm that previously “remained a topic for 
military historians in the context of specific battles and campaigns.”44 As such, 
historical studies continued to examine wartime change and the subfield grew with 
additional analyses. Several emphasized the First World War and considered tactical 
changes related to the development of operations and emerging concepts associated 
with modern warfare, to include numerous new technologies and related 
capabilities, combining arms, the emergence of battlefield depth, and the need to 
coordinate forces across new scales of time and space.45 Others considered the 
Second World War, also focusing on the specifics of their period, to include Allied 
learning for the Normandy Campaign, U.S. Army divisions in Northwest Europe, or 
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U.S. Army forces as they fought to Germany.46 Several authors specifically 
addressed British Army and Commonwealth learning, considering how doctrine and 
training influenced military performance in Northwest Europe.47 However, these 
examinations remained highly contextual—the natural orientation of historical 
analysis—and therefore did not move to broader assessments about the relationship 
between wartime change and operational outcome. Of course, this scenario results 
largely from the different purposes of historical and social science analyses, but this 
difference reinforces how needs remain for addressing the topic of wartime 
adaptation and how it may benefit multiple fields. Taken together, this combination 
of specific focus and policy orientation across security studies, political science, and 
history, supports the importance of seeking a more comprehensive understanding 
wartime adaptation’s nature, benefits, limits, and costs.48 
 Scholars in the late-2000s increased contributions regarding wartime 
adaptation and often indicated its desirability for improved battlefield performance, 
displaying the need to identify precisely what it could deliver. For example, Chad 
Serna examined “why the [U.S.] army had to adapt so radically” from 2003–08.49 
David Ucko considered how the U.S. military in Iraq adapted to challenges that 
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could then be institutionalized.50 Meir Finkel asserted that the ability to recuperate 
swiftly during conflict presented an essential response to wartime surprise.51 While 
these claims delivered useful analysis, they reflected an assumption that adaptation 
was inherently beneficial for increasing effectiveness and contributing to success, 
but without thoroughly examining this relationship with battlefield operations.  
 Since 2010, scholarship of increased rigor has emerged and contributed to 
new conceptual understanding of wartime adaptation, but opportunities remain 
regarding tactical adaptation and particularly its relationship with operations. Using 
case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan, James Russell and Theo Farrell examined how 
and when military adaptation occurs.52 Russell’s “Innovation in War” examined 
three battalions operating in Iraq between 2005 and 2007, concluding that the units 
“successfully innovated in war—a process largely executed organically within the 
units themselves.”53 Russell argued that searching for tactical solutions to 
unpredicted problems delivered new organizational capacities not initially present, 
allowing the units to transition from a focus on conventional operations to 
counterinsurgency.54 Russell expanded this analysis in his 2011 Innovation, 
Transformation, and War,55 concluding that battlefield tactical adaptation drove 
larger organizational innovation at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 
Examining U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces in Iraq from 2003–06, Russell 
concluded that brigade-level units independently adapted effectively in the field 
which then caused rear-echelon efforts to reorient capabilities toward the new 
circumstances.56 For Russell, tactical adaptation caused fundamental changes as 
local successes drove larger doctrinal change in the DoD as it attempted to emulate, 
reproduce, and spread successful new techniques and procedures.57 Thus, Russell 
began to address the need identified by Grissom—to assess innovation originating in 
the tactical units—and presented examples of “ad hoc adaptation in which 
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individual leaders reacted to local circumstances by cycling through different ways 
of employing their units and equipment on the battlefield.”58 Farrell’s “Improving in 
War” advanced these assessments by presenting a new theory regarding how 
militaries improve operational performance during wartime.59 Examining six British 
Task Forces between 2006 and 2009 in southern Afghanistan, Farrell explored how 
new ideas, low degrees of centralization, and high personnel turnover enabled 
British forces to be adaptive.60 He argued that these traits were vital in delivering 
battlefield advantages. Despite his addition and the recent gains in the field, Farrell 
still concluded that “more research needs to be done” to understand military 
adaptation.61 Also, that recent practical experience “confirms the importance of 
studying bottom-up military adaptation.”62 This enduring need and relevance for 
studying wartime adaptation was echoed by Williamson Murray who argued that the 
issue of combat adaptation represented “one of the most persistent, yet rarely 
examined problems that military institutions confront.”63 Subsequent assessments 
examined new ideas by considering how international partners may learn during 
counterinsurgency,64 challenges for small states adapting in multi-national 
coalitions,65 and specific tactical problems for smaller-scale conflicts,66 but the 
larger questions remained unanswered about how these changes may enable 
operational goals or to deliver larger advantages. Thus, an enhanced understanding 
about how and under what conditions tactical adaptation may shape operational 
performance and contribute to success appears to be a timely, relevant need that 
remains insufficiently addressed by existing security studies scholarship. Next one 
must consider how these elements and their relationship may be identified, 
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OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: IDENTIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT 
Diverse research has considered military power. But, so far, this scholarship has yet 
to identify precisely the tenets of operational effectiveness and to discern how they 
may be manipulated by tactical changes to deliver success or to prevent failure. 
Therefore, this project aims to use specific criteria for identifying levels of 
effectiveness during mid-to-high intensity ground warfare and assess how these 
levels may raise or fall through wartime adaptation.  
Military power has been a core theme of international affairs since some of 
the oldest and most renowned writings on politics.67 Modern thinkers continued to 
consider the broad field of military power, establishing a foundation and identifying 
opportunities for additional analysis.68 Since the mid-1980s, a handful of analysts 
pursued narrower scopes to concentrate more specifically on military effectiveness, 
delivering vital contributions to form a general foundation in the subfield.69 This 
concentration provided a more precise understanding of operational effectiveness,70 
as well as some initial criteria for its identification and measurement.71 Yet despite 
this increased attention, scholars have still concluded that a more coherent, 
cumulative literature was required for this critical subject.72 In particular, recent 
studies had indicated the importance of examining how operational outcome may be 
influenced by different variables while much remained unexplored and many 
questions unanswered.73 Thus, without additional progress, this scenario risked an 
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incomplete understanding of wartime performance and what is considered effective. 
It also provided a unique opportunity for new ideas. 
 This study’s concentration on operations and operational effectiveness will 
begin to address this omission. The unit of analysis is the operation, which may be 
considered “a series of interconnected battles resulting from a single prior plan.”74 
Operations are the ways in which strategic goals are translated into the tactical 
methods necessary for their attainment, aligning and linking tactics with strategy. 
Operations are sufficiently isolatable and form a distinct unit of analysis as they 
frequently (although not necessarily) occur within a campaign, “a series of one or 
more interconnected operations in a single theater.”75 A body of literature has 
developed to consider operations and what makes them more or less effective, 
although no agreement exists about what, exactly, is operational effectiveness.76 In 
this examination, then, the intermediate variable of operational effectiveness is 
considered the ability of soldiers and units in performing battlefield tasks through a 
series of missions to destroy adversary forces and achieve physical objectives as 
designated by their commanders. This perspective posits that effectiveness 
contributes to campaign outcome, while acknowledging that it may not decisively 
determine the outcome of an operation, campaign, or war. For example, during the 
1939–40 Winter War, Finland’s impressive battlefield skills against the Soviet 
Seventh Army failed to prevent defeat.77 In 1944, U.S. First Army in the Huertgen 
Forest displayed low operational effectiveness yet still managed to capture the 
forest.78 These instances reinforce how high or low effectiveness may not 
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necessarily result in a corresponding outcome of success or failure. However, it 
would be hard to argue that military forces past and present would not benefit from 
a more effective combat performance to reduce costs in lives, time, and resources. 
Determining what, exactly, this entails has been more complicated. 
 
Establishing a Foundation, Categories, and Measures 
This study’s definition of operational effectiveness draws from the rich scholarship 
regarding military power, and this project aims to build upon this general foundation 
across various fields of study. Emerging largely since the Second World War, 
modern sociology emphasized human motivation in battle, particularly individuals 
or small units.79 Political science discussed power, war, and military organizations, 
but regarding specific tenets of how changing performance may alter outcome, 
political science has been labelled “more a point of departure than a conclusive 
resolution.”80 Military history offered rich narratives and contributions, but without 
building a systemic framework or generalizable patterns for analysing military 
effectiveness and how it may be created. Finally, operational research considered 
new technologies, force structures, and resources, eventually growing into 
sophisticated mathematical modelling and computer simulations, but concentrating 
largely on resources and numbers caused this perspective “to measure military 
effectiveness almost exclusively in hard assets, neglecting the organizational and 
other forces that allow a military to use those assets productively.”81 This 
combination of faculties delivered new insights but still required more and more-
specific analyses to determine how effectiveness should be measured and outcomes 
may be changed.  
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In the 1980s a handful of scholars reintroduced human elements for 
analysing warfare and battlefield performance.82 Martin van Creveld’s 1982 
Fighting Power emphasized human skill in combat, particularly “the sum total of 
mental qualities that make armies fight.”83 By challenging assessments that relied 
solely on numbers of forces or equipment, Van Creveld's comparison of German 
and U.S. Army performance during the Second World War concluded that an 
army’s overall military power rested significantly on “mental, intellectual, and 
organizational foundations.”84 This assessment reflected an idea which would 
continue to grow in the security studies community: that an examination of wartime 
performance should include how people and resources are used together rather than 
considering only their quantity or technological capabilities. Although unexplored 
by Van Creveld, a logical conclusion from this analysis is an important opportunity 
regarding adaptation and success: for if military power relies on the way people 
apply their resources then it may be possible to change battlefield performance by 
altering some of these non-material variables.  
Incorporating this new theme, Allan Millet and Williamson Murray led some 
of the most comprehensive assessments of military effectiveness which delivered 
new tools and increased precision for evaluating performance.85 “The Effectiveness 
of Military Organizations” with Kenneth Watman assessed organizational elements 
in order to “determine precisely where and in what ways organizations have or have 
not been effective.”86 The authors emphasized institutional concepts and doctrines 
regarding how state resources converted into combat power. This perspective 
encouraged assessments of military power to include considerations about how 
states translate capabilities into battlefield realities—a key purpose of operations.87 
The three-volume Military Effectiveness more directly considered operations, with 
contributions by twenty-one authors that evaluated effectiveness from the tactical to 
strategic levels, delivering a vital framework for discussion and analysis.88 While 
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the 30-year-old text is a bit dated and suffered from a theoretical framework 
emphasizing distinct planning activities over other elements, as well as favouring 
description over rigorous critical analysis, the series still delivered an early attempt, 
systematically, to consider effectiveness from tactics to strategy.89 Military 
Effectiveness encourage more precise evaluation of military performance and 
provided the foundational analysis upon which many others built. 
Since 1990 additional scholarship delivered preliminary benchmarks for 
measuring changed effectiveness, although ultimately the field’s critical need 
remained unfulfilled.90 Eliot Cohen and John Gooch’s Military Misfortune signalled 
adaptation as a core tenet of battlefield performance, since failure to adapt could 
contribute to larger catastrophe.91 For Cohen and Gooch, this ability to respond to 
new and unexpected circumstances was vital because “every campaign presents 
some unforeseen challenge or circumstance” that requires a military to handle the 
ever-changing present.92 The authors identified dangers associated with the failure 
to adapt, and hailed successful changes93 which led them to conclude “the ability to 
adapt is probably most useful to any military organization and most characteristic of 
successful ones.”94 But since Cohen and Gooch focused on military misfortune and 
how failure to adapt may contribute, their analysis stopped short from delivering a 
precise or comprehensive analysis on how operational performance may be 
enhanced by tactical change. Others then identified more specific criteria for 
assessing operational effectiveness and its relationship with battlefield outcome. 
Stephen Biddle consistently emphasized the role of human skill in employing forces 
and weapons, particularly the lethal effects of modern firepower.95 After arguing in 
1996 that the Gulf War outcome depended on a unique skill imbalance combined 
with new technology,96 in 2004 Biddle introduced the nonmaterial variable of force 
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employment as an explanation for battlefield outcomes.97 Assessing operations to 
control territory through mid-to-high intensity combat, Biddle concluded that the 
centrally important criteria for determining battle outcome was “the doctrine and 
tactics by which forces are actually used in combat.”98 This perspective increased 
focus in 2007 when Biddle defined new criteria for influencing military outcomes 
by isolating the variable of skill in reducing vulnerability to firepower.99 By 
emphasizing doctrine, tactics, and skill as key measures for combat outcome, Biddle 
could identify a category of elements that influenced performance. Other analysis 
would need to address remaining questions about specific variables in relation to 
outcome, and to evaluate performance with a deeper consideration of opponents’ 
actions and environments.100  
 In 2007 Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley delivered a more structured 
analytical approach to military effectiveness with several authors contributing 
insights regarding the influence of global and internal pressures.101 Brooks 
supported Biddle by concluding that effectiveness and victory must be considered 
separately, and that “studying military effectiveness is vital if we are truly to 
understand” the phenomenon of war.102 Brooks conceded that a great deal remained 
unknown and deserved additional attention. She encouraged further analysis to 
include a greater understanding of the cases associated with military effectiveness 
and wartime performance.103 Caitlin Talmadge followed this call by delivering new 
indicators for assessing operational effectiveness and how wartime changes may 
contribute to battlefield success.104 Assessing the Iraq–Iran War (1980–88) and 
fighting between North and South Vietnam (1954–1975), Talmadge distinguished 
two sets of tasks for grading operational effectiveness in accordance with Biddle’s 
                                                                                                                
 97 Biddle, Military Power. 
 98 Biddle, Military Power, ix. 
 99 Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes,” 207-227. Biddle uses the term skill in 
accordance with the larger framework established by editors Brooks and Stanley, defined as “military 
personnel’s capabilities and motivation to perform essential tasks in preparing for and executing 
war.” It is isolated as one of the four attributes of military effectiveness along with integration, 
quality, and responsiveness. See Brooks and Stanley, 15; Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes,” 
220, footnote 2. 
 100 Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes,” 219. 
 101 Brooks and Stanley. 
 102 Brooks, Brooks and Stanley, 231-232. 
 103 Brooks, Brooks and Stanley, 231-233. 
 104 Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance”; Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army.  
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previous framework. She identified criteria across “basic tactics” and “complex 
operations” along with ratings of excellent, adequate, and poor.105 With these 
definitions and benchmarks, Talmadge provided a valuable framework in what 
manner forces may perform differently, how these may be identified, and how to 
measure if performance changes.106 A similar approach is used in this project for 
identifying observable battlefield events that may be categorized for measuring 
levels of operational effectiveness. It then uses this scale to identify changes in 
effectiveness during performance as compared across operations, forces, or time.  
 
Benchmarks to Identify and to Rate Operational Effectiveness 
Operational effectiveness can be measured in terms of three benchmarks of ability: 
basic skills, complex tactics, and sophisticated manoeuvre.107 A force displaying 
only basic skills may be assessed to possess low effectiveness. Complex tactics, 
which incorporate basic skills, would indicate intermediate effectiveness. 
Incorporating basics skills into complex actions and applying them in sophisticated 
manoeuvre would signal high effectiveness. This range of benchmark indicators was 
selected by incorporating criteria from other analyses of military affairs and 
tailoring it according to the categories expanded from Talmadge. The levels and 






                                                                                                                
 105 Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance,” 186; Talmadge, The Dictator’s 
Army, 7. 
 106 However, Talmadge’s scope of analysis is wider than this study’s. She examined state-
level threat environments and how they shaped organizational practices of authoritarian regimes and 
influenced military effectiveness. See Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army, 12-15. 
 107 These benchmarks emulate Talmadge’s structure and indicators from her 2015 
assessment of battlefield effectiveness, in accordance with Stephen Biddle’s outlook emphasizing 
vulnerability and firepower. This project’s research design is then supplemented by incorporating 
other criteria and is expanded with a third category to deliver increased precision. See Talmadge, The 
Dictator’s Army, 4-8. Additional criteria from Biddle, Military Power, and Pollack, Arabs at War.  
 108 Table cites Biddle, Military Power, 40-42; Mansoor, The GI Offensive, 3-6; Millett, 
Murray, Watman; Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness, Vol. 1-3; Pollack, Arabs at War, 4; 
Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army, 34; Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance,” 180-221. 
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Basic small unit 
engagements  
Ambush, static defence, 
orderly retreat, planned 
attack 
(Talmadge, Dictator’s, 34) 
 
Core combat skills  
-  Unit cohesion 
-  Disciplined tactical 
leadership  
-  Information management 
-  Technical skills 
-  Weapons handling 
-  Basic logistics  
-  Routine maintenance 
(Pollack, Arabs, 4)  
 
Maintain core combat skills 
and proficiency in battles 
Complex Actions 
Combined-arms; division-
level actions; defence in 
depth; fighting withdrawal; 
counterattack; offensive 
manoeuvre 
(Talmadge, Dictator’s, 34) 
 
-  Information shared 
accurately; shapes events 
 
-  Tactical leadership plans 
and conducts small unit 
actions within larger 
concept of operations 
 
-  Responsiveness; low-level 
initiative and high-level 
coordination across 
multiple parts of a force 
Breakthrough & 
exploitation operations  
Deep elastic defences 
(Biddle, Military Power 40-
42) 
 
-  Operations tailored to 
attack critical weakness 
with a strength 
 
-  Consistent tactical 
leadership in complex, 
fluid unit actions 
 
-  Tactical leadership and 
independent manoeuvre to 
support other elements 
 
Basic skills reflect whether forces can maintain minimum proficiency in core 
abilities throughout battles emphasizing small unit engagements. Indicators include 
ambushes, static defence, orderly retreats, and planned attacks.109 Minimum 
proficiency would include disciplined tactical leadership, simple information 
management, weapons handling, basic logistics, routine maintenance, and indicators 
of minimal unit cohesion.110 These abilities would most likely form during training 
and later serve as a wartime indicator of the minimal criteria for preventing failure 
since they may be considered prerequisites for modern ground warfare. Thus, they 
indicate only low effectiveness; alone the elements are unlikely to deliver 
operational success unless the adversary is grossly overmatched or woefully futile, 
while the absence of basic skills almost certainly will contribute to failure.111 
 Complex tactics refer to the fundamental elements for executing mid-to-high 
intensity combined-arms. They require unique skill across tactical units and among 
                                                                                                                
 109 Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army, 34. 
 110 Criteria with slight changes from Pollack, Arabs At War, 4. 
 111 Detrimental effects from poor basic skills displayed in Pollack, Arabs at War, 552-583.  
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higher commands to combine firepower and movement for desired outcomes. Also, 
they demand the ability to coordinate various units and weapons across time, space, 
and echelon. Complex tactics may be displayed through actions that synergistically 
apply weapons’ effects, division-level operations, defence in depth, a fighting 
withdrawal, counterattack offensive manoeuvre, as well as low-level initiative 
combined with high level coordination. Executing complex tactics almost certainly 
requires tactical leadership to plan and conduct small unit actions, and information 
shared with commanders to shape events. This combination of integration, 
responsiveness, low-level initiative and high-level coordination across multiple parts 
of a larger force indicate intermediate effectiveness.112  
 Sophisticated manoeuvre indicates high operational effectiveness since it 
requires significant skill and should deliver decisive advantages. Breakthrough and 
exploitation operations, deep elastic defences, consistent tactical leadership in 
complex and fluid unit actions, as well as tactical leadership that independently 
manoeuvres to support other elements may be considered sophisticated in that they 
often require units to interact in a complex or intricate process for delivering 
firepower and movement.113 Combining simultaneous and sequential movement of 
units through time and space in relation to an adversary entails significant difficulty. 
This ability almost certainly requires units to coordinate actions that create 
imbalances and tailor powerful attacks against enemy weaknesses. Sophisticated 
manoeuvre reflects high skill as it reduces vulnerability to firepower, enables 
exploitation of opportunities to induce casualties, and facilitates movement to attain 
objectives with sustainable rates of casualties.114 In mid-to-high intensity ground 
warfare it should deliver decisive advantages since skilfully applying technology 
and resources reduces vulnerability and alters an environment to create new 
opportunities, destroy enemy forces, and rapidly seize key terrain through a 
combination of assessment, action, and reaction. 
 Rating operational effectiveness in this manner reflects two presumptions. 
First, that wartime performance as measured by the level of effectiveness 
                                                                                                                
 112 Criteria and characterization of “complex operations” from Talmadge, The Dictator’s 
Army, 4-6, 34. 
 113 Criteria from Biddle, Military Power, 40-42. 
 114 Conception of skill uses criteria from Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes,” 207-208. 
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contributes to operational outcome. Second, that if a force’s wartime performance 
displays new criteria or shifts to a higher level of effectiveness then it may indicate 
adaptation. Therefore, changes in benchmarks or ratings provide indicators and 
measures for assessing how, when, and how much tactical adaptation can alter 
effectiveness and influence outcomes. So, then: what exactly is a success or failure? 
 
OPERATIONAL SUCCESS: EFFICIENTLY ATTAINING OBJECTIVES 
“Competence on the battlefield saves time and conserves lives.”115 The ability of 
combat units to attain operational goals while limiting its losses of lives and 
resources appears a fairly uncontroversial objective for military forces.116 Dangers 
from poor battlefield performance are numerous and costly.117 Yet despite this 
critical importance and enduring relevance, questions remain over what, exactly, is 
meant by success, and how, precisely, wartime tactical adaptation might contribute 
to it. Failure to address these questions may deliver an incomplete understanding 
about wartime performance and how it may be influenced. Therefore, one must ask 
what we consider a successful outcome. 
Throughout this analysis, operational success is considered a combination of 
goals, costs, and time, defined as: The ability to achieve assigned missions with 
acceptable expenditure of material and human resources according to planned 
times. This definition prioritizes achieving one’s operational goals as the most 
important criteria, followed closely by how well the forces performed in their 
pursuit as measured by costs and time. To evaluate success, first it will be asked: 
Did units achieve their primary operational objectives? And second: How efficiently 
did they perform? 
 Clearly, this project’s definitions for operational success and operational 
effectiveness face a common, significant challenge: how to define criteria and to 
measure actions that occur relative to an adversary and also one’s own goals, 
                                                                                                                
 115 John H. Cushman, “Challenge and Response at the Operational and Tactical Levels, 
1914–1945,” in Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness Vol. 3, 322. 
 116 As summarized after twenty-one experts evaluated military effectiveness from 1914–
1945: “first-rate operational and tactical performance is a virtue to be sought by those responsible for 
military forces.” Cushman, 322. 
 117 Cohen and Gooch. See also Pollack’s critique of “consistent and crippling” failures in 
tactical leadership, information management, weapons handling, and maintenance. Pollack, Arabs at 
War, 4-10, 574, 582. 
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timetables, and conceptualizations about what costs are reasonable or not. This 
requirement of a relative and subjective comparison means that most definitions 
tend to lose their capacity for universal applicability. Yet it would seem incomplete 
to ignore an adversary, or one’s own objectives, when assessing combat 
performance. Thus, the challenges associated with measuring something relative to 
an adversary or one’s own criteria appear to be a necessary burden when striving for 
analytical accuracy. Therefore, operational success requires this measure of 
efficiency for considering the objectives achieved, how skilfully they are attained, 
and at what cost. This perspective considers the way a military force uses its 
resources in pursuit of wartime goals as an essential element for assessing success, 
as long as forces are not grossly mismatched.118 In this view, executing the most 
appropriate methods for forces to attain goals quickly while limiting costs is vital; 
finding these methods may require changes when battlefield realities fail to meet 
expectations. Thus, the nature of warfare as a dynamic clash between adversaries 
seems to require an analysis of operational success to consider goals, efficiency, and 
effectiveness. A force displaying high effectiveness should attain objectives with 
fewer losses and at a faster rate than a force with lower abilities, increasing the 
likelihood of success. But intuition and assumptions are not the same a critical 
evaluation. Next these claims must be tested. 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND CASE STUDIES 
The next chapter presents hypotheses and the following chapters test them through 
seven case studies of operations in Burma and India from 1942–45. Clearly, this 
limited number of cases and evidence cannot deliver a comprehensive theory about 
wartime change with universal applicability. Rather, findings should suggest several 
general conclusions about wartime tactical adaptation and its relationship with 
operational performance and outcome. To ignore these and what they suggest may 
invite unnecessary risks or costs. The subsequent implications may shape how 
adaptation should be considered, how it may be tailored, and the value in using 
                                                                                                                
 118 Perspective echoes assumptions in Martin van Creveld's work about intrinsic qualities of 
fighting power and measuring effectiveness, as well as Stephen Biddle’s examinations about skilful 
implementation of forces to avoid attrition while attaining objectives. See Van Creveld; Biddle, 
Military Power; Biddle, “Explaining Military Outcomes.” 
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effectiveness to evaluate changes during warfare. These ideas are explored through 
the following chapters. Chapter Two presents this study’s three hypotheses and their 
development by drawing on core themes about military adaptation and broader 
security studies. Then, Chapters Three through Nine examine various British units 
fighting elements of the Imperial Japanese Army. Finally, Chapter Ten delivers 
some general principles about adaptation and their broader relevance for academic 
and policy research.  
Within the main body of case studies, seven operations are examined, listed 
in greater detail below. These cases are relevant and appropriate for this project’s 
research objective since they address core elements of wartime tactical adaptation 
and reflect central themes on the subject. Also, the cases possess several advantages 
for focused, structured comparative analysis. First, they present diverse values of 
tactical adaptation that should reveal distinct lessons about causality. Second, there 
are different results across the cases, from clear success to clear failure. Third, 
sufficient records and source materials exist to provide detailed information and 
deliver data-richness. Fourth, with variations across the independent and dependent 
variables, some cases provide examples where outcomes differ from what may be 
expected. Fifth, the cases are suited for controlled comparisons since they have 
similar characteristics in technology, ground-based tactics, size of forces, nature of 
objectives, and the cases all occurred within five years of each other. Finally, the 
cases share overlapping adversaries to provide useful comparisons.  
 
Case Study 1 – Imperial Japanese Army Invades Burma, 1942. If wartime 
tactical adaptation enables operational success or prevents failure, then the failure to 
adapt by Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Fifteenth Army attacking into Burma 
against the British Burma Army should result in operational failure. 
 
Case Study 2 – First Arakan Offensive, September 1942 to May 1943. If 
wartime tactical adaptation enables operational success or prevents failure, then the 
failure to adapt by 14th Indian Division should result in operational failure when 
attacking Japanese defenders from the 213th Regiment in the Arakan peninsula. 
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Case Study 3 – Second Arakan Encounter, December 1943 to March 1944. If 
wartime tactical adaptation enables operational success or prevents failure, then 
Indian Army tactical adaptation should result in XV Corps operational success 
against IJA Twenty Eighth Army in northwest Burma in the Arakan peninsula. 
 
Case Study 4 – Long Range Penetration Groups (LRPG), 1943. If wartime 
tactical adaptation enables operational success or prevents failure, then tactical 
adaptation by LRPG 77th Indian Brigade should result in operational success during 
Operation LONGCLOTH against IJA 18th Division in northern Burma. 
 
Case Study 5 – LRPG Special Force, 1944. If wartime tactical adaptation enables 
operational success or prevents failure, then tactical adaptation by Special Force (3rd 
Indian Division LRPG) should result in operational success during Operation 
THURSDAY against IJA 18th Division near Indaw. 
 
Case Study 6 – Imphal, March to July 1944. If wartime tactical adaptation 
enables operational success or prevents failure, then tactical adaptation by British 
Fourteenth Army should result in IV Corps operational success against IJA Fifteenth 
Army at Imphal in eastern India and northwest Burma. 
 
Case Study 7 – Breakout to Meiktila, December 1944 to March 1945. If wartime 
tactical adaptation enables operational success or prevents failure, then tactical 
adaptation by British Fourteenth Army should result in operational success as it 
fought IJA Burma Area Army across the Irrawaddy River and down central Burma 
to Meiktila city.  
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Chapter 2 
Hypotheses and Testing Adaptation 
The U.S. Army asserts that “the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly 
wins.”1 To which this examination responds: How do we know? It may be easy to 
assume adaptation’s importance since both counterinsurgency doctrine2 and 
manoeuvre warfare tenets3 prescribe adaptability as a core virtue. Comparably, the 
dangers of its omission appear numerous and severe. This risk endures perhaps most 
vividly in themes of the First World War that portray military leaders as unwilling to 
learn from their continued mistakes, therefore repeatedly sending thousands to die 
because they failed to understand how warfare had changed and no longer followed 
their deeply-held beliefs.4 
 Yet an unquestioning acceptance of claims that hail adaptation as essential 
also entails risks. At a minimum, it risks incomplete knowledge or misguided 
prescriptions without further refinement through testing and analysis. More 
dangerously, it risks lives and resources in combat. When Chinese forces crossed the 
Yalu River into North Korea during 1950, shocked U.S. X Corps forces suddenly 
had to fight toward the east coast. But rather than alter methods against the 
unexpected adversary, X Corps recovered and retreated by using established 
methods, techniques, and procedures. In this instance, disciplined tactics and an 
unwillingness to change almost certainly were essential to prevent disaster. On the 
opposite side of the peninsula, Eighth Army collapsed.5 This example indicates one 
of this project’s themes: that adaptation’s relationship with outcome is more 
complex than at first glance. Absolute statements may misrepresent what tactical 
                                                                                                                
 1 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department 
of the Army, 15 December 2006), p. x. 
 2 “You’ve got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive.” General Peter J. 
Schoomaker, USA, 2004, quoted in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, ix. 
 3 NATO joint doctrine cites the Alliance posture as structuring itself “for the most likely 
operations with the agility to adapt to the most demanding.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine (United Kingdom, December 2010), p. 2-
10. See also U.S. Army directive: “doctrine must be definitive enough to guide specific operations, 
yet remain adaptable enough to address diverse and varied situations worldwide.” FM 100-5 
Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, June 1993), p. 1-1. 
 4 Robert Foley called this viewpoint an “enduring and widespread” myth of the First World 
War. Robert T. Foley, “Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes? Learning in the British and German 
Armies During the Great War,” International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (2014), p. 279. 
 5 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War 
(New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 165-196. 
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adaptation can or cannot deliver. To explore these ideas, this chapter considers 
themes about tactical adaptation and presents three hypotheses for their evaluation. 
 The hypotheses used throughout this project that are guided by two 
questions. First, under what conditions is wartime tactical adaptation more or less 
effective at changing operational performance? Second, how might different types 
of adaptation effect operational outcome? Drawing from studies on wartime 
adaptation, military innovation, and organization learning, this chapter explores 
elements of tactical adaptation regarding information mechanisms, adaptation type, 
and the nature of change. From these themes, the hypotheses will enable an 
evaluation of what conditions and types of tactical adaptation are more likely to 
deliver operational success. In the following chapters, these hypotheses will be 
tested across the case studies with an emphasis on the hypotheses most relevant and 
appropriate for each case, since not every case study can comprehensively address 
all the categories. 
 Three hypotheses will test the themes used in this project and discussed throughout 
the rest of this chapter. Hypothesis 1 (H1) considers information mechanisms, movement, 
direction, and dissemination. H1 states: “Tactical adaptation captured and disseminated 
through a centralized vertical mechanism is more likely to result in operational success than 
when shared across decentralized horizontal networks.” Hypothesis 2 (H2) considers 
adaptation type, specifically anticipation compared with improvisation. H2 states: “Tactical 
adaptation based on anticipation will outperform tactical adaptation based on improvisation 
in delivering operational success.” Hypothesis 3 (H3) considers the nature of change during 
tactical adaptation by comparing human skill with technology. H3 states: “Tactical 
adaptation based on new training or unit reconfiguration, rather than new or modified 
equipment, is more likely to result in operational success.” 
 As measured by observable analysis in the case studies, findings will be 
rated on a five-part scale: confirm, support, neutral, challenge, or contradict. 
Admittedly, these terms and their use will be quite subjective, and throughout this 
examination the hypotheses will be considered weak in that their exploration may 
deliver only weak predictive effects.6 Findings are unlikely to deliver an 
unequivocal forecast or an exclusive prediction, rendering the hypotheses with only 
                                                                                                                
 6 Criteria of strong tests versus weak tests from Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for 
Students of Political Science (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 31-32. 
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moderate certainty and uniqueness of prediction. However, examining these themes 
about types and conditions of adaptation as they relate to operational performance 
and outcome should deliver new evidence to join existing information and form 
probabilistic predictions regarding these phenomena. Additionally, findings should 
possess practical relevance regarding the employment and sustainment of forces.  
 
H1: INFORMATION MECHANISMS 
Over four hours in 1967 Israel destroyed a paralyzed Egyptian Air Force.7 The 
opening attacks of the Six Day War caught Egyptian pilots and senior commanders 
completely by surprise. The air commander, stuck in a transport plane, was unable 
to deliver orders. In the absence of formal directives, Egyptian defenders failed to 
take emergency procedures, and many refused basic defensive precautions.8 For 
several hours, air force leadership did not reveal that the force was destroyed; the 
army would not know until the next day. After Israeli ground attacks shattered 
Egyptian army forces through initiative, skill, and improvisation, the 1967 conflict 
appeared to offer a clear warning against centralized formal authority as it could 
hamper information movement, block solutions to immediate and obvious combat 
threats, and fail to disseminate essential information in a dynamic combat 
environment. If these mechanisms failed in such a scenario, then how could they 
provide any success in the longer term?  
 Yet the reality may be more complex, and failed execution may not always 
indicate a flawed concept. Upon closer examination, centralized, vertical 
mechanisms may possess unique virtues in information storage, integration, and 
recall, to capture and to disseminate lessons across organizations. These issues 
reflect a larger tension regarding how a military should design and implement 
mechanisms for information movement to enable improved combat performance. 
Implications would shape training, organizational priorities, resources, and what 
traits are most desired in personnel like initiative, discipline, accountability, 
authority, and obligation. 
                                                                                                                
 7 Paragraph relies on Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 62-70. 
 8 Pollack, 63.  
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 H1 predicts an answer to the research questions:  What type of information 
mechanisms are most effective for translating tactical adaption into operational 
success? How do different types of information movement, direction, and 
dissemination shape the quality of tactical adaptations and their impact on 
operational outcome? As a result, H1 states: “Tactical adaptation captured and 
disseminated through a centralized vertical mechanism is more likely to result in 
operational success than when shared across decentralized horizontal networks.” 
Testing H1 will evaluate how information mechanisms explain the relationship 
between wartime tactical adaptation and operational success. 
 H1 considers primarily how military organizations share solutions to current 
and future problems. H1 posits that a unique ability for new ideas to be captured, 
evaluated, retained, disseminated, and recalled in future scenarios all combine in 
centralized vertical mechanisms to enable superior tactical adaptation than 
decentralized horizontal networks. This information storage and recall enables 
diverse ideas to be compared and applied using formal authority across a wide 
breadth for high impact. In reality, ground warfare likely entails a combination of 
the two mechanisms. However, organizations appear to favour or prioritize one type 
over the other, and it is possible to isolate and to consider their individual merits, 
risks, and costs. The simple table below, on the next page, indicates some general 
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Figure 2.1: Information Mechanisms and Network Characteristics 




DIRECTION Information moves up: 
collected, stored, evaluated 
above the combat unit.  
Information moves across: within or 
across self-contained combat units. 
LOCATION OR 
UNIT OF  
ANALYSIS 
-   Above the division  
(1914–1990) 
-   Above the brigade  
(1991–Present) 
-   Within or across divisions  
(1914–1990) 
-   Within or across brigades  
(1991–Present) 
NATURE OF  
COLLECTION 
AND SHARING 
Formal, upward:  
-   Official reports with 
systematic  
assessment to higher 
authority 
Informal, across: 
-   Ad-hoc channels; personal 
networks 
-   Official or unofficial reports with 
unsystematic assessments to 
various audiences 
DISSEMINATION Broad; general application 
of ideas and guidance 
across units 
Specific; delivered in accordance 
with applicability or to select units 
DISTRIBUTION Directed by authority; 
command issues 
authoritative directives or 
doctrine 




Centralized Vertical Information Mechanisms 
H1 relies on propositions that centralized control delivers superior quality of ideas 
with greater impact. This combination of more-appropriate solutions and wider 
relevance are due to a central mechanism’s capacity for study coupled with authority 
for implementation. Centralized vertical mechanisms may provide superior 
information storage, vetting, and recall for translating new tactics into larger 
operational significance. This overall capacity should enable adaptations that are a 
higher quality due to their evaluation and vetting, and more significant since they 
may be recalled and widely disseminated. H1 posits that adaptation shared through 
centralized vertical mechanisms will make more significant changes to operational 
effectiveness in nature and breadth than decentralized horizontal mechanisms. 
 Higher impact may be possible due to authoritative endorsement. In his 
assessment of wartime innovation, Stephen Peter Rosen observed that the “more 
hierarchical and centralized the organization, the greater the impact of the 
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innovation.”9 Once an organization has assembled a clear picture of a need then a 
central organization can implement it with the quickness necessary for impact.10 By 
exploring British attempts to incorporate tanks during the First World War, Rosen 
argued that a delayed implementation was caused by organizational shortcomings in 
defining an appropriate measure of effectiveness, failure to use the available 
information to evaluate ideas, and “the absence of tight central controls to ensure 
implementation.”11 For Rosen, a centralized organization can implement innovations 
faster than a looser organization which lets ideas circulate and fails to direct a 
solution toward its highest need.12 
 Michael Doubler’s assessment of German and Soviet army learning 
indicated a high capability to overcome more significant challenges and to deliver 
substantial impact on combat effectiveness. In contrast, decentralized adaptations 
appeared most effective when only incremental change was required.13 For Doubler, 
the higher impact of a centralized mechanism resulted from its superior perspective 
and organizational power for addressing larger problem followed by more thorough 
dissemination. A “centralized and formal” technique uniquely allowed for study, 
dissemination, and implementation of new ideas,14 with advantages for addressing 
larger challenges often beyond the capacity of smaller combat units to overcome. 
The Soviet General Staff led major change by enabling a new way of fighting, 
possible largely due to its central authority of which there was no comparable 
attempt by the U.S. army.15 The formal body gathered, studied, and analysed lessons 
resulting in “a series of directives, regulations, and instructions to units on better 
ways to conduct operations.”16 Combined with new units and equipment, the Soviets 
experimented and transformed throughout 1943 and issued new directives in 1944 
that “formed a comprehensive view of deep operations” and delivered devastating 
offensives against Germany and Japan.17 
                                                                                                                
 9 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 38-39. 
 10 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 39. 
 11 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 128. 
 12 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 39. 
 13 Michael D. Doubler, Closing With The Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 
1944–1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1994), p. 281, 274. 
 14 Doubler, 278. 
 15 Doubler, 279. 
 16 Doubler, 276. 
 17 Doubler, 277. 
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 A high quality of improvements delivered through central collection, 
storage, evaluation and dissemination was also displayed by the German army. After 
invading Poland the German army high command (OKH)18 conducted robust 
analysis and altered tactics which enabled them to be “devastating on the 
battlefield.”19 Large-scale collection of after-action reports suggested weaknesses in 
tactical combined-arms coordination and small-unit leadership, leading OKH to 
create a new training program implemented over six months.20 The retraining, 
reorganizing, and reequipping increased skills across various active and reserve 
units, and overcame lingering resistance to the value of mechanization and armour.21 
OKH established monthly evaluation reports for division and corps commanders,22 
and the German army’s performance afterwards reflected a larger institutional 
emphasis on large-scale collection, analysis, and dissemination through centralized 
vertical mechanisms.23 The OKH-led improvements have been hailed as an 
exemplar of professionalism that directly contributed to subsequent victories.24 
Furthermore, the internal assessments and dissemination proved “central to the 
remarkable early triumphs” of the German army, allowing it “progressively to 
enhance its combat capabilities” by refining and improving25 through a larger 
commitment to centralized assessment, experimentation, institutional 
dissemination.26 This commitment continued after the operations in France revealed 
how armour formations required more infantry support, causing OKH to reorganize 
panzer formations which improved combined-arms.27 German ground forces 
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continued to employ formal, centralized processes to adapt and increase proficiency 
which gradually shifted to overcoming setbacks as the war progressed. New ideas 
often originated in tactical units, but it was the Ostheer, Heer, or OKH, that could 
assemble ideas, evaluate their appropriateness, consider campaign-level challenges, 
and then disseminate lessons with new training to implement them across forces.28 
 Eastern Front fighting required the German army’s most significant 
adaptations as combat challenges and the environment “rendered existing doctrine 
inadequate.”29 New defensive doctrine represented the Heer’s “most significant 
change” as distances required forces to abandon defence in depth for linear 
defences.30 The altered procedures to extend defenders beyond strongpoints coupled 
with immediate counterattacks led the Heer to create massed defensive fire plans, 
with challenges identified and solutions disseminated through revised training 
directives.31 New anti-tank doctrine, combined with accelerated tank modifications 
and development, delivered vital capabilities for countering Soviet armour.32 
Eventually, the 1942 Soviet counterattacks ground to a halt against German 
defenders who had “quickly improved its defensive and winter warfare capabilities” 
through experimentation and “rapid dissemination of after-action reports.”33  
 By 1944 the Heer had become “quite different in organization, tactics, 
equipment, training, and character”34 due to its ability to examine combat 
performance and disseminate lessons. From 1943–44 Heer adaptation “became 
more systematic and widespread” which transformed the army’s character and 
improved combat power.35 Revised defensive doctrine included swamp and forest 
fighting, and increasingly relied on fortifications and linear defence.36 Gradually the 
army had to substitute firepower for its lost mobility due to dwindling resources, 
notably in North Africa and in Western Europe. Manoeuvre warfare became “a 
luxury the Heer could no longer afford,” so by 1944 the army had altered combat 
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purposes to rely on firepower, static fortifications, and counterattacks.37 Ultimately, 
of course, Germany “found itself increasingly outnumbered and outgunned.”38 But 
the army’s adaptability consistently addressed shortcomings in combat performance 
with significant results. 
 These examples of German and Soviet learning reflect how an increased 
degree of centralization may enable greater and more efficient exploitation of core 
competencies. In a military force, these core acts would include refining or 
modifying tactics, techniques, or procedures.39 According to this logic, a military 
organization using a centralized vertical information mechanism can effectively 
prioritize its desired competencies and then allocate resources appropriate for their 
improvement. Additionally, the authority to ensure compliance and the longevity to 
sustain these actions over a longer period may support enduring solutions. Finally, 
focusing on overall organizational needs may prove more effective at addressing 
larger challenges, while avoiding changes based on local conditions that may favour 
short-term solutions—a critique of other information mechanisms.40 
 
Decentralized Horizontal Information Mechanisms 
Proponents of decentralized horizontal networks may hail increased creativity, 
reduced barriers to sharing, and quicker information movement for enhanced 
adaptation and broader learning. Vitally, advocates of a decentralized, informal 
learning process can cite examples of its benefits across various contexts to include 
attrition in the First World War, combined-arms in the second, and modern-era 
counterinsurgency. Yet this process also entails risks, notably organizational 
forgetting, a limited impact, and low-quality solutions. 
 Uniquely appropriate solutions to unfolding tactical realities were displayed 
in Robert Foley’s assessment of First World War German army innovation.41 
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Argued to represent a new form of horizontal innovation, German changes depended 
on “spreading knowledge between units rather than up and down the chain of 
command.”42 This movement reflected how “new, informal doctrine is formed by 
units learning from one another, rather than from centrally produced doctrine.”43 
While Foley discussed how the German army also relied on formal learning 
processes,44 he argued that forces “used the experiences of other units to change in 
the way in which it fought and consequently instituted what amounted to radically 
different doctrine in the course of battle.”45 This process resulted in “continuous 
transformation,” and as early as November 1916 the German model proved essential 
for quickly producing new tactics and technologies while fighting a “constantly 
changing enemy threat.”46 
 Separately, authors hailed a U.S. approach that relied on decentralized and 
informal processes. Michael Doubler praised an American “informal approach” 
during the Normandy Campaign to combine arms effectively for “its highest levels 
of performance and capabilities.”47 Doubler concluded that this approach, which 
specifically “eschewed centralized control,” was a key reason for larger success 
because “it proved itself capable of quickly adapting to new and sometimes 
unexpected circumstances.”48 As combat revealed shortcomings, American forces 
“implemented an unusual variety of tactical and technical innovations” that 
improved performance through ideas that “sprang from all units and ranks and 
spread throughout the commands in theater.”49 Citing revised air–ground battle 
teams, new techniques for river crossings and urban warfare, bunker tactics, and 
hedgerow fighting, Doubler concluded that the decentralized technique displayed 
how armies require and can deliver “the ability to change quickly and to adapt their 
combat techniques in order to win.”50 Russell Hart argued that a U.S. ability to learn 
quickly and to adapt using an “informal, decentralized learning process” was vital 
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for success.51 Hart cited improved firepower, mobility, combined-arms warfare, and 
air–ground operations between the North Africa and the Normandy campaigns as 
indicating an ability to learn that was “most important” for increasing capabilities.52 
Bottom-up innovation enabled the army to overcome difficulties and to improve 
combat performance, and this learning “was central to both the triumph of U.S. arms 
and to Allied victory in Normandy.”53 
 Others examined British Army performance and its approach to learning and 
doctrine as it related to wartime change during the Second World War. Since the 
early 2000s, multiple authors determined that the British Army displayed wartime 
learning but disagreed about the scale or quality of change. Several concluded that 
the army successfully employed a flexible, problem-solving approach that improved 
effectiveness and reduced costs, indicating how a looser, decentralized approach can 
exploit reduced barriers to change both quickly and creatively in some situations.  
 In his 2000 analysis of British doctrine and training, David French argued 
that the army employed a loose framework with flexibility that enabled it to 
overcome pre-invasion shortcomings and to develop highly effective tactics and 
operations. This ability was particularly impressive and important since, despite 
time and opportunities to learn before the Normandy invasion, the British Army had 
failed to create or to impose throughout the force an appropriate doctrine for 
fighting in Northwest Europe.54 This shortcoming produced numerous initial costly 
setbacks which required forces to learn while reacting during combat. For French, 
the shortcomings were twofold: the army possessed neither a universal interpretation 
of doctrine nor a single guiding force to impose a uniform understanding of doctrine 
had it existed. Thus it was unclear what should be done or, if known, how to 
incorporate the solutions. Combat quickly revealed deficiencies in combined-arms 
tactics but structural challenges within the army’s approach to doctrine meant that 
even when problems were analysed and lessons identified there remained a practical 
inability to impose prescriptive action. This problem was solved, according to 
French, by the leadership of General Montgomery and his approach to doctrine as it 
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related to performance. As 21st Army Group incorporated Montgomery’s general 
framework for fighting and commanders understood expectations, the force created 
a flexible communication system for acting within that concept. Then the army 
improved training to meet those standards which also enabled tactical commanders 
to make decisions within the larger doctrinal framework. As a result, the British 
Army improved combat capabilities and employed weaponry both efficiently and 
effectively. By incorporating a loose structure of doctrinal understanding 
implemented by a strong commander and inculcated through new training, “by 
1943–5, the British had become highly competent in many aspects of waging war at 
the tactical and operational level.”55 
 Canadian learning also indicated how a flexible approach to doctrine and 
change could improve capabilities and performance, displayed through actions 
before invading Northwest Europe and during the Normandy Campaign. Writing in 
2003, Terry Copp argued that past analyses of Canadian performance continued to 
rely on a faulty premise that underrated combat ability and contribution to victory.56 
Rather, Canadians played a key role among Allied soldiers that employed “flexible 
and innovative operational and tactical solutions to the challenges confronting 
them.”57 The virtues of these tenets and the willingness to improve could be seen as 
early as 1941, when Calgary Highlanders initiated battle drills and created combat-
simulation training areas, inspiring similar schools and training in England and 
Canada. By 1944, additional training and reorganized infantry battalions had 
evolved to fight using a bite-and-hold concept, providing a shared understanding of 
what should be accomplished, although the specific tenets remained uncodified. 
This approach reflected how Canadian forces lacked a coherent tactical doctrine, 
requiring setbacks to be addressed by a problem-solving approach that proved “an 
effective method of dealing with the enemy.”58  Robert Engen supported this 
finding, concluding in 2009 that Canadian tactics revealed how infantry “were 
capable of flexible responses to the problems presented on the battlefield.”59 This 
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ability was displayed during night attacks that required small-unit initiative; patrols 
and raids; and how forces applied fire-and-movement within the bite-and-hold 
concept.60 For Engen, these examples of tactical change were particularly 
impressive when considering how Canadian doctrine limited the overall capacities 
of small-unit leaders. Ultimately, he concluded that “it seems doubtful that 
Canadians could have done much better than they did.”61  
 John Buckley argued that British Army forces learned fast and well with “a 
high degree of success” in Northwest Europe.62 The army’s performance 
demonstrated “a good deal about its flexibility, adaptability and its modern attitude 
to warfare,” with Buckley’s 2010 and 2013 works directly challenging arguments 
that the force failed to grasp modern warfare.63 Rather, the British Army’s flexible 
attitude towards doctrine enabled a unique and effective problem-solving approach 
that encouraged units to create new solutions, to impose them throughout the force, 
and to adapt according to new combat conditions. The most important changes 
addressed combined-arms coordination against German defences, when pre-invasion 
assumptions proved false. Vital was developing new armour-infantry and infantry-
artillery tactics against dug-in German defenders who, it was assumed incorrectly, 
would retreat to terrain more favourable for manoeuvre. The result was that, by late 
August 1944, “officer and NCOs had recast a range of tactical doctrines, and senior 
commanders had modified their operational methods to cope with the German 
strategy of digging in and slugging it out.”64  
 This flexible approach allowed the British Army to change when pre-
invasion expectations proved wrong. Unlike the Germans, who adhered to standard 
processes even when they proved ineffective and suffered disproportionate 
casualties, 21st Army Group avoided being stuck within a system when combat 
revealed how fundamental concepts were flawed.65 Three interrelated challenges 
faced frontline units during the first days of the invasion: that lessons based on the 
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Mediterranean and North Africa were inappropriate for Northwest Europe; the 
terrain and defenders were different than anticipated; and combat units had to 
address problems while fighting skilled German defenders. Key to addressing these 
challenges was a perspective that doctrine served as a starting point for refinement 
to fit circumstances, interpreted through “a culture of doctrinal flexibility, bordering 
a times on indiscipline.”66 Granted, this approach had trade-offs and limitations; 
British units lacked interchangeability, and even when adaptations occurred the 
army’s “laissez-faire attitude to the imposition of doctrine had also resulted in an 
uneven adoption of suitable fighting techniques.”67 However, overall, this flexible 
and problem-solving approach reaped large benefits as it allowed forces to assess 
problems quickly, to change fast, and to develop practical solutions for many of the 
tactical problems faced in a process “both top-down and bottom-up.”68  
 Benefits of this style were displayed when adapting combined-arms 
cooperation, where “British armoured forces actually demonstrated considerable 
flexibility and adaptability” and produced impressive results both quickly and 
efficiently.69 German defenders in dense, compartmented terrain caused many 
problems and placed a premium on infantry-armour cooperation. Simply locating 
defenders proved quite difficult and the terrain slowed tempo, limited options, and 
rendered many methods inappropriate. Division commanders responded by 
combining infantry and armour brigades into mixed forces with two infantry 
battalions and two armour regiments, a change adopted by Eighth Corps as well as 
Canadian and Polish units. To maintain tactical speed when joined by slower-paced 
infantry, troops started to ride tanks and then commanders altered self-propelled 
tracked artillery for use as armoured personnel carriers. For attacking against 
prepared defences, the sequential method advocated by Eighth Army was “found 
wanting in close terrain,” as the procession of tanks, infantry, tanks, and artillery 
failed to reveal entrenched defenders, causing attackers to move too deep and into 
easy encirclement.70 The answer was close coordination of infantry and armour 
during the assault, a new tactic employed by several brigades in late June and July, 
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and “from late July onwards, armoured forces had settled on tactical approaches that 
served them best.”71 Thus, by early August, British forces developed and applied 
new methods and approaches, “even if unevenly in place across the army.”72 
Uniquely, these achievements occurred without a single, standard doctrine 
rigorously enforced, relying instead on a culture of problem-solving that allowed 
commanders to create working solutions when faced with problems—and to do so 
“more immediately than if a rigorous conformity to official methods had been 
endemic.”73 The resulting solutions were transmitted both formally and informally,  
particularly for low-level tactical issues. Overall, British Army units “were quite 
able to adapt, and problems were largely mitigated as the campaign unfolded.”74  
 Supporting this favourable assessment, in 2015 Charles Forrester argued that 
the British Army successfully created a shared understanding of concepts and 
expectations throughout a cadre of commanders uniquely appropriate for this 
approach. This process delivered advantages over German defenders and produced 
broader changes that resulted in a uniform doctrine of concepts and approaches by 
late 1944 that were highly effective.75 For Forrester, a key difference existed 
between developing shared concepts and prescribing uniform tactics. He argued that 
studies emphasizing specific tactics and methods have misunderstood the British 
Army’s relationship with doctrine, how it enabled effectives, and how it contributed 
to success. Rather, in Forrester’s interpretation, a relatively undisciplined regard for 
doctrine was essential to develop commanders with problem-solving approaches to 
battlefield challenges, critical for addressing new and unexpected combat realities. 
Vitally, this loose regard for common practices allowed units to quickly disregard 
tactics from North Africa that proved inappropriate in Northeast Europe. It also 
enabled 21st Army Group to implement a command structure and to select 
commanders that would use a problem-solving approach within a wider, rigid 
framework of expectations.76 Within this non-negotiable framework, leaders—
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usually at the division—would decide how to fight and they could find their own 
answers to battlefield challenges. Then they could share the solutions using both 
formal and informal communication systems. This doctrine functioned well by 
encouraging quick-thinking within the goals of the master plan, enabled by having 
the appropriate personnel.77 The key was not to impose uniform tactics throughout 
the force, but to impose uniform understanding about expectations and processes for 
making decisions within a shared framework about intentions and aims.78 Thus, by 
late 1944, this style of “reciprocal command” allowed 21st Army Group to move 
“from a situation of doctrinal ‘anarchy’ to one of doctrinal uniformity.”79 
 Regarding counterinsurgency operations, John Nagl’s assessment of efforts 
in Malaya and Vietnam cited informal, decentralized information movement as vital 
for driving innovation with superior ideas and broad impact. Evaluating British and 
U.S. forces, Nagl argued that local solutions were key criteria for militaries to be 
considered learning institutions.80 Information movement across informal networks 
without the interference of higher or official authority delivered a core strength of 
British army operations in Malaya and uniquely enabled adaptation. As a result, 
“informally developed ‘doctrine’ was disseminated by word of mouth and through 
unofficial writing of participants in campaigns.”81 This led to a culture that “not just 
encouraged but actively expected innovation.”82 In contrast, U.S. Army efforts in 
Vietnam failed to overcome a predisposition for conventional, attrition-based 
doctrine, due to formal authorities actively discouraging innovation among 
subordinates.83 In this perspective, the formal information mechanism directly 
undermined adaptation by failing to evaluate new ideas, blocking the transmission 
of superior ones, and authoritatively disseminating inappropriate solutions for the 
challenges faced. 
 Yet decentralized mechanisms risk missed opportunities for larger learning, 
as well as losing what solutions they do create. Some have criticized the British 
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Army approach, concluding that the costs and deficiencies warrant a more critical 
assessment regarding wartime performance and measuring effectiveness. Writing in 
2000, Timothy Harrison Place considered doctrine and training, concluding that the 
British Army’s approach produced a larger resistance to adapting even when new 
ideas emerged. Place argued that the British Army “failed to establish and enforce a 
coherent and effective tactical doctrine,” failed to learn or to adapt, and found 
training insufficient and inappropriate for battlefield realities.84 This shortcoming 
arose from deeper structural shortcomings in the army: leadership struggled to learn 
lessons even after revealed through combat, and any lessons they identified could 
not be imposed throughout the force due insufficient mechanisms for implementing 
broader change. These problems were not caused by only a few commanders; rather, 
they resulted from an organizational culture that “excelled at planning for 
foreseeable eventualities” but struggled against the unexpected.85 The results were 
costly, “unpredictable, minor events on the ground that collectively deprived British 
troops of many a victory in Normandy.”86 Place notes the “enterprise and initiative 
demonstrated by thousands of British soldiers,” but concludes that these qualities 
emerged “despite, rather than because of, the training system.”87  
 Others, also critical, concluded that British Army adaptation tended to occur 
“on a unit-by-unit basis based on individual units’ experiences” which ultimately 
failed to deliver larger change.88 One author concluded that British forces adapted 
slowly, with less focus, and “ultimately proved less effective.”89 For example, 
British failure to retain and spread new counter-mortar groups illuminated “the 
army’s slowness in learning from experience” along with challenges associated with 
informal decentralized learning networks.90 After forces in North Africa endured 
high casualties due to German mortars, units organized new counter-mortar groups 
that “proved effective in the Mediterranean and saved many lives.”91 The new 
organization executed a new mission under new conditions and reduced casualties in 
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accomplishing objectives—a clear definition of increased effectiveness. However, 
once withdrawn from theatre the units disbanded their counter-mortar teams and the 
army failed to institutionalize them or their methods. Subsequent units arrived at 
Normandy “without a counter-mortar organization, with the result that German 
mortars inflicted 70 percent of total casualties during June and July.”92 The army’s 
lack of formal mechanisms to evaluate and disseminate combat lessons was deemed 
a significant contributing factor in “preventing it from deriving appropriate 
lessons.”93  
 This risk of lost solutions was echoed later by Nina Kollars.94 Evaluating 
new methods for U.S. convoy defence in Vietnam and Iraq, Kollars posited that 
decentralized networks produced multiple solutions in patternless exchanges which 
must be translated into practices by central networks.95  Kollars concluded the gun 
truck innovations developed in Vietnam were lost due to this lack of central 
authority, whereas similar modifications later in Iraq could endure due a centralized 
network of theatre-based locations for modifications and training.96 Kollars argued 
that the difference between learning new solutions and keeping them depended on a 
central mechanism to capture, refine, and distribute the new methods, techniques, or 
procedures. Sergio Catagnani similarly concluded that informal information sharing 
may be lost through organizational forgetting.97 Assessing British counterinsurgency 
operations in Afghanistan since the mid-2000s, Catagnani found that informal 
learning systems could undermine their institutionalization and therefore cause an 
organization to “lag behind in terms of process and disseminating operationally 
current and specific knowledge for units.”98 The lack of a formal, central mechanism 
can produce “traps” for lost solutions or people leave units and “that unit may forget 
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insights gathered through adaptation.”99 Thus informal networks can move 
information quickly, but they may lack the capacity to retain and to disseminate 
solutions effectively. Without organizational incorporation or institutionalization of 
new knowledge then gains are more likely to be short-lived.  
 In addition, decentralized mechanisms may suffer from reduced impact even 
when ideas are good. Stephen Peter Rosen cited U.S. submarine warfare during the 
Second World War as suffering from a lack of centralized direction when it had to 
shift from targeting Japanese battlefleet forces to merchant shipping.100 This change 
required a fundamental revision of mission and the old tactics had to be 
abandoned.101 Near-term changes occurred through strict quotas accompanied by 
large-scale removal of commanders but failed to deliver change of greater 
significance due to high command’s inability to define appropriate new goals. As 
quotas and firings promoted commanders skilled with the new tactics and removed 
those without, U.S. submarine anti-shipping warfare increased effectiveness (yet 
missed delivering the larger impact of which it was capable). The submarine force’s 
decentralized nature created challenges for implementing change since the necessary 
larger revision of endorsing a new way of operations “had to be made in a 
centralized context” which it lacked.102 While decentralized organizations may 
favour innovation since they possess autonomy and capacity to conduct all functions 
required for innovation, they would still operate with a slower effective speed than a 
centralized organization which can target and direct new ideas.103 
 Israel Defense Force (IDF) informal horizontal learning also indicated 
challenges for high-impact adaptation. Niccolò Petrelli concluded that Israel's 
mechanisms were insufficient for adapting to low-intensity conflict from 1987–
2005.104 For Petrelli, new ad-hoc units and missions enabled the sharing of 
information and ideas, along with improved knowledge management, to diffuse 
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“techno-tactical conduct” of low-intensity conflict.105 However, the IDF continued 
to struggle with overall operational effectiveness due to “difficulties in promoting 
the assimilation of a broader conceptual grasp.”106 IDF units continued to execute 
missions according to routine procedures, and Petrelli argued that this shortcoming 
indicated how the IDF suffered from a “cognitive gap” where units continued to 
employ traditional concepts despite their limited appropriateness or effectiveness.107 
Ultimately, the IDF failed to produce larger success because if fell short of 
delivering a new understanding of how to fight as required for operational success. 
Similarly, Raphael Marcus’s assessment of IDF tactical change suggested how 
informal learning processes may hinder larger change.108 Examining Israel learning 
from 2000–06 through engagements with Hizballah, Marcus delivered a favourable 
assessment of IDF adaptation but assessed that its impact was undermined since 
“flexible and informal organizational culture can occasionally backfire without 
proper oversight and generalship.”109  
 Thus, the implications for H1 are that if the perspective favouring centralized 
vertical mechanisms is correct then findings should support H1. Consequently, 
analysis should reveal that tactical adaptation based primarily on upon storing, 
evaluating, and disseminating new techniques, procedures, or methods is likely to 
increase effectiveness and result in operational success. 
 
H2: ADAPTATION TYPE 
After facing close-range surprise attacks by Japanese forces in the jungles of Borneo 
and Malaya, Allied forces implemented counter-ambush techniques to react 
instinctively against the unexpected assaults.110 Units practiced immediate action 
drills to react quickly when caught unaware. In the jungles, the “prearranged battle 
drills so often held the key to success” as anticipation reduced confusion and 
increased combat effectiveness by specifically and purposefully eliminating the 
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opportunity to consider alternatives or to improvise.111 This scenario required 
adjusting the balance between improvisation and anticipation to overwhelmingly 
prioritize the latter. However, the tension between these inherently elements entails 
merits, risks, trade-offs, costs, and characteristics that may be more complex than 
initially assumed. Anticipation is characterized by action in preparation for 
something that is expected or may happen.112 Improvisation invents or makes 
something new at the time when it is needed without prior planning.113 In practice, 
this balance between preparation and invention may reinforce each other or occur in 
combination, but still it may be possible to isolate their individual merits for 
analysis. This consideration is necessary to evaluate how each may impact tactics 
and operations, either from a single event or through aggregate actions. H2 evaluates 
these degrees of relevance and therefore which type is more likely to deliver 
superior tactical adaptation. 
 H2 predicts an answer to the research question: What type of tactical 
adaptation is more likely to result in operational success—when based primarily on 
preparation before use, or creation when required? As a result, H2 states: “Tactical 
adaptation based on anticipation will outperform tactical adaptation based on 
improvisation in delivering operational success.” Testing H2 will evaluate how 
adaptation type explains the relationship between wartime tactical adaptation and 
operational success. 
 At a most basic level, H2 considers how humans address surprise. Warfare 
delivers numerous challenges so that “it is virtually impossible for states and 
militaries to anticipate all of the problems they will face in war.”114 How forces 
react to surprise can reduce costs or seize fleeting opportunities. Key questions 
regard the role of time, how tactical units should be applied, and what may be 
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reasonably expected in battlefield performance. H2 also reflects a larger tension 
regarding discipline and initiative when faced with challenges, as warfare can 
reward or punish both creativity and discipline. Battle demands discipline and 
adherence to orders “on which cohesion in battle depends,” but this need for 
discipline can contrast with the need for people to question procedures and devise 
superior outcomes.115 This balance reflects larger questions about how most 
effectively to fight, to prepare, and what qualities should be prioritized in personnel 
and units.  
 In extreme versions, the tension between improvisation and anticipation may 
reflect divergent assumptions about warfare. Current U.S. manoeuvre doctrine 
demands improvisation by emphasizing agility through flexibility and ingenuity.116 
Creatively overcoming immediate challenges is required to mitigate setbacks and 
exploit fleeting opportunities. In contrast, USSR top-down adaptation honed during 
the Second World War required preparation, obedience, discipline, and intentionally 
stifling tactical creativity. The Soviet Army’s method overcame its initial, 
disastrous, performances, and improved into mechanized manoeuvre warfare on a 
massive scale to outfight and annihilate its opponents.117 Thus, both anticipation and 
improvisation may deliver potential advantages and both entail inherent risks; 
different contexts may exacerbate these costs, enhance the benefits, or favour one 
type above the other. However, it remains unclear what precise circumstances may 
cause these effects. 
 
Anticipation: Preparing for the Future 
Anticipation may deliver superior ideas in preparation for future obstacles. First, 
anticipation may be necessary to address challenges that require solutions outside 
the capacity or expertise of the commanders and units immediately engaged in 
combat.118 In Peter Mansoor’s assessment of U.S. infantry forces in Europe during 
the Second World War, adaptation had to occur at the division since regiments and 
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below “were too focused on the current battle.”119 Divisional personnel were close 
enough to the fighting to understand what was needed, yet with time and resources 
which were unavailable to those immediately engaged in combat. As such, division-
level assessment, refinement, and dissemination proved vital for increasing combat 
performance. Gradually, according to Mansoor, the U.S. army evolved into a more 
combat-effective force which ultimately caused campaign success.120 Although 
initially “few divisions were fully effective upon their entry into combat,”121 the 
units sustained combat force and improved performance. Removed from immediate 
demands of tactical combat, division leadership could hone expertise and deliver the 
resources and solutions necessary to increase combat power and prepare for future 
operations.  
 The Soviet Army also employed anticipation to adapt tactics outside the 
capacity of tactical units. The Fortieth Army in Afghanistan caused “significant 
change” in its style of fighting by addressing larger challenges in guerrilla 
warfare.122 Slowly, the Soviets used a structured, hierarchical method to adapt, 
while tactical units were unable due to doctrine or priorities. Realizing they had to 
adjust beyond the initial invasion requirements, Soviet techniques shifted from 
massive firepower and tank formations to lighter, more mobile units in infantry 
carrier vehicles and helicopters. Soviet High Command emphasized controlling vital 
centres and lines of communication through a garrison force using position artillery 
and a mobile force to strike adversaries.123 Firebases supported artillery and mobile 
strike teams in Combined Arms Reinforced Battalions, helping to shift operations 
toward an emphasis on attrition. Techniques developed in contrast with traditional 
tactics that emphasized heavy firepower and overwhelming with mass,124 and 
ultimately “the Soviets learned the art of war in Third World.”125 While one may 
question the choice of strategy or campaign goals, Soviet adaptation improved their 
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ability to execute attrition operations through solutions unlikely possible by tactical 
units alone. 
 Second, anticipation may be more effective for delivering high impact on 
operational outcome due to increased perspective, foresight, collaboration, and time. 
Higher staff may be more capable of aligning needs or changes with tactical 
priorities and campaign objectives, delivering greater appropriateness and increased 
relevance for operational outcomes. Increased battlefield perspective from more 
information, greater insight regarding current developments, and additional foresight 
regarding operational goals and future actions may enable anticipatory change to 
address unexpected challenges with greater capacity to result in success or failure. 
German army preparations to counter Allied amphibious assault at Normandy reflect 
these merits. As Germany’s strategic focus shifted westward in 1943 the Westheer 
dramatically increased combat power and changed tactics in order to challenge “the 
imminent second front” in 1944.126 In preparation for the expected landing, German 
troops “studied Allied combat techniques, tactics, and amphibious assault 
doctrine.”127 Soldiers practiced new anti-tank methods and improved camouflage for 
the French shore’s distinctive terrain, and overall “programs represented serious, 
professional, and realistic preparation.”128 Additionally, coastal divisions were 
expanded, retrained, and strengthened in order to delay and disrupt the assault to 
enable a counterattack. Overall, the Westheer “made remarkable progress toward 
becoming a counterinvasion force” although ultimately it couldn’t overcome larger 
shortcomings.129 
 Concurrently, Allied anticipation accurately predicted challenges with the 
assault but failed to prepare for later shortcomings which nearly resulted in disaster, 
indicating the dangers of insufficient anticipation. In 1942, the Dieppe “debacle” 
revealed how amphibious landings still faced significant obstacles.130 Allied troops 
crushed by German defenders proved harbour assaults as unfeasible, causing 
planners to prepare for landings over open beaches in order to come ashore and 
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further inland to stage resources and personnel.131 Preparing for the OVERLORD 
landing, assaulting units would need to achieve a lodgement and build forces faster 
than their adversary over several weeks, “a daunting problem since reinforcing 
troops and supplies would have to come ashore over open beaches” unlike German 
defenders using road and rail.132 Ultimately, planners revised operations in 
accordance with the new requirements,133 but Allied anticipation failed in other 
instances. For instance, initial preparations revealed serious weakness at the tactical 
level.134 When the experienced Major General Corlett135 arrived to advise senior 
commanders they largely ignored his insistence on improved fire support and 
additional ammunition allotments — advice later proved “completely correct.”136 
Due to this unwillingness to address tactical problems, “the Omaha beach landing 
was almost a failure,” reinforcing the risks of poor anticipation.137 
 A relatively small anticipation at Iwo Jima delivered significant 
contributions to what became “the best-conducted defensive operation of the 
Japanese war.”138 Preparing to defend the island against U.S. amphibious assault and 
seizure, the IJA commander rejected standard army practice and the navy’s 
preference for direct defence on the beaches and airfield.139 Instead, the IJA altered 
its force posture to execute a defence in depth throughout the rocky terrain. 
Exploiting time and foresight, the IJA prepared for several months before the 
landing as defending forces entrenched themselves in natural caves modified and 
enlarged “into an intricate system linked by sixteen miles of tunnels.”140 By 
adjusting combat techniques from forward defence to entrenchment in the new 
environment, IJA positions increased protection against firepower while their own 
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artillery could reach the vulnerable beaches. Tasked to cause as many casualties as 
possible, the IJA proved highly effective by channelling attackers into slow, deadly 
frontal assaults over several weeks that killed 6,821 and wounded another 17,372.141 
The casualty ratio was one of the IJA’s most-favourable across the Pacific battles.142 
 U.S. Army development of special patrol groups during the Korean War 
reflected the need for higher commanders to anticipate needs and alter forces into 
new combat teams for revised purposes. As operational goals changed in 1951 to 
linear defence and capturing prisoners,143 Eighth Army now faced defending the 
main line of resistance across an extensive front. Forces had to prepare for fighting 
with smaller outposts and fortifications to pressure enemy troops, deny advances, 
and collect intelligence from captured prisoners. Senior commanders recognized that 
the new mission would require unique skills and aggressiveness beyond the average 
infantryman. Leaders designed new units of small patrol groups for the updated 
tactics of raids and extensive patrols, tailored specifically for the expected future 
missions despite “no official doctrine.”144 Special patrol groups frequently 
conducted the new missions deemed necessary for success. The new units 
performed a higher proportion of the missions for patrols, night raids, ambushes, 
and prisoner capture, and could execute the high-risk missions considered most 
important for attaining larger goals of defence, repelling attacks, and increased 
intelligence collection. Although their larger impact remains debated,145 these 
specialized units likely achieved objectives with fewer casualties than the less-
prepared infantry.146 
 But anticipation also entails risk and potential costs. Most dangerous may be 
guessing wrong, seen in U.S. Army tank destroyer forces from 1941–43.147 In 
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response to Germany’s impressive integration of armour forces, U.S. senior 
leadership tasked a special planning branch within the War Department to prepare a 
solution for future anti-tank operations. The organization evolved into an 
autonomous centre that created doctrine, designed force structure, assembled forces, 
organized training, and selected equipment based on mobility and firepower for use 
against masses of fast-moving light tanks.148 A clear wartime challenge had been 
identified, and leaders initiated new actions tailored specifically to fight the 
expected future battles with foresight, planning, and significant resources. Yet the 
tank destroyer battalions’ deployment to North Africa in 1942 produced dismal 
results. German units operated contrary to expectations as they combined arms to 
include effective antitank fire from overwatch positions. Battlefield realities 
revealed how the original U.S. methods based on lightly armoured tank destroyers 
seeking, striking, and destroying German tanks was “suicidal.”149 When units 
attempted to act as planned “the results were usually costly, or disappointing, or 
both.”150 Poor results caused the War Department to limit unit activation, halt 
deployments, and reduce forces. Ultimately, the General Board concluded that tank 
destroyer doctrine had never been validated. It closed the Tank Destroyer Center, 
and deactivated battalions. Incorrect expectations had developed in isolation and 
created inappropriate doctrine, force structure, and training. Ultimately, this failure 
of anticipation produced low effectiveness and proved costly. 
 
Improvisation: Unplanned Solutions 
Improvisation appears to provide specificity for addressing problems, refinement to 
improve solutions, and flexibility for missions and exploiting fleeing opportunities. 
First, solutions may be tailored with increased specificity since immediate problems 
can be clearly known. Germany’s adjusted use of 88-mm Flak anti-aircraft cannons 
into a powerful anti-tank weapon can be traced directly to improvisation,151 applied 
to halt British forces advancing across the Halfaya Pass in the Egyptian–Libyan 
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frontier in 1941.152 On Iwo Jima, Japanese armour forces whose tanks were disabled 
chose to partially bury the equipment and employ the functioning turrets as 
artillery.153 Forces could evaluate immediate problems with known requirements, 
and then modify equipment and alter techniques to partially overcome a deficiency. 
Second, solutions may be uniquely appropriate to specific challenges due to the 
capacity for trial and refinement. Experimentation may allow refinement of tactics 
as new inventions are tested against practical reality, delivering more appropriate 
benefits through incremental improvement. This process enables evolutionary 
advancement. Robert Foley challenged traditional views of First World War 
German infiltration tactical development by arguing that they arose from informal 
learning and experimentation among tactical units.154 Third, improvisation 
encourages increased flexibility in tactical forces to overcome problems creatively. 
U.S. doctrine cites improvisation as an example for overcoming challenges in 
offensive movement as German forces in 1940 France commandeered local buses 
for moving infantrymen, or as U.S. Army rangers in Grenada seized East German 
trucks to enhance tactical speed.155 As warfare’s unknowns likely outnumber what 
may be predicted or how specific circumstances may change throughout conflict, 
improvisation can provide immediate solutions with speed and appropriateness. 
 Japanese adaptation to jungle warfare in Malaya revealed improvisation’s 
accumulated effects. Organized and trained to fight Soviet forces across the plains 
of Manchuria and northern Asia, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) was “completely 
unprepared’ for operations in Southeast Asia.156 Additionally, IJA lacked tactical 
jungle training and had no practical preparations for the environment.157 Also they 
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were outnumbered.158 Yet the IJA repeatedly and consistently applied light infantry 
tactics prepared for mobile warfare in open terrain to the road network of the Malay 
jungle.159 IJA forces adjusted methods to fight in the limited visibility with 
infiltration and encirclement throughout the new environment conditions delivering 
high mobility and rapid tempo.160 In 70 days—quicker than planned—the IJA 
invaded 650 miles across the peninsula to Singapore and achieved “the greatest land 
victory in Japanese history.”161 In Malaya, unprepared IJA troops made small 
adjustments when necessary which aggregated into larger, significant advantages. 
 Yet improvisation entails risks and potential costs. First, ad hoc solutions 
may be inappropriate or unsustainable if reliant on contexts unlikely to be replicated 
in the future. Examining U.S. integration of new M1 Abrams tanks, Chris Demchak 
chronicled how spontaneous “quick fixes” informally addressed near-term problems 
but also increased system complexity and therefore raised the probability of 
undesired surprises.162 Invented solutions created informal, local networks across 
people and units that grew in significance until they were critical to success. 
However, these informal dependencies work only “as long the coordination and 
resource interactions are not significantly disturbed”163—rarely possible when units 
face the disruptions of deploying and executing combat operations. Thus, what 
appears as an effective solution may be impossible to replicate as circumstances 
change, undermining their value in combat. 
 Second, improvisation may favour improving existing tactics rather than 
questioning their broader relevance or contributions to effectiveness. In this sense, 
improvisation risks increasing proficiency for doing things wrong. U.S. attrition 
tactics relying on firepower in Vietnam might reflect this risk. Over the first three 
years, U.S. firepower consistently “mauled” Vietnamese attackers through large 
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battles around cities and base camps.164 In the 1967 defence of Khe Sanh, U.S. 
forces effectively applied new firepower systems for precise targeting and mass 
destruction, exemplifying years of tactical and technological improvement.165 
However, Robert Scales argued how this reliance on firepower and measuring 
success through body counts ultimately revealed that “a finite limit exists to what 
modern firepower can achieve in limited war, no matter how sophisticated the 
ordnance or how intelligently applied.”166 Effective firepower delivered impressive 
tactical gains but this method for executing operations failed to deliver larger 
success. Relatedly, Andrew Krepinevich blamed reliance on firepower and material 
superiority as critical factors in larger U.S. army failure.167 If Krepinevich and 
Scales are correct then even the most momentous tactical improvements in 
firepower still would have failed to deliver success since the methods were 
inappropriate. Forces were chasing their mistakes. 
 Finally, improvisations also can fail. Approaches may cause “high casualties, 
as fighting units identify problems and work toward solutions.”168 Some problems 
may be insurmountable for the available forces. This risk may seem obvious and it 
is not exclusive to improvised ideas but it bears reminding. Lost resources and lives 
cannot be recouped. Circumstances that favour improvisation—unplanned responses 
at moments they are required—suggest scenarios that may be limited in time, 
resources, or personnel, and therefore a failed improvisation may reduce relative 
strength as well as substitute for a more appropriate action. In the Pacific theatre, 
Japanese forces without heavy anti-tank guns experimented using improvised 
explosives devises both thrown and buried underground.169 Others used themselves 
“as mines and missiles.”170 All had limited success. A superior answer may have 
been found in better preparation. 
 Thus, the implications for H2 are that if the perspective favouring 
anticipation is correct then findings should support H2. Consequently, analysis 
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should reveal that tactical adaptation based primarily upon new techniques, 
procedures, or methods developed before they are needed is likely to increase 
effectiveness and result in operational success. 
 
H3: NATURE OF CHANGE 
Facing Libyan attackers armed with tanks and fighter-bombers in 1985, northern 
Chadian rebels declined international offers for tanks, armoured personnel carriers, 
or heavy artillery.171 Instead, the Toubou tribesmen requested and received trucks, 
light armoured cars, small arms, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The new 
equipment enabled improved mobility and firepower through tactics that reflected 
the rebels’ traditional techniques for desert warfare, now with enhanced speed of 
movement, concentration, flexibility, and tempo. This increased effectiveness 
ultimately helped shift military power to favour the rebels. It also raises questions: 
since the equipment delivered new capabilities to the rebels, why did they decline 
the more advanced technology? And why were the less-sophisticated resources so 
useful in shaping battlefield outcome? This scenario hints at a larger question 
between adapting with technology and the skill required to employ existing 
technology more effectively. H3 addresses part of this broader debate.  
 H3 predicts an answer to the research question: Are tactical adaptations more 
likely to result in operational success when they are based on new technology, or 
when they are based on new ways of using existing technology through 
reorganization or training? As a result, H3 states: “Tactical adaptation based on new 
training or unit reconfiguration, rather than new or modified equipment, is more 
likely to result in operational success.” Testing H3 will evaluate how the nature of 
tactical adaptation shapes its relationship with operational success. 
 H3’s logic is that new training or unit reconfiguration can contribute to 
success because it increases skill and delivers new abilities for using existing 
technology. H3 accepts that new technologies can have significant impact on 
battlefield performance, but also that they present challenges and require 
modification in human skill. At a minimum, personnel must adjust to the new 
technical techniques, effects, and how they may change the battlefield. More 
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disruptive technologies may directly challenge known concepts and require 
significant organizational change before they may be fully adopted, creating new 
challenges in the short-term which may require more time than available during 
conflict. H3 infers that scholars citing technological advancement as the primary 
driver for increased military effectiveness insufficiently consider the costs of 
incorporating new material, the challenges created by new technologies on an 
operating environment, or the importance of reorganization and training on 
battlefield outcomes. Reorganization and training can reduce barriers which may 
include an increased ability to harness technology, while new technology tends to 
create new challenges before it may be fully applied. H3 posits that technological 
change is important but may be less beneficial for operational success in comparison 
with the way humans use existing technology as measured by skill. 
 H3 reflects a larger tension among scholars regarding the relationship 
between technological advancements and military performance. Debates over these 
issues indicate a continued need for analysis regarding how operational success may 
be shaped by these factors, and these considerations frame H3. As such, this section 
uses prior theorizing to explain H3’s foundation, comparing skill-based changes in 
training or reorganization versus technology-driven adaptations in advanced 
weapons, equipment, or new resources. While themes and authors do not claim that 
only technology or that only skill matter in warfare, they do favour one over the 
other as primarily important or essential. 
 
Technological Imbalances 
Coalition victory in the Gulf War appeared to reveal significant opportunities and 
dangers related to technological disparity, and subsequent discussions of military 
power increasingly emphasized technological advantages over human skill. Many 
assessments since the early 1990s presented new technologies as decisive for 
determining battle outcome and perhaps even ultimate victory.172 Often associated 
with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),173 proponents contended that 
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technological advancements in precision weapons and sensing technology had 
fundamentally changed modern warfare.174 Following overwhelming Coalition 
success in 1991, RMA concepts regarding network-centric warfare “infused military 
discourse” and influenced considerations about technological advancements as a key 
driver for military innovation.175 Some analysts argued that technology would 
continue to deliver “major changes in war’s conduct” over the next decades.176 
 Discussions of RMA advancements emphasized new airpower capabilities, 
and most disagreements tended to surround the magnitude of improvement rather 
than whether a major change was underway.177 In 2013, RAND’s Benjamin 
Lambeth concluded that “by far the most preeminent unifying theme” to emerge 
from recent conflict was that “airpower will inevitably be pivotal in future wars.”178 
For Lambeth, air operations “can achieve desired objectives essentially 
singlehandedly if conditions are right,” citing how in Serbia (1999) and Libya 
(2011), “allied airpower singlehandedly achieved NATO goals.”179 The traditional 
relationship between ground and air power had fundamentally changed since 
“ground forces have now come to do most of the shaping and fixing of enemy 
forces, with airpower now doing most of the actual killing.”180 Thus some airpower-
led RMA enthusiasts questioned whether the core nature of ground warfare had 
changed, to include questioning the relevance of ground forces. 
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 Since 2014, analysts continued to argue that improving technological 
advantages remained essential for future military dominance and national U.S. 
defence policy, now labelled the Third Offset Strategy.181 Part of the U.S. Defense 
Innovation Initiative, the Third Offset Strategy proposed that past U.S. military 
strategy had successfully used technological advantages to substitute for 
conventional mass when facing the Soviet Union, and that continued advancements 
in defence technology would be necessary as “growing technological parity” 
threatened to erode remaining competitive advantages.182 After the first offset 
strategy used a nuclear arsenal to counter Soviet conventional divisions and the 
second created precision-strike conventional weapons for attacking deep behind 
battle-lines of forward soviet troops, the proposed third offset would require a new, 
similarly momentous technological edge, although the specific details and concepts 
remained undetermined.183 Two proponents suggested increased unmanned and 
autonomous systems based on advances in cyber warfare, computing, autonomous 
swarms of ISR, artificial intelligence, commercial robotics, additive manufacturing, 
general miniaturization of power systems and propulsion mechanisms, electric 
weapons, and using technology to enhance human physical and cognitive 
abilities.184 An extension of RMA thinking, the third offset proponents prioritized 
technological advantages as decisive in warfare, implying human skill as a 
secondary (or lower) priority. 
 Less bold assessments still asked to what degree technology had changed 
ground forces. Deep-strike weapons provided attack capabilities of such scale and 
breadth that perhaps they could partially substitute for roles previously required 
from land-based manoeuvre units.185 Referencing the 2003 Iraq invasion, Keith 
Shimko claimed that precision weapons’ ability, simultaneously and immediately, to 
attack tactical, operational, and strategic targets now enabled aerial firepower to 
perform roles that replaced some previously required of mechanized breakthrough 
operations. If this partial replacement was already underway and technological 
advancements would continue (as assumed), then what future replacements would 
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follow? This question (and others) indicated that the traditional, distinct role of 
ground forces may be changing. However, it remained unclear to what degree or 
magnitude. Some would reply that it was not very much.  
 
 Skill Advantages 
An alternative argument is that a skill imbalance can be at least as dangerous as a 
technological imbalance. Foremost is Stephen Biddle’s argument that human skill 
remains fundamental to understanding battle outcomes, warning about over-
emphasizing the relevance of technological developments when assessing battlefield 
events.186 Challenging RMA enthusiasts and the degree which ground warfare had 
changed, in 1996 Stephen Biddle reintroduced human skill as fundamental to 
understanding battle outcomes. Assessing 20th Century combined-arms warfare, 
Biddle argued the impact of technological modernization in warfare remained 
secondary to human skill for using equipment, weapons, and terrain. He also 
claimed that warfare had not fundamentally changed since the First World War. 
Vitally, Biddle’s analysis did not reject all value of technological change. Rather, it 
implied that RMA advocates had overlooked the need for balancing technology with 
skill. Yes, new and more-advanced equipment created imbalances in technological 
capabilities, but humans still had to know how to use and to exploit these new 
systems. Hence, technological change delivered new opportunities and also new 
burdens. Biddle’s writings contain three key elements for H3. 
 First, that explanations of the Gulf War that considered only technological 
imbalances appeared incomplete since human skill and error could be equally 
important as relative technological capabilities.187 Using independent histories and 
counterfactual computer simulation, Biddle concluded that the overwhelming 
Coalition victory was caused by “a synergistic interaction between a major skill 
imbalance and new technology.”188 As such, the dominant narrative incorrectly 
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focused on “numbers and technical characteristics of two sides’ weapons.”189 More 
broadly, the technology-centric narrative risked “serious misjudgement of states’ 
real military power” by overemphasizing the role of technology and overlooking the 
qualities required to employ it effectively.190 According to a more nuanced 
perspective that considered technological imbalances along with skill differentials, 
advanced technology may dramatically raise the costs of human mistakes or 
shortcomings but, alone, it remained insufficient for explaining battle outcomes. 
 Second, nonmaterial variables required further consideration to explain 
battle outcomes to which Biddle introduced his concept of force employment.191 The 
centrally important criteria for determining battle outcomes was the way forces 
employed material through “the doctrine and tactics by which forces are actually 
used in combat.”192 The most effective force employment for achieving victory was 
the “modern system” that prioritized reducing one’s vulnerability to the full lethality 
of opponents’ firepower.193 Firepower lethality entailed a constant danger that 
required new and unique ways to employ it, hide from it, and sustain forces by 
reducing vulnerability to its effects. Biddle later emphasized, specifically, the 
human skill in reducing vulnerability to firepower as a key variable for limiting 
battlefield casualties and therefore explaining military outcomes.194 These 
arguments challenged analysts who overlooked nonmaterial factors to explain 
battlefield outcomes, as well as their underlying assumption that 20th Century 
warfare had fundamentally changed. 
 Finally, land-based warfare and ground forces appeared to retain distinct 
roles essential for victory. Biddle argued that the importance of human skill and the 
nature of the modern system was fundamentally unchanged since at least 1900 
regarding mid-to-high intensity ground warfare.195 Throughout the 20th Century, 
“the dominant technological fact of the modern battlefield has been increasing 
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lethality.”196 Therefore, the common determinant of military outcome was how 
skilfully a force can reduce its exposure to enemy firepower while maximizing its 
own lethality against an adversary.197 The modern system combined techniques that, 
when implemented, “damps the effects of technological change and insulates its 
users from the full lethality of their opponents’ weapons.”198 Thus, modern military 
power would continue to prioritize ground-based combat, and the most important 
national military task remained “the mission of controlling territory in mid-to-high 
intensity continental warfare.”199 This mission would remain a central military 
purpose until the modern battlefield was no longer dominated by firepower.  
 Others warned against underestimating the importance of existing weapons, 
equipment, or resources.200 A mistake was that emphasizing technological 
advancement overlooked the continued impact of established methods and 
incorrectly assessed impact by focusing on the arrival of new items rather than 
measuring their broader, comparative relevance. As a result, military analysts who 
focused on novel or new developments overlooked how “the well-established ones 
became the great killers.”201 For example, David Edgerton cited Soviet combat 
deaths in the Second World War: while many focus on the technological advances 
since 1919, approximately 5,000,000 (50%) of all Soviet soldiers died from artillery 
and 2,000,000 (20%) by smalls arms—the same technology responsible for most 
killings in the First World War. Most of the remaining 3,000,000 (30%) died from 
starvation and disease—ancient killers.202 Focusing only on the changes since 1919 
would overlook the importance and impact of existing technology, incorrectly 
substituting novelty for significance. A second mistake was that military analysts 
emphasizing technological change become vulnerable to inaccurate measurements 
by failing to consider the scope that something is used. Smaller technologies may 
have a large impact since they are used daily by many, and minor adjustments in 
their use or maintenance may have a significant impact. Again referencing 20th 
                                                                                                                
 196 Biddle, Military Power, 2. 
 197 Biddle, Military Power, 3. 
 198 Biddle, Military Power, 3. 
 199 Biddle, Military Power, 6-7. 
 200 Argument from David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History 
Since 1900 (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 201 Edgerton, 143. 
 202 Edgerton, 144 
   70 
Century deaths, Egerton cites the rifle as killing over 10,000,000 civilians through 
massacres and formal executions until approximately 1970.203 This simple weapon 
had momentous impact since it was used by many of people despite experiencing 
only relatively minor technological advancements throughout the period.  
 Considering these themes, H3 appears supported by examples displaying a 
significant impact on operational outcome due to wartime change based upon 
reorganization or training. From 1937–45 Japanese army forces in China 
reorganized and established new units to shift from conventional warfare to fighting 
both regular and guerrilla forces.204 Facing hundreds of thousands of combatants in 
conventional, insurgent, and guerrilla forces,205 units shifted to continuous small 
patrols supplemented by resource destruction and large-scale search-and-destroy 
missions. Japanese forces blockaded and fenced railways, established posts and 
forts, and implemented systems of blockhouses, barbed fences, and pill boxes 
supplemented by intense patrolling, to control territory and to protect lines of 
communication.206 The revised procedures and altered methods used existing 
resources to enhance combat abilities. New units effectively supplemented large-
scale search-and-destroy operations to find and kill adversaries, considered the top 
priority.207 Coordinated with division-level operations, the Japanese displayed “a 
successful pattern of tactical maneuver to capture and destroy guerrilla forces.”208 
Blockading larger areas with miles of fencing, crossing marches and digging ditches 
to limit guerrilla movements trapped enemy fighters and effectively limited their 
activity.209 After 1943, newly-formed strike units fused intelligence collection, long-
range scouting, and assaults, which proved “very successful” through ambushes and 
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assassination.210 Overall, Japanese adaptation using existing technology in new 
ways enabled them to control large areas of Chinese territory and to achieve their 
objective in limiting guerrilla activity. 
 H3 is also supported by USSR Seventh Army against Finland during the 
1939–40 Winter War. Initial setbacks and a poor combat performance caused 
Seventh Army to reorganize and retrain mid-conflict, eventually applying methods 
to overcome both Finn defenders and the cold environment. Soviet changes 
contributed to Seventh Army achieving objectives with improved speed and reduced 
casualties. Initially, Soviet assaults were “hurried and amateurish” that displayed 
“little understanding the terrain or problems of coordinating infantry, artillery, and 
armor.”211 None of the forces met their minimum operational objectives as Seventh 
Army personnel consistently failed against Finn defenders that “outfought their 
numerically superior opponents.”212 Soviet failures caused Moscow to pause 
operations in December 1939, and over the next six weeks Seventh Army 
reorganized, overhauled command structure, and trained in new tactics for the 
decisive second phase.213 Soviet forces created a special mobile group, established 
new assault groups, initiated winter training, exercised penetration against 
fortifications, replaced personnel, and supplemented forces with additional riflemen 
and a few heavy tanks.214 Then, from 12 February to 9 March, Seventh Army 
displayed its new abilities in improved tactics and combined-arms operations. New 
and reorganized units helped to penetrate defensive lines and to seize the Karelin 
Isthmus, causing Finland to concede. Overall, the Seventh Army endured high costs 
but displayed improved tactics, a new ability in combined arms through large-scale 
operations, and achieved its objectives. 
 In addition, H3 appears supported by U.S. Army operations during the 1944 
Normandy Campaign.215 When poor coordination between infantry and armour 
undermined combined-arms operations and slowed progress in northwest Europe, 
“the determination of both troops and commanders to retrain in the field was a key 
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strength that consistently allowed them to enhance their combat effectiveness.”216 
After evaluating new techniques for combined-arms operations, First Army 
retrained untested units in the field and rotated other formations off frontline service 
to retrain.217 Russell Hart assessed that improved cooperation and “growing mastery 
of the combined-arms air-land battle brought success in Normandy.”218 This U.S. 
commitment to retrain in the field during a combat campaign contributed to “a 
paradigm of military adaptability.”219 
 Thus, the implications for H3 are that if the perspective favouring skill is 
correct then findings should support H3. Consequently, analysis should reveal that 
tactical adaptation based primarily upon increasing skill through reorganization and 
training is likely to increase effectiveness and to contribute to operational success.
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Chapter Three 
Fighting Unprepared:  
Japanese Invasion and British Expulsion, 1941–42 
After launching attacks in December 1941, across Southeast Asia the Imperial 
Japanese Army appeared invincible as it rode a tide of battlefield victory and 
conquest.1 In Burma, both British and Japanese forces faced adversaries and an 
environment different than prepared, with essentially no specific doctrine or 
training. Yet their outcomes were quite different: British forces proved “an 
unmitigated disaster” suffering decisive defeat and expulsion to India, while 
Japanese attackers consistently trapped and destroyed their better-equipped 
adversaries throughout the jungle.2 Assessing performance and outcome, this 
chapter posits that the lack of British adaptation exacerbated setbacks. Furthermore, 
a lack of change influenced performance and effectiveness of both forces but the 
subsequent outcome derived from a deeper, significant skill imbalance that would be 
nearly impossible to reconcile after the operation began. Thus, this case indicates 
how once fighting starts then it may be too late to overcome core deficiencies in 
skills and basic abilities. The IJA invasion also indicates how a force may be 
inflexible—even anticipating wrongly—but not require change when significantly 
more skilled than its adversaries. Therefore, this case suggests that inflexibly may 
harm forces and deliver additional costs but that inflexibility, alone, is unlikely to be 
the sole cause of low effectiveness or operational failure.  
 
Forces and Capabilities 
Japan’s Southern Expeditionary Army Group, headquartered in Saigon, prepared for 
an overland invasion from Siam to occupy Burma by capturing Rangoon, seizing 
key infrastructure, and destroying defenders.3 Control of Rangoon would enable 
resupply and reinforcement necessary for sustained control and administration of the 
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country. With Japanese forces positions along the border in Siam,4 the operation into 
Burma was to occur six weeks after the invasion of Malaya using IJA Fifteenth 
Army.5 Totalling 35,000 men in eleven battalions across two understrength 
divisions, the 55th and 33rd, Fifteenth Army was small but possessed a modest 
numerical advantage over defending units.6 The primary objective was to destroy 
defending forces, with the secondary objective of securing strategic locations: 
Rangoon and its port; Mandalay; Prome on the Irrawaddy River; Toungoo on the 
Sittang River; and Yenangyaung with its oil fields.7 Rangoon presented the key 
geographic objective because the port could resupply a military force and serve as 
the overall logistics base, while the city formed the key intersection for internal lines 
of communication.8 Without Rangoon, an army could seize Burma but not sustain it. 
Invading forces would arrive from northern Siam, move westward toward 
Rangoon, and cross two rivers to seize the capital. Then forces would push 
northward along the Irrawaddy and Sittang rivers toward India in the northwest and 
China in the northeast, destroying forces and cutting any overland link between the 
countries. Two routes would cover the 150 miles to Rangoon: 55th Division straight 
west to the city while 33rd Division circled north to attack it from the opposite side.9 
Then, the 33rd Division would attack Prome while the 55th Division moved up the 
Sittang valley.10 Overall, Fifteenth Army’s plans entailed flexibility and, with 
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limited administrative or logistic support lines, allowed the army to alter divisional 
objectives and to move units once inside the country.11 In preparation, the IJA 
probed Burma’s frontiers to seize Victoria Point and two airfields at Mergui and 
Tavoy, and positioned for the larger attack with its main force.12 
 
Japanese Attacking Forces 
Operations in Malaya during December 1941 revealed that Japanese tactics could be 
effective in the jungle environment despite no significant preparation for the terrain 
or climate. Through well-executed basic offensive tactics, the IJA proved effective 
in jungle fighting due to its organization, training, infantry-based doctrine, and high 
readiness, rather than any specific preparations for jungle fighting. In the new 
environment, vegetation slowed movement and limited communication, delivering 
advantages to light infantry which could maximize mobility to move undetected and 
attack flanks which were almost always vulnerable to encirclement.13 
 The IJA organized infantry divisions to prioritize mobility and flexibility in 
the attack with a superior concentration of forces. During 1937 the IJA began 
creating triangular divisions by reorganizing from the four-regiment square, now 
allowing one unit to attack, one to envelop, and one held in reserve, increasing 
overall divisional mobility and flexibility.14 The reorganization also created a 
surplus of regiments which facilitated expanding the number of divisions, now 
totalling around 16,000 people apiece with 3,000 per regiment.15 For battlefield 
control, frequently a division would form a separate, subordinate task force called an 
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infantry group to conduct combat operations.16 The divisions to invade Burma 
reflected standard army procedures and were relatively unexceptional. Both had 
been formed within the previous two years from Eastern Army Administrative 
District, with the 33rd Division from Sendai since March 1939 and the 55th Division 
at Zentsuji from August 1940.17 Both divisions formed in accordance with the 
standard model of regionally-based enlistment and district support while deployed, 
to include replacement personnel and various administrative support.18 IJA units 
formed around two-year active service conscripts supplemented by reserve 
replacements, and the 33rd and 55th divisions likely followed this standard model.19 
The 55th Division had not fought before Southeast Asia.20 The only relevant changes 
to the divisions occurred in Siam, where transport units added animals and removed 
some motorization; a few others allocated mountain guns down to their companies.21   
 IJA doctrine envisioned fighting the USSR in Manchuria rather than a 
British imperial force in Southeast Asia. Doctrine emphasized intangible soldier 
qualities to deliver quick, decisive battlefield victory through offensive actions by 
superior light infantry, “the heart and soul of the force.”22 For planners and trainers 
the USSR remained their primary adversary, and Japan’s previous annual exercise 
(November 1941) envisioned operations in Manchuria against the Soviets.23 To 
avoid a long-term attrition battle which would exacerbate Japan’s material weakness 
relative to the USSR, IJA doctrine aimed for a short war by rapid encirclements for 
piecemeal destruction. These tactics required mobility, speed, and initiative through 
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effective junior leadership,24 and the infantry regularly received higher-quality 
officers than other branches from the Military Academy.25 Fundamentally, IJA 
doctrine and method of warfare relied on qualitative intangibles among its soldiers 
in fighting spirit, aggressiveness, and belief in victory.26 IJA training was “intense,” 
“thorough,” “severe,” and emphasized core abilities for light infantry.27 Infantry 
conscript training covered two years of basic skills, including frequent marches 
greater than 20 miles per day, escalating to battalion and regimental exercises.28 
Once a division deployed, a detachment remained in Japan aligned with geographic 
recruiting administrations and was responsible for training replacements.29 Overall, 
this combination of doctrine and training produced, tough, disciplined infantry with 
core skills and abilities, However, the doctrinal demands for initiative and creativity 
were prescribed to a greater extent than prepared or practiced.30 
 Japanese practices remained relatively unchanged by combat experience in 
China and Manchuria. Assessments often reinforced infantry-based offensive action 
as the key for victory, and fighting in China during the 1930s “seemed to confirm 
the validity of the Japanese way of warfare.”31 Notably, defeat by the Red Army at 
Nomonhan in 1939 failed to produce any major revisions of established practices, 
despite meticulous study and several internal criticisms of army performance.32 
Rather, Japan’s Army General Staff reinforced established methods that emphasized 
fighting spirit.33 IJA leaders concluded that, to overcome material shortcomings 
during battle, the most significant lesson was the necessity for morale, fighting 
spirit, leadership, and spiritual power.34 Furthermore, Nomonhan had no significant 
impact on doctrine or its underlying assumptions about short, decisive warfare.35 
Thus, the IJA reaffirmed its emphasis on moral attributes and psychological factors 
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for winning operations.36 Any potential lessons from 1939 “had not been assimilated 
or heeded by 1941–42.”37 There was no alteration of units or methods before 
fighting in Burma.  
 Regarding jungle warfare, the IJA lacked specialized preparation or 
substantial general guidance. First, there was no doctrine. The one doctrinal 
reference most similar to jungle fighting was found in the 1938 Field Service 
Regulations which contained only three pages concerning wooded terrain as well as 
populated areas.38 The military academy’s tactical manual also lacked reference to 
jungle warfare or forest fighting, despite including guidance on other techniques 
such as river crossings, artillery placement, traffic routes, and map drawing.39 
Subsequently, conscript training before 1941 contained “little or nothing especially 
relevant to tropical warfare.”40 Second, the IJA conducted very limited tactical 
jungle training prior to fighting in Southeast Asia, even after creating a new research 
group. Formed in 1941, the 30-member Taiwan Army Research Section had only six 
months to prepare for warfare across the Pacific region by assessing and reporting 
recommendations regarding army organization, equipment suitability, geography, 
weapons maintenance, overall campaign directions, sanitation, logistics, 
administration of seized territory, military strategy, and tactics.41 Members of the 
IJA’s Taiwan Army—not units to invade Burma—conducted short-term 
manoeuvres that concentrated on sea transport and disembarkation, still with little 
emphasis on jungle tactics.42 IJA planners prioritized Malaya for preparations and 
selecting units, with more specific research led by section commander Colonel 
Masanobu Tsuji. His work included reconnaissance trips and a visit to the Formosa 
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jungle training school, but it appears that Tsuji completed little work on actual 
jungle warfare tactics during his time in Taiwan due to other requirements.43 The 
Taiwan Army Research Section failed to deliver significant impact on the 55th or 
33rd divisions which invaded Burma, although it did produce Japan’s only 
instruction on tropical warfare, a short pamphlet provided to the specific units 
departing to Malaya as they boarded ships for the invasion.44 Authored by Tsuji and 
designed to be read quickly while underway to invade, the pamphlet delivered 
general advice about weather and disease but contained little tactical guidance.45 
With a translated length of 33 pages, the pamphlet’s most specific tactical 
prescriptions regarded sea transport, disembarkation, and the landing assault, with 
other general details about tropical movement, sleeping, and camping.46 One 
paragraph specifically addressed jungle movement and it delivered the manual’s 
most-detailed recommendations for jungle fighting: 
By jungle is meant dense forest in which a large variety of trees, 
grasses, and thorny plants are all closely entangled together…. This 
type of terrain is regarded by the weak-spirited Westerners as 
impenetrable, and for this reason—in order to outmaneuver them—
we must from time to time force our way through it. With proper 
preparation and determination it can be done.47 
Apart from this pamphlet, Fifteenth Army attacking into Burma possessed “no 
experience of jungle warfare nor a doctrine for how to conduct it.”48 The force 
would rely on light infantry tactics prepared for mobile warfare in open terrain 
against the Soviet Union, applied in an unfamiliar terrain against a different 
adversary.49 Therefore, a scenario existed which would appear highly vulnerable to 
unexpected setbacks that could require adaptation to overcome them. Fortunately for 
the Japanese, defending units were prepared even less. 
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British and Burmese Defending Forces 
Defending Burma were “two weak divisions.” 50 The 17th Indian Division included 
2nd Burma Brigade, along with the 46th, 16th, and 48th Indian brigades. The 1st Burma 
Division possessed the 13th Indian Brigade and 1st Burma Brigade.51 The forces 
would operate as the Burma Army under Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant-General 
Thomas Hutton, himself subordinate to regional Commander-in-Chief General 
Archibald Wavell headquartered outside the country.52 Defending troops were 
largely unprepared and under-trained, reflecting larger challenges associated with 
army growth that sacrificed near-term readiness for longer-term force expansion. 
 The 17th Indian Division was new and unready. Formed as part of the larger 
Indian Army expansion from 1939–41, the division suffered like most others from 
inexperienced personnel, limited training and an overall state of low readiness. The 
expansion had fundamentally changed the Indian Army from a small, specialized 
military into a massive wartime force “at a speed with had never been envisioned.”53 
Personnel increased from 183,000 to over 1,000,000 which diluted overall quality.54 
Creating new formations pulled from regular units and depleted the reserves, and 
then many of the newly-raised units were again divided for the new units inside the 
regiment.55 Now, “a large number of the new Indian troops had little basic 
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training.”56 Within the 17th Indian Division, several battalions had joined their 
brigades only six weeks before arriving in Burma, with limited preparations.57 One 
brigade commander assessed that “most of the young soldiers had not reached even 
a reasonable standard of efficiency” in their weapons.58 Another concluded that, “no 
one had any experience of jungle, except for a few senior officers.”59 Inexperienced 
officers and NCOs made training even more difficult, contributing to an absence of 
collective training.60 The 1st Burma Division had received “no collective training at 
all.”61 Once units arrived in Burma during late 1941, very few had additional 
training and “were equally inexperienced and ill-equipped” to fight the Japanese.62 
 In addition, most preparations had been for open warfare in the Middle East 
rather than infantry-based jungle fighting. In the desert, the importance of tanks 
caused infantry often to hold static defensive positions or to move in troop-transport 
vehicles—tasks poorly suited for infantry-led jungle fighting.63 Training prior to 
deployment often used open fields to simulate the desert, while also assuming 
sustained logistical support via road-based resupply.64 As such, the 17th Indian 
Division trained in India for Middle East operations and any specialized training 
reflected its emphasis on tank-led, mechanized desert warfare.65 Force organization 
also made units unprepared to defend using small-unit actions against light infantry. 
Reliance on a road-bound transport system limited defensive flexibility and created 
lines of communication which could be vulnerable when over-extended.66 
Operationally, Burma’s limited road network meant that a force relying on road 
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transport possessed few avenues for movement and therefore its lines became 
inflexible and predictable. 
 Unlike the larger British Army, the Indian Army could directly issue training 
directives to its formations. The British Army lacked comprehensive doctrine or 
mechanisms for learning wartime lessons,67 but the Indian Army possessed some 
capacity for issuing directives through the General Staff via official manuals and 
instructions, to include new training and combat lessons.68 The problem was that 
directives emphasized frontier warfare and how to improve fighting across the 
North-West frontier, or were otherwise inappropriate for Burma.69 The Indian Army 
possessed some formal guidance regarding jungle warfare, but nowhere near a 
comprehensive doctrine. In 1940 army leadership published the 11-page Military 
Training Pamphlet No. 9 (India) Extensive Warfare: Notes of Forest Warfare about 
fighting in thick forests in Africa or Asia.70 MTP9 emphasized ingenuity, mobility, 
patrols, small-unit initiative, flank attacks, and jungle movement, largely due to 
limited transportation networks.71 It warned to be “ready for enemy appearing 
anywhere” but “do not fear enemy penetration.”72 Some forces in Burma received 
MTP9, but “little evidence exists that troops trained according to its guidelines.”73 
The army also lacked relevant guidance for infantry tactics in the jungle. The core 
text remained Field Service Regulations Volume II: Operations, which presented 
warfare through a universal set of principles with little specific guidance.74 It 
included thirteen points on “Bush Fighting,” but anticipated that any fighting would 
be against “either untrained savages armed with modern rifles or spears, bows and 
arrows, and muzzle-loading guns, or trained troops led by Europeans.”75 Army in 
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India Training Memorandum No. 6, published in April 1941, was the first AITM to 
address jungle warfare but it was only one page of guidance about “Warfare in 
Mountainous and Forest Countries.”76 Additionally, “little was done to remedy these 
deficiencies or familiarize troops with jungle conditions.”77 Partially due to a 
widespread belief that large-scale operations in the jungle were impossible, there 
was no true preparation for infantry-led jungle fighting before the Japanese invaded. 
And once they did, the limited lessons emerging about jungle warfare from Malaya 
had little impact in Burma due to the short timeframe and lack of higher direction.78 
For the specific forces preparing to defend Burma, new units had arrived as 
brigades without preparation operating as a division. Initially, only the division 
headquarters and 46th Brigade arrived in Burma, later receiving the 16th and 48th 
Indian brigades and 2nd Burma Brigade.79 The 17th Indian Division lacked 
integration, conducted very little jungle training, and commander Major-General 
John Smyth concurred with higher headquarters that the young unit possessed 
deficient readiness.80 Most forces didn’t arrive in Burma until early January 1942 
and were activated immediately for battle with limited preparation once inside the 
country.81 The 1st Burma Division assembled during 1941 as a weak garrison force 
supplemented by additional units, and lacked any significant preparation for 
operating as infantry or in the jungle. The 13th Indian Brigade arrived in April as a 
reserve in Mandalay, and in mid-year the country’s other internal security units 
reorganized to become the 1st and 2nd Burma Brigades under the 1st Burma Division, 
joined by two British battalions in Rangoon for domestic security.82 The 1st Burma 
Brigade included the newly-raised four battalions of indigenous Burma Rifles, and 
the Burma Military Police gendarmerie that previously served as the Burma Frontier 
Force, units designed and prepared for border control and internal security.83 
Uniquely, the Burma Military Police possessed a 1928 manual for jungle warfare 
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but it emphasized tribal subjugation an was inappropriate for the upcoming battles.84 
Additional formations would arrive in January and February, to include three 
Gurkha battalions and a regular armour company, but overall the units remained 
understrength and ill-prepared.85 
In preparation for the impending IJA attack, forces positioned along Burma’s 
eastern border with Siam in small pockets to hold approaches and then to oppose 
invaders as they attempted to traverse the five rivers leading to Rangoon.86 Already 
hindered by limited personnel and low readiness, the force disposition did not help. 
The forward deployment “was weak, for it meant tying isolated and unsupported 
units to villages that could be either outflanked or reduced by a concentrated 
enemy.”87 This disposition likely increased risks, vulnerabilities, and would 
exacerbate setbacks during the operation. However, the disposition could not 
reconcile the larger disparity in skill, readiness, and tactics. These deeper, structural 
deficiencies would have significant impact during the operation. 
 
Invasion, Surprise, Setbacks, and Retreat 
The Japanese invasion and thrust north entailed numerous events, actions, reactions, 
and responses, but the overall trend is clear. Over several weeks invading IJA forces 
would prove that “Japanese tactics, especially flanking movements at night through 
difficult terrain, could not be halted by road-bound Allied troops.”88 The result was 
“an unmitigated disaster” and the longest retreat in British history.89 Setbacks 
accumulated, combined, and cascaded, so that “the Army in Burma had no real 
chance of stopping the Japanese and suffered a string of defeats.”90 Neither side 
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implemented change sufficient to be considered adaptation, but for different 
reasons: the defenders had no ability or time, while the attackers had no need. 
British-led Allied forces consistently struggled against Fifteenth Army’s offensive 
tactics and in the jungle, factors that were mutually reinforcing but entailed distinct 
challenges. These problems would become obvious once fighting began. 
 On 20 January 1942, IJA Fifteenth Army invaded using offensive tactics 
through the jungle that consistently outfought defending forces, opened the path to 
Rangoon, and chased defenders out of Burma.91 Almost immediately units from the 
IJA 55th Division infiltrated the 16th Indian Brigade’s defences and caused a 
disorganized retreat.92 The IJA’s force organization and offensive doctrine appeared 
uniquely suited to the Burmese jungle: the light infantry possessed sufficient 
mobility to move throughout the terrain, they had the skills to do so, and the 
restricted visibility “made it an almost perfect medium for attack” since troops were 
difficult to detect and defenders’ flanks were frequently insecure.93 In contrast, the 
defenders possessed widespread “ignorance of the jungle” and “perhaps above all 
poor training.”94 These shortcomings could be seen when the 16th Indian Brigade 
was quickly disrupted and pushed to Dawnas in disarray within 48 hours. It was “a 
grim foretaste of things to come,” seen in IJA speed, exploitation, and “ruthlessness 
with which they drove forward across terrain considered impassable.”95 The early 
battles followed a pattern of Japanese attackers moving through the jungle for 
powerful strikes against units that consistently proved road-bound, unprepared, and 
without time to change.96 Some collapsed and disintegrated.97 
 Defenders withdrew from the Bilin River to the Sittang River Bridge which 
now presented as the last vital defensive point between invaders and Rangoon.98 IJA 
units outraced the retreating defenders, attacked those guarding the bridgehead, and 
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seized nearby hills.99 On 23 February as two IJA regiments approached the 
bridge,100 members of 17th Indian Division destroyed it which trapped the 16th and 
46th brigades on the wrong side—half the division’s strength.101 This event reduced 
the unit to 3,500 personnel, 41% of its total strength,102 “finishing the division as a 
fighting force until reinforced and re-equipped.”103 It also caused Wavell to replace 
commanders of both the Burma Army and 17th Indian Division.104 By losing the 
bulk of defending forces as well as control over the Sittang River, defenders now 
possessed no real capacity to prevent IJA progress toward Rangoon or its almost-
certain seizure. IJA units continued to apply their basic infantry tactics and exploited 
advantages in relative speed, mobility, and small-unit skills to push toward the 
capital. The remaining parts of 17th Indian Division was temporarily encircled and 
trapped by a roadblock, fortunate to survive. Simultaneously, British reinforcements 
arrived on 5 March with the 63rd Indian Brigade, but the new forces had little ability 
or time to address the IJA momentum.105 Forces reorganized into a newly-created 
Burma Corps commanded by Major-General Bill Slim, with the 17th Indian 
Division, 1st Burma Division, and newly-arrived 7th Armoured Brigade.106 One day 
later the Burma Army escaped Rangoon and retreated 200 miles north to Prome. 
With the capital now undefended, on 8 March the IJA 33rd Division “advanced 
straight towards Rangoon without meeting much resistance, and took the city.”107 
Cut from reinforcements and external resupply,108 defenders lost the ability to 
sustain a major force or large-scale operation inside Burma.  
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The IJA invasion and seizure of Rangoon required almost zero deviation 
from original planning, and the IJA’s account of the operation indicates no 
significant challenges or setbacks.109 Now controlling Rangoon and its critical port, 
the IJA reinforced. Fifteenth Army gained two divisions as they arrived in the 
capital, the 18th from Singapore and the 56th from Java, delivering the largest 
concentration of operational IJA ground forces in Southeast Asia. The final Japanese 
drive north “did not lead to any major changes in fighting methods” as Fifteenth 
Army infiltrated the outnumbered, over-extended British, and encircled units on a 
large scale.110 In April Fifteenth Army pushed northward while defenders struggled 
to slow the invaders south of Mandalay. By mid-April the 1st Burma Division, 
trapped at Yenangyaung, burned the oil fields. Soon after, IJA 56th Division turned 
the Allied flank and began to collapse the front as forces retreated out of the 
country, ceding it to Japanese control. By 28 May nearly all Burma Corps troops 
had passed into India after a 900-mile retreat.111 Burma Corps was dissolved. All 
remaining forces were transferred to IV Corps and India Command.  
 
Measuring Effectiveness and Outcome 
The IJA Fifteenth Army invasion presents a clear example of operational success. 
Attacking forces controlled Rangoon within eight weeks and seized all the critical 
locations after only five months. To gain control of the country cost Fifteenth Army 
only 2,000 battlefield deaths—far less than the 10,000 casualties in Malaya and 
Singapore, considered one of the most decisive routs in modern warfare.112 Quickly, 
decisively, and relatively inexpensively, Fifteenth Army seized all objectives 
deemed critical for control and never truly appeared close to battlefield defeat. 
 Yet this example also indicates how outcome and performance are not 
always perfectly aligned, as Fifteenth Army operational effectiveness is rated as 
intermediate. IJA forces consistently applied complex tactics but never delivered 
sophisticated manoeuvre or combined arms across units. While applied for 
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German deaths in Poland, where also the Germans suffered 30,000 wounded and 3,400 missing in 
action, compared to Polish losses of 70,000 killed, 133,000 wounded, and 700,000 taken prisoner.  
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impressive effects, the IJA essentially applied “grand tactics” that used mobility and 
tempo to outflank and to assault.113 The higher-echelon units employed the same 
techniques simply on a larger scale, without significant inter-unit coordination or 
any synergistic application of effects. The performance “at the tactical level is what 
won,”114 as rapid assaults and pursuit were suitable for the terrain and sufficient 
against the unready defenders. IJA success depended largely on an alignment of 
strengths in their basic skills for applying core infantry tactics in the jungle. Units 
consistently displayed their proficiency in small-unit engagements using ambush, 
movement, and attack. Forces also displayed basic coordination of ground 
firepower, and the two divisions operated well within a flexible plan, particularly 
regarding the seizure of Rangoon and subsequent pursuit. Tactically, the British 
forces “had been completely outclassed,” particularly as the IJA held defending 
units in place while conducting a wide turning movement around the flank, through 
the jungle to attack a line of communication.115 This hook technique was not new 
but was applied very well. Notably, the IJA “were not jungle experts.”116 When IJA 
units moved out of the jungle into the open plains of the Irrawaddy Valley in 
pursuit, the same tactics proved effective outside the jungle against defenders as 
they withdrew to India.117 The IJA suffered no setbacks, and their intermediate-level 
effectiveness was plenty sufficient for victory. 
 By comparison, British operational effectiveness was low and the outcome a 
failure. Put simply, unprepared troops performed poorly. Although a few exceptions 
exist,118 personnel and units consistently struggled with basic skills and core combat 
abilities. Units were “half trained, and the training they had received was for the 
wrong environment.”119 Defenders were unprepared in basic techniques and 
“insufficiently mobile off the roads.”120 After losing the Sittang River, “the fate of 
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Rangoon was no longer in doubt,” and with it the country.121 Only an orderly retreat 
saved the units from greater disaster.  
However, this last point is notable, reminding how Fifteenth Army failed to 
destroy defending forces in the field—the primary objective.122 Retreating forces 
suffered about 1,400 deaths, no small sum, but significantly less than the 38,000 in 
Malaya and Singapore.123 They also largely evaded capture, also unlike in Malaya 
and Singapore with 130,000 prisoners and internees, or in the Philippines with 
72,000 prisoners, or the Dutch East Indies with 93,000 captured Allied troops.124 In 
Burma, many of the forces escaped and arrived in India. The 17th Indian Division, 
while reduced and battered, was “still capable of functioning as a division.”125 A 
nucleus remained that the Japanese, “for all their advantages of initiative and 
numerical superiority, had failed to annihilate.”126 Sanctuary, protected by terrain 
and the upcoming monsoon, had saved many of the retreating forces. 
 
Figure 3.1: Measuring Adaptation, Effectiveness, Outcome: Japanese Invasion 






















Findings and Relevance 
Case Study Assessment: Lack of tactical adaptation by IJA Fifteenth Army during 
the 1942 invasion did not create significant setbacks or prevent operational success.  
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In this case study, hypothesis 1 (H1), central vertical information mechanism 
over decentralized horizontal, comes out as neutral. H1 is inapplicable due to 
insufficient evidence. Minor changes that occurred prior to the invasion such as the 
IJA’s short pamphlet from the Taiwan Army Research Station, the 17th Indian 
Division’s minor preparations before deployment, or the Indian Army’s issuance of 
MTP9 (first edition), were not in response to battlefield setbacks in Burma. Also, 
they had limited impact on performance. 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2), anticipation over improvisation, is disputed. Both forces 
during the 1942 invasion anticipated incorrectly regarding terrain and adversary, but 
with very different results. Japanese preparations for open warfare against the USSR 
across Manchurian plains created no significant problems for jungle fighting against 
Allied forces in Burma while British preparations for open warfare against the 
Germans and domestic internal defence in Burma led to failure. Neither side 
improvised to create new tactics, techniques, or procedures that impacted upon 
effectiveness or outcome. This hypothesis reflects a larger challenge for this case 
study in that it is very difficult to measure a condition or type of adaptation when 
there was no significant battlefield change. However, H2 is considered disputed due 
to the costs and degree of Indian Army mistaken anticipation. Being so wrong, and 
the high costs this caused, combine to challenge the notion that anticipation will 
produce superior ideas through foresight, perspective, analysis, and implementation.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3), skill over technology, is affirmed. Findings from this 
case study appear most relevant for H3 as IJA attackers exploited a significant 
imbalance in skill despite less-advanced technology or modernization. Throughout 
the operation retreating defenders needed time and space to address their skill 
deficiencies that had resulted from insufficient or deficient training. Thus, the 1942 
invasion provides a strong example of the relevance, necessity, and impact of 
thorough and effective training in basic skills as it relates to battlefield performance 
and outcome. A less-equipped, less-advanced, attacking force without a significant 
numerical advantage used unchanged methods applied in a consistent pattern to 
outperform its more-advanced adversaries, and to attain a decisive success. While 
H3 shares a similar problem with the other hypotheses regarding the difficulty of 
measuring conditions for tactical adaptation when there was limited change, this 
case suggests that a skill imbalance can be highly dangerous, and in some cases may 
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overcome a technological imbalance. Therefore, skills developed through training 
may be more valuable than some types of resources, equipment, or technological 
sophistication. Unfortunately for the British, this lesson would be displayed again in 
their next operation. 
 
Figure 3.2: Findings for the Japanese Invasion 
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Chapter Four 
Failure to Adapt:  
The First Arakan Offensive, September 1942–May 1943 
Facing pressure to display British resolve after retreat to India, in 1942 British 
forces began a limited overland advance down Burma’s western coast on the Arakan 
peninsula to seize Akyab island.1 This offensive aimed for a “very limited 
objective” that would deliver minor tactical improvements in return for creating a 
larger effect in morale and world opinion.2 Yet despite this limited aim and British 
numerical superiority, after several months the attack ended in abject failure as even 
modest objectives were unattainable against outnumbered Japanese defenders in 
their bunkers. British forces applied unchanged tactics in uncoordinated, massed, 
frontal assaults across a narrow front, resulting in a decisive defeat. This chapter 
posits that insufficient British tactical adaptation before and during the operation 
exacerbated setbacks and contributed to this outcome. Thus, examining the First 
Arakan Offensive reveals how tactical inflexibility can exacerbate setbacks and 
contribute to operational failure. This case also suggests how human skill may 
overcome technological disadvantages, displayed by Japanese defenders with 
inferior numbers, equipment, and firepower, repulsing a much larger force using its 
material advantages incompetently. 
 
Forces and Capabilities 
Japanese defence of the peninsula appeared light. Of the four IJA divisions in 
Burma only the 55th was in the country’s west, with just one regiment and some 
divisional units defending the approach to Akyab.3 These units would be isolated 
from reinforcements for at least several weeks since other forces were spread along 
the coastline and occupied parts of southern Burma, with larger IJA forces 
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Vol. 14, No. 1 (2007), p. 87. 
 2 William J. Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945 (New 
York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), p.149, updated introduction with an unabridged republication of 
the edition originally titled Defeat Into Victory published in 1956.  
 3 Slim, 40. 
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elsewhere in central Burma, parts of Assam, and the far northeast.4 Commanded by 
Colonel Kosuke Miyawaki, who would operate under direct command of Fifteenth 
Army in Rangoon rather than a division commander, the composite defensive group 
was built around the 213th Regiment responsible for garrisoning Arakan.5 This 
3,600-strong force included two infantry battalions, one battalion of mountain 
artillery, a company of engineers, with field, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank guns.6 Many 
of the personnel previously fought in China, and had arrived in Rangoon via sea 
from Bangkok during the initial invasion before fighting across central Burma.7 
Regarding preparations for the defence, IJA doctrine emphasized offensive action 
and generally avoided specific technical guidance, but the IJA did possess and 
follow some common techniques regarding defence, particularly the use of bunker 
systems. According to Allied reports, “Japanese doctrine prescribes that ‘even the 
smallest unit will prepare deeply entrenched and strong positions against the 
expected attack.’”8 Additional evidence compiled across Southeast Asia revealed 
common IJA practices using defensive bunker systems, as later corroborated during 
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the operation.9 However, Japanese defenders would face attacking units that 
possessed significant advantages in numbers and firepower.10  
Following orders originating with Commander-in-Chief India Archibald 
Wavell to Eastern Army Commander Noel Irwin,11 the plan into Arakan eventually 
became Operation CANNIBAL.12 To execute, forces would employ direct infantry 
attacks across the jungle-clad Mayu hills which ran 90 miles from the Indian frontier 
and through the coastal terrain, with hills sitting between narrow strips of land with 
tidal streams often swamped by rain and mud during the late-year monsoon.13 The 
peninsula bordered the Bay of Bengal in the southwest and Mayu River along the 
east. Eastern Army possessed one unit judged fully operational,14 so the assault 
down Arakan would be conducted by Major-General W.L. Lloyd’s 14th Indian 
Division which would grow to three times the normal size during the course of the 
operation.15 The division would begin the assault with four infantry brigades, the 
47th Indian, 123rd Indian, 55th Indian, 88th Indian; V Force, and two artillery 
regiments. Later the division would add three more brigades, the 6th British, 71st 
Indian, and 29th Independent (Commando), resulting in the equivalent of nine 
brigades.16 All units would remain under division command rather than an 
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intermediate corps headquarters.17 The brigades varied in capacity, quality, 
experience, and integration, and faced several larger challenges. Units of the 14th 
Indian Division had served on the Northeast Frontier during 1942,18 and in Burma 
they had dispersed widely across the Arakan front and Bay of Bengal in defensive 
positions of battalions and companies.19 This orientation limited collective training 
above the battalion and the locations were ill-suited to learn jungle tactics. Several 
units were new to the division: two brigades arrived only in September, the 123rd 
and 47th, and later the 55th Indian Brigade joined from the Northwest Frontier. 
Finally, three loose battalions were incorporated into the 88th Indian Brigade.20 
Overall, the division’s limited training, defensive garrison duties, and new personnel 
caused the unit to suffer from general limited readiness exacerbated by a “drop in 
effectiveness” prior to the offensive.21 
 Attempts to address some of the shortcomings displayed in 1942 varied 
across units and made limited progress in the 14th Indian Division.22 Higher 
directives could be vague or impractical, such as C-in-C Wavell’s training directive 
in May 1942 that assessed the “root causes” for failures to be a lack of toughness, 
lack of discipline, lack of offensive spirit, and inappropriate equipment.23 It included 
the brief, general remedies of training hard, an increased reluctance to surrender, a 
need for more initiative, and to reduce equipment loads.24 In other cases, 
prescriptions would prove wrong, such as the conclusion that tanks could not be 
useful in the jungle.25 This misperception would be reflected during the First Arakan 
Offensive against Japanese bunkers, before ultimately being proven false two years 
later at nearly the same locations. More frequently and more broadly, attempts to 
implement new ideas failed since “there was no consistent application of new tactics 
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 22 Several of these army changes will be addressed later and with greater detail when 
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or processes.”26 Ideas were developed and codified in pamphlets or memoranda but 
“did not immediately translate into dramatically improved combat effectiveness” 
because they required commanders and units to train forces based on the updated 
ideas when they were already occupied conducting other tasks.27 Several ideas were 
promulgated across the Indian Army at different locations and echelons but failed to 
take root before the First Arakan Offensive. In early 1942, a revised Military 
Training Pamphlet No. 9, now expanded to 27 pages, recommended increased 
initiative, patrolling, and an active defence to protect vulnerable flanks against 
Japanese attacks. However, the new MTP9 offered little specific guidance on how to 
train or execute these tactics.28 In February 1942, Army in India Training 
Memorandum 14 first mentioned jungle warfare and delivered a brief (two-page) 
prescription about expecting IJA flank attacks and quickly counterattacking, but the 
document lacked specific guidance and was not accompanied by any formal 
requirement to implement the changes.29 AITM15 expanded the prescriptions about 
jungle fighting with some lessons from Malaya that argued the core elements of 
jungle warfare against the IJA presented nothing radical or new and required only 
basic improvements in patrols, information sharing, and physical fitness, concluding 
that “many of our mistakes were due to our neglecting the original principles of 
war.”30 The most significant new ideas may have been in AITM17 with the 
introduction of infiltration tactics and a need to increase the larger organization’s 
cycle of operations, but its publication in September 1942 was too late for the start 
of the Arakan offensive.31 Thus, even the minor army lessons beginning to emerge 
in 1942 had limited impact on units preparing to fight the Japanese in western 
Burma.32 A piecemeal, uncoordinated process for implementing new ideas delivered 
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to units vague or impractical guidance when they were already engaged in other 
tasks, worsened by unclear prioritization. Furthermore, the army’s basic training and 
reinforcement procedures remained relatively unchanged, so new ideas were not 
arriving to the 14th Indian Division. Across India Command there was “no consistent 
application of new tactics or procedures.”33  
 More specifically, 14th Indian Division made “limited progress in improving 
basic and jungle training” due to its force distribution, limited time, and army 
uncertainty about the appropriate lessons or how to change.34 In August 1942 the 
division created its own jungle warfare training centre in India but “the tactics 
devised were still not adequate” and the decentralized system of training was poor 
preparation for the upcoming fight.35 The Jungle Warfare School at Comilla 
addressed six core issues: Japanese outflanking and hook movements; holding 
ground when outflanked in order to maintain initiative; minor tactics (particularly 
ambushes); fitness; health discipline; and “dispelling the myth of the impenetrable 
jungle.”36 At the school, a platoon would deliver demonstrations as well as guidance 
to officers, non-commissioned officers, and complete platoons, with the aim of 
creating instructors for future training.37 Courses, consisting primarily of brigade 
officers, completed seven iterations from August to December although the total 
personnel trained is unclear. In other instances, some battalions received a small 
number of lectures on Japanese tactics, to include brief demonstrations, and then a 
few days of practical application to test the new techniques. However, with such 
limited information and efforts it failed to produce significant change.38 
Furthermore, even if superior ideas and techniques were available, “there had 
simply not been enough time to thoroughly drill the necessary techniques into the 
men and officers.”39 Therefore, while the 14th Indian Division made some 
preparations by emphasizing core combat skills and small unit engagements in the 
jungle against new Japanese tactics, the training only superficially addressed 
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challenges already displayed by Japanese attackers in the jungle. However, it did not 
predict the bunker system to be faced next. The significance of this new challenge 
would emerge as the operation unfolded. 
 
Down the Peninsula: Tactical Stagnation and Persistent Defeat 
The operation began 21 September as 14th Indian Division moved forces forward in 
preparation of the main assault in December.40 The early stages saw two brigades 
push southward through the hills toward Japanese positions at Maungdaw and 
Buthidaung where a Japanese battalion (II/213) had positioned itself fifty miles 
forward from the main force and straddling the Mayu Range.41 Now with two Indian 
brigades close to the IJA positions, a reserve brigade at Chittagong, and an 
additional brigade for a final assault,42 the IJA withdrew its forward battalion and 
moved down the peninsula to Donbaik near the southern tip.43 Donbaik was highly 
defensible, and had been prepared with fortifications and bunkers. Other IJA forces 
were deployed eastward across the small river at Rathedaung. At these locations, 
attacking forces would first experience the challenges of fighting against IJA bunker 
systems. In general, these systems connected multiple pill-boxes constructed of 
thick logs and soil.44 Dug into the ground and with thick overhead protection, the 
bunkers’ physical strength offered protection against artillery and some aerial 
bombs. Importantly, the structure could withstand supporting firepower from nearby 
IJA units which delivered protection for the 5–25 personnel inside the fortification 
in case they needed supporting firepower if attackers threatened to breach the 
system. Tunnels and trenches enabled IJA movement, and the overall system 
possessed camouflage and natural cover to exploit advantages for tactical defence.  
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The “real strength” of this system “lay in the sum of its parts” organized as 
an interconnected network of supported positions.45 This included weapons pits, 
strongpoints, and pillboxes prepared in depth and for intersecting fields of fire that 
could cause disproportionate casualties against any attackers caught in the 
overlapping fire.46 This ability to hold positions and combine firepower could enable 
a relatively small number of soldiers to achieve “surprise in the defence” and 
repulse larger units.47 The bunkers also possessed effective protection against 
attacking firepower, allowing defenders to survive, remain concealed, and to 
respond. The bunkers would prove “quite impervious to bombardment by field-guns 
and even the direct hit of a medium bomb rarely penetrated.”48 One unit would 
report that a pillbox could withstand “three direct hits from a [3.7-inch howitzer] at 
point-blank range,” and that this ability delivered valuable protection for the 
defensive locations.49 As a result, Japanese could “take accurate and heavy shelling 
without showing any signs of movement,” withstanding attacks as well as 
maintaining concealment of their automatic weapons and positions.50 With this 
ability to withstand indirect fire, if attackers penetrated to the bunkers then 
defenders could mass close-range artillery, mortars, and machine-guns to deliver 
disproportional casualties against the exposed attackers.51  
 At Donbaik and Rathedaung, IJA defenders had established these defensive 
bunker systems and the subsequent fighting produced “a classic example of 
Japanese defensive tactics.”52 One IJA regiment repulsed “attack after attack by 
massed battalions of 14th Indian Division” for fifty days.53 Facing IJA bunkers for 
the first time, attacking troops were channelled into mutually-supported fields of fire 
by the well-prepared and well-sited defensive positions.54 Overall, the skill and 
tenacity of Japanese defenders “came as an unpleasant surprise” to Indian Army 
                                                                                                                
45 Moreman, “’Debunking,’” 111. 
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The War Office, April 1945), 14, BL. 
47 Periodical Notes on the Japanese Army No. 7, 16. 
 48 Slim, 152; Allen, Burma, 98. 
49 Periodical Notes on the Japanese Army No. 7, 14-16. 
50 WO 172/1951, 14 Indian Division: G.S. 01 January 1943–30 April 1943, report no. 
125/10/I, 16 January 1943, TNA. 
 51 Slim, 153. See also Periodical Notes on the Japanese Army No. 7, 14. 
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attackers, as 14th Indian Division repeatedly stalled against the fortifications using 
massed infantry across a narrow front.55 Once fighting began, the combination of 
sturdy bunkers, skilled defenders, and attackers using uncoordinated frontal assaults 
caused the 14th Indian Division to fail consistently throughout the next three months 
and to suffer significant casualties.56 The division struggled from the very start,57 
and by 10 January the two leading brigades had been “brought to a standstill” on 
both sides of the Mayu River at Donbaik and Rathedaung.58 Assaulting Donbaik in 
early January, forces “were thrown back with heavy losses, and the same pattern 
continued for four successive days.”59 On 3 January, initial elements of the 47th 
Indian Brigade “experienced great difficultly during preliminary moves through 
thick darkness and jungle.”60 On 8–9 January, the brigade lost 100 casualties in a 
battalion assault as “progress proved impossible across the 600 yards of flat 
ground.”61 The brigade attacked again ten days later with “considerable numerical 
superiority” but suffered heavy losses in the “conventional set-piece frontal attack” 
as the leading company “suffered a number of casualties” against the entrenched 
defenders.62 By 21 February the brigade headquarters was suffering direct attacks 
from the IJA and the brigade withdrew.63 
 Across the river at Rathedaung, attackers failed to locate many IJA positions 
and conducted isolated actions which proved too weak to dislodge the defenders.64 
On 2 February, attackers in 123rd Indian Brigade faced hand-to-hand fighting, and 
IJA counterattacks caused “heavy casualties” as the brigade failed to hold ground.65 
“Heavy fighting” continued as the brigade advanced on 2–3 February and was “held 
up by enemy resistance” even with an artillery concentration that “did not reduce the 
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57 WO 172/1951, 14th Indian Division Daily Intelligence Summary, No. 66, Period 0900 
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enemy’s resistance.” 66 Then came a standard IJA counterattack, delivering more 
harm to the weakened forces. The attacks by the 123rd Indian Brigade had failed and 
the unit was withdrawn.67  
 Attacks by 55th Indian Brigade in early February also failed to clear IJA 
defenders and were driven back.68 The brigade attacked using two battalions “on a 
narrow front” accompanied by artillery and eight tanks from XV Corps but Japanese 
defenders quickly destroyed the forces.69 The tanks proved “ineffective.”70 They 
were “knocked out almost at once” and made “no impression at all.”71 Attacking 
infantry stalled as an entire battalion could be halted by a single defensive position. 
IJA firepower repulsed other attempts and attackers withdrew after facing “a 
strenuous fight,” with supporting artillery failing to reduce IJA resistance.72 On 18 
February the 55th Indian Brigade again attacked Donbaik with four battalions in a 
frontal assault that penetrated to the bunkers but, ultimately, failed against close-
range mortars and artillery.73 One battalion exited the tree line and attacked “across 
an open field” with no preparatory patrolling before assaulting “well-entrenched 
enemy positions in a frontal movement” without flanking support.74 Other units 
made “yet again a stereotyped direct frontal assault on a narrow front, behind a 
timed barraged fired by field artillery.”75 The result: “it was cut to pieces.”76 
Throughout the brigade, units conducted similar frontal assaults in the open and the 
subsequent losses caused the brigade to withdraw after two weeks. 
 By late February, the 14th Indian Division had grown to nine brigades after 
adding 71st Indian and 6th British brigades, tasked to assault Donbaik alongside the 
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 67 Moreman, The Jungle, 68. 
68 WO 172/2097, February 1943 War Diary, 55 Indian Infantry Brigade HQ, 1943 
February–March, 02 February, TNA. 
 69 Moreman, “’Debunking,’” 112, 113; Moreman, The Jungle, 68. 
70 Wavell to War Office 15 Feb., p. 1, in IOR/L/WS/1/1323, Burma Assam Operations.  
 71 Slim 152; McLynn, 101. 
72 WO 172/1951, 14th Indian Division Daily Intelligence Summary, No. 90, Period 0900 
HRS. 2 FEB to 0900 HRS 3 FEB 1943, p. 1, point 2(a), TNA. 
 73 Moreman, The Jungle, 69. See also WO 172/2097, 55 Indian Infantry Brigade HQ, 1943 
February–March, 18–19 February, TNA. 
74 Marston, Phoenix, 89. 
75 Moreman, “’Debunking,’” 115. 
76 Marston, Phoenix, 89. 
   102 
47th Indian Brigade.77 The attackers continued struggling to reach or to infiltrate the 
bunkers.78 The 6th British Brigade led the final attack on Donbaik in mid-March 
using a frontal assault with six infantry battalions supported by two field regiments, 
but made little progress and suffered heavy casualties during IJA counterattacks 
supported with defensive firepower.79 The final attack, again, was “made piecemeal 
on orthodox lines and completely failed to deal with Japanese defenses.”80 Similar 
to the preceding months, this “final British attack on Donbaik ended in abject 
failure.”81 At Rathedaung, individual units continued to be surrounded and forced to 
withdraw.82 By late march the 14th Indian Division’s offensive into Arakan ended. 
Then the Japanese counterattacked. The IJA inflicted severe losses against 
the British forces “widely dispersed and vulnerable” which continued to employ the  
same ineffective defences from the invasion.83 The continued, failed attacks at 
Donbaik and Rathedaung had provided time for the IJA Fifteenth Army’s 55th 
Division to arrive in Arakan after moving two regiments over 600 miles.84 By early 
March the Japanese had received sufficient reinforcements to counterattack the 
dispersed British units and began a larger counteroffensive. Shifting from defence to 
the attack, IJA forces again employed “a combination of deep and wide outflanking 
manoeuvres and infiltration tactics as used a year earlier.”85 Against the unchanged 
IJA tactics, British forces still used linear defences and had “no answer.”86 Static, 
standard defensive tactics allowed Japanese attackers to infiltrate between defensive 
positions, block movements, and attack from unexpected directions similar to the 
year before.87 Japanese companies “ran rings around Indian battalions, battalions 
outmanoeuvred brigades and regiments defeated several times their own number in 
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strength using the jungle either to outflank or to infiltrate British positions.”88 
Within a month, the Japanese encircled and attacked forces near Donbaik and 
Rathedaung, cleared the east and west flanks of the Mayu Range, emptied the 
valley, and “pushed back the numerically superior” troops in “demoralizing 
fashion.”89 Finally, the Japanese halted their offensive in April with British forces 
returned to their original position.  
 In a “complete failure” the British suffered 916 killed, 2,889 wounded, 1,252 
missing.90 Irwin fired 14th Indian Division commander Lloyd91 and then was himself 
fired as Eastern Army commander.92 In June the 14th Indian Division was re-
designated as a training division, withdrawn, and moved to Chhindwara. The unit 
would not fight again during the war.93 The Arakan offensive delivered the exact 
opposite of the intended effect on morale and world opinion, as the former 
plummeted and the later remained grim. The IJA’s bunker system and defensive 
techniques used at Donbaik became an exemplar of effective infantry defence.94 
 
Measuring Effectiveness and Outcome 
The First Arakan Offensive provides a clear example of operational failure. First, 
British forces failed to achieve the assigned objective as they could not clear IJA 
defenders to seize Akyab Island, a relatively limited goal. Second, the operation 
unfolded much more slowly than planned (or may seem reasonable) as forces 
stalled, repeatedly, at Donbaik and Rathedaung. When battling IJA defenders and 
then pursued by IJA counter-attackers, units from more than nine brigades expended 
high amounts of resources and lives against an outnumbered adversary that 
consistently outperformed them. Furthermore, the mounting casualties required units 
to replace personnel with less-experienced and under-trained reinforcements which 
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exacerbated costs and proved “one of the main reasons for the breakdown of 
fighting efficiency” as the operation unfolded.95 
 The 14th Indian Division’s performance may be considered tactical 
stagnation—the opposite of adaptation. During later reflection upon the division’s 
failures, it was concluded that “not enough attention had been paid to Japanese 
tactics and the lessons to be learnt from them.”96 As one author later summarized: 
We made frontal assaults on prepared positions; when the troops 
were exhausted the Japanese counter-attacked in the familiar form by 
a hook behind our positions and forced us to retire. We ended where 
we started, but after heavy losses in men and vehicles. As an 
offensive, the operation had failed.97 
The division employed forces and resources in an unchanged manner, repeatedly 
pushing frontal infantry assaults across narrow fronts to challenge the bunker 
complexes and IJA defences. Attempts to incorporate additional firepower with 
tanks or artillery—such as the failed infantry and armour attacks by 55th Indian 
Brigade in early February—entailed no significant changes to procedures or 
techniques.98 The result had limited impact on defending forces and the brigade 
reverted to infantry-led frontal assaults. Artillery, as displayed in late February after 
several months of fighting, continued to employ a pre-timed initial barrage that 
failed to damage the bunkers or to provide sufficient cover for attacking units to 
close with the fortifications.99 Infantry rarely attempted to manoeuvre around or 
above the defensive positions, seen repeatedly in the conventional attacks and 
subsequent failures by 47th brigade at Donbaik in January, 123rd brigade’s failed 
assaults at Rathedaung, and the 55th brigades’ struggles at Donbaik. When faced 
with these repeated, similar setbacks, the 14th Indian Division’s only change to 
battlefield tactics was to add more forces which produced unchanged results. Then, 
when pushed on the defensive in late February and March, British forces again 
                                                                                                                
95 IOR/L/WS/1/1371, Report of the Infantry Committee 1943, War Staff India Office 1-14th 
June 1943, p. 7, BL. 
96 Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men 
(London: Papermac, 1986), p. 497, originally published 1974. 
97 Mason, 497. 
98 AITM 18, 1. 
99 WO 172/2097, February 1943 War Diary, 55 Indian Infantry Brigade; Moreman, 
“’Debunking,’” 115. 
   105 
suffered from the same deficiencies displayed in 1942 during the invasion. This 
scenario indicates how any efforts to change during 1942 by 14th Indian Division or 
the larger army had little impact on changing performance in Arakan. 
 British operational effectiveness was low. Most forces struggled to function 
as a cohesive unit, and many lacked cooperation as a battalion.100 When attempting 
to incorporate tanks, such as during the 55th Brigade’s early-1943 assault on 
Donbaik, forces displayed an inability for armour and infantry to cooperate much 
less coordinate throughout the battle. Additionally, “no attempt” was made to train 
infantry and armour to coordinate together.101 Repeated frontal assaults against 
outnumbered IJA units consistently showed challenges for executing planned 
attacks against unchanged defences. Once facing the IJA counteroffensive, British 
units struggled with basic small-unit engagements in static defence and orderly 
retreat. Forces appeared to maintain core combat skills in unit cohesion, disciplined 
leadership, technical skills and weapons handling, but events in the First Arakan 
Offensive failed to suggest an ability to execute the complex tactics indicative of 
intermediate effectiveness. Thus, they are rated as low. 
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Findings and Relevance 
Case Study Assessment: Insufficient British tactical adaptation before and during 
the First Arakan Offensive exacerbated setbacks and contributed to operational 
failure. 
 For this case study, hypothesis 1 (H1), central vertical information 
mechanism over decentralized horizontal, is supported. Prior to the First Arakan 
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Offensive, new ideas began to emerge in increased patrolling, more aggressive 
small-unit tactics, and infiltrating behind IJA defences, but the lack of a formal army 
training centre or a clear prioritization of what ideas required attention, at what time, 
and in what order, undermined their larger adoption. The decentralized and 
horizontal nature of sharing information produced disparate notions with differing 
relevance across units and centres with unclear guidance. One result was that units, 
with little time to decide or to implement changes, took various ad-hoc actions and 
produced guidance that was frequently unclear or contradictory. This decentralized 
process contributed to the resulting low effectiveness. The First Arakan Offensive 
supports H1 because the decentralized mechanisms failed to incorporated battlefield 
lessons for wartime adaptation. The shortcomings in readiness and effectiveness 
appear directly related to the lack of a central mechanism to incorporate lessons in a 
formal and structured manner.  
 Hypothesis 2 (H2), anticipation over improvisation, is disputed. The First 
Arakan Offensive indicates the costs of failure to improvise, suggesting that 
improvisation may be more applicable to reducing immediate setbacks than 
attempting to anticipate future challenges. Once encountering the IJA bunker 
defences and initial setbacks in January 1943 with the 47th Indian Brigade then 14th 
Indian Division consistently failed to create any new solution as it continued to 
deploy the 123rd Indian Brigade, the 55th Indian Brigade, the 88th Indian Brigade, the 
71st Indian Brigade, and the 6th British Brigade. Over several months these brigades 
consistently employed simple frontal assaults that failed to close upon the bunkers, 
much less breach them, seize them, or suppress the Japanese counter-fire. It seems 
unreasonable to expect the Indian Army to possess sufficient knowledge beforehand 
about the bunker systems to anticipate or to train fully for their destruction, but once 
the battles unfolded then the repeated application of tactics unsuited for the tasks at 
hand delivered crippling setbacks. Anticipation still may be more valuable in 
preventing the future repetition of mistakes, but the 14th Indian Division’s struggles 
against IJA counterattacks in March 1943—which used the same techniques as the 
year before—displayed a failure to conduct anticipatory adaptation as well. Thus, 
the failed attempts to anticipate future solutions and the apparent necessity to 
improvise ones combine to dispute H2. 
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 Hypothesis 3 (H3), skill over technology, is affirmed. Constructed largely of 
wood and dirt and supported by small arms, the bunker systems delivered an 
effective defence against an attacking force that was better equipped and much 
larger. By cooperatively using basic resources and foresight against unchanging 
tactics, an expanded IJA regiment repeatedly repulsed multiple brigades armed with 
more artillery, more armour, and more-advanced equipment. While the bunkers 
would later be defeated through advanced training, improved combined-arms 
coordination, and new assault tactics, during early 1943 the skill of a few IJA 
defenders successfully and effectively repulsed a force superior in numbers, 
equipment, and firepower. This outcome indicates the power of skilfully employing 
existing technology and limited resources over incompetently using greater 
resources and more advanced technology. Thus, IJA bunker defence affirms the 
importance of skill over technology. 
 
Figure 4.2: Findings for the First Arakan Offensive 
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Chapter Five 
Adaptation and Success: 
The Second Arakan Encounter, 1943–44 
Following Japan’s successful defence against the British Arakan offensive, by early 
1943 the IJA controlled a defensive perimeter across Burma and both sides paused. 
As Japan lacked the desire or capability to push further north, British forces 
regrouped in northeast India. During this period, the Indian Army developed new 
tactics that would improve battlefield performance and enable a very different 
outcome in the Arakan by early 1944. The IJA, in contrast, remained unchanged. 
This chapter posits that British adaptation and Japanese consistency enabled British 
forces to counter the IJA tactics employed so successfully in the past, and to achieve 
operational success. Thus, this case indicates how wartime change may contribute 
significantly and directly to operational success by raising battlefield effectiveness. 
Therefore, the Second Arakan Encounter suggests that if forces possess the capacity 
to learn against an adversary presenting clear and surmountable tactical challenges 
then wartime adaptation may deliver critical advantages to improve performance 
and to enable operational success. 
 
 BRITISH STUDY AND CHANGE 
Japanese attackers had outfought British forces but these techniques failed to present 
any fundamental or revolutionary change in warfare. And since the tactics had been 
clearly revealed they were now available for thorough examination.1 During 1943 
and early 1944, British forces used anticipation and a central, formal mechanism for 
information management to consolidate, evaluate, and disseminate new ideas. Then 
they used revised training to build skills in the new tactics for in the jungle and 
against the bunkers. The result was a British force whose units, up to and including 
divisions, could fight well in the jungle against IJA encirclement, hooks, and 
infiltration, and increased effectiveness against the IJA defensive bunker systems. 
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pick up and use.” H.P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies 
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 432. 
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Problems and Needs 
The retreat from Burma and failed First Arakan Offensive revealed shortcomings 
that caused rigorous internal assessment and resulted in significant change. Initially, 
the larger Indian Army continued to suffer from low readiness due to the lingering 
effects of force expansion.2 Also, training “with little centralised control” lacked 
coordination or much practical application.3 Fighting in 1942 had enabled the army 
to highlight dangers of IJA speed, mobility, infiltration, and encirclement, but 
reform remained unattainable without time for larger assessment and direction. In 
response to this combination of setbacks, shortcomings, and previously ineffective 
techniques, the Indian Army reorganized in 1943 to implement new tactics using 
revised training and to increase resources in preparation for the invasion of Burma. 
 Most immediately the army needed to address jungle fighting and to develop 
responses to IJA attacks. In both Malaya and Burma, defenders had “no effective 
answer” for IJA infiltration, encirclement, and roadblocks which repeatedly proved 
devastating.4 The lack of basic skills across British forces was exacerbated by 
insufficient jungle training, causing units to be unprepared in both general tactics 
and specialized skills.5 Tactically, forces “had been completely outclassed” by 
Japanese methods that proved highly effective while also relatively simple.6 The IJA 
had been “demonstrably better skilled at living and moving in the jungle,”7 enabling 
them repeatedly to hook and hold British forces at their front while sending a quick 
mobile force in a wide turning movement around the flank, through the jungle, to 
block lines of communication.8 British troops lacked such an ability to move 
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 3 Alan Jeffreys, The British Army in the Far East 1941–1945 (Oxford, Great Britain: Osprey 
Publishing, 2005), pp. 14-15. 
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through the jungle, to move with comparable speed, to prevent such outflanking 
movements, or to breach the roadblocks.9 
 IJA defensive systems also proved a significant challenge. The First Arakan 
Offensive displayed IJA forces as “formidable opponents on the defensive whose 
skill at constructing elaborate and strong fortifications was unparalleled.”10 In 
addition, the British technique of attacking bunkers across a narrow front had 
“proved disastrous.”11 Unprepared for the bunkers and unable to coordinate 
firepower to breach them, forces had displayed insufficient skills in core capabilities 
to overcome the numerous challenges they faced. When attacking IJA defences “the 
same mistakes had been made again and again,” using established techniques that 
consistently proved ineffective.12 Overall the IJA defenders proved “hard to see and 
harder still to kill” when prepared and concealed in the protective bunker systems.13 
 
Assessment and Change 
In mid-1943 the Indian Army conducted internal assessments that changed its 
organization and revised practices to alter readiness and capabilities, establishing a 
foundation that would endure for the war’s duration. First, Commander-in-Chief 
Wavell formed the Infantry Committee in May 1943 during his final days in post, 
and directed the group to examine past infantry performance and recommend 
corrective action.14 Assembled in June, the committee issued an influential “detailed 
analysis of causes of failure” from the invasion through the First Arakan 
Offensive.15 It emphasized the failed preparation of infantry for jungle warfare, an 
organizational mistake compounded by low readiness and general unpreparedness. 
The overall quality of personnel in the infantry was deemed low compared with that 
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of other branches, and problems were exacerbated by insufficient training, 
especially the absence of collective training.16 Training centres could not handle the 
high volume of incoming personnel—which now arrived possessing a lower level of 
basic skills—and therefore delivered troops to their units unprepared to fight. Once 
combat began the units received only similarly under-trained replacements.17 The 
committee recommended to senior leadership that the infantry receive better 
officers, NCOs, and recruits; that forces receive improved training both individually 
and collectively; that the army reduce the shifting of experienced troops into new 
units; and the establishment of new training divisions. For these forces to be 
effective in Asia, doctrine had to change and be controlled by a central authority: 
One final aspect affecting basic training needs stressing. This is the 
overriding need for a simple and recognized jungle warfare doctrine 
which must include cut and dried battle drills on which the training of 
recruits can be based… at present many doctrines exist, all of them 
fundamentally different and all of them being put into effect in 
different parts of India. They would stress the urgent need for G.H.Q. 
to control the Pandits, who produce such doctrines, so that the 
training of the recruit and the trained soldier can follow accepted 
doctrine.18 
The committee’s recommendations would be addressed by the Director of Infantry 
Reginald Savory, and this new office “marked an important turning point in fitting 
the Indian Army for war against Japan.”19 Supported by new Commander-in-Chief 
Auchinleck,20 Savory and his office were granted broad authority regarding training, 
resources, and organization. He would play “a critical role for the rest of the war” by 
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 17 IOR/L/WS/1371, Report of the Infantry Committee, 2. 
 18 IOR/L/WS/1371, Report of the Infantry Committee, 8. 
 19 Moreman, The Jungle, 84. In June 1943 Wavell appointed Major-General Reginald 
Savory as Inspector of Infantry and the position changed a few months later to Director of Infantry. 
Before this appointment, Savory commanded the 23rd Indian Division in Assam. Callahan, 98. 
 20 Wavell was replaced on 20 June 1943 by General Sir Claude Auchinleck, and command 
over Burma passed to the new South East Asia Command (SEAC). However, during the next four 
months, the Commander-in-Chief India “acted as a caretaker responsible for operations on the Indo-
Burma front as well as organizing, equipping and training units destined for that theatre.” Moreman, 
The Jungle, 84. 
   112 
implementing, evaluating, and refining new and specialized training programs 
throughout the theatre, with the most important time being June–November 1943.21  
 Vitally, the army soon created training divisions to improve replacements’ 
readiness, and also linked incoming personnel with frontline divisions.22 The two 
new training divisions were the 14th Indian Division from the First Arakan 
Offensive, now located in Chhindwara, and the 39th Indian Light Division (formerly 
the 1st Burma) from the retreat out of Burma, at Saharanpu.23 Now recruits 
completed elementary-level training—also extended by a month—before the 14th 
and 39th divisions delivered two months of specialized jungle training using 
experienced officers and NCOs as instructors.24  Soldiers next moved to 
reinforcement camps which also changed significantly from their initial status as 
holding locations, manned by staff largely “unwanted by units or who preferred the 
rear to the front.”25 Now each camp was linked specifically with a forward division 
that would rotate veteran personnel to run the camps and to train the replacements, 
providing greater discipline and realism. Additionally, as forward units evaluated 
new tactics and doctrine, they could send back assessments so that incoming 
soldiers received the same updates as those currently fighting—and with time to 
prepare.26 This process delivered timely lessons which matched practices of the 
forward unit, and replacements began to identify as part of the division.27 
 British forces now possessed a mechanism to address deficiencies as well as 
time to do so during the monsoon. To implement solutions, the army used four 
general processes that were related but can be considered individually. First, it 
brought new units. The 7th Indian Division trained individually and collectively on 
the Northwest Frontier and became one of the first formations to conduct jungle 
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 24 Slim, 191. 
 25 Slim, 191. 
 26 Messervy 5/15, Lessons From Operations, 10 September 1944, p. 1, in Messervy, 7 Indian 
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training.28 After the unit transferred to India’s central provinces it joined a mobile 
jungle training team led by veterans of the Burma retreat in a programme 
emphasizing minor tactics, specialized jungle skills, and coordination with artillery, 
mortars, and machine guns.29 The 20th Indian Division was created in March 1942 
and “established and trained solely for the war in Burma.”30 In Ceylon since mid-
1942, the division’s commander distributed recent lessons from Burma and Malaya 
and incorporated them into training.31 Uniquely, the unit performed intensive 
training to the level of full divisional exercises. In general, it “had little to do other 
than train hard focusing on basic training and entirely on jungle fighting against the 
IJA.”32 The 81st West African Division from southern Nigeria landed at Bombay 
and the unit began to train in jungle camps near Chas and Western Ghats.33 
Although specialized jungle training was limited since the terrain proved unsuitable, 
the division still benefitted from practicing small-unit skills in accordance with 
emerging lessons.34 The 5th Indian Division arrived after fighting with distinction in 
North Africa against German and Italian forces, and began jungle training in Bihar 
Province with the assistance of a brigade of Arakan veterans.35 The division moved 
again to Lohardya, Ranchi, to lighten its force by replacing motor transport with 
animals and acquiring smaller artillery, and to conduct two months of jungle 
training.36 It also gained a brigade and regiment from Arakan, and the units 
conducted jungle warfare education as well as training with tanks.37 Overall, the 5th 
Indian Division conducted a detailed training program on terrain, patrolling, 
weapons, fire control, and fieldcraft. 
 Second, British forces created and disseminated lessons for new tactics and 
fighting in the jungle. Two mechanisms proved most important: an updated edition 
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 33 Moreman, The Jungle, 89. 
 34 Some officers had previously attended the West African jungle training school at Enugu. 
Moreman, The Jungle, 90; Jeffreys, The British Army, 56. 
 35 The 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade from the 14th Indian Division, designated as a training 
unit. Moreman, The Jungle, 90. 
 36 Jeffreys, The British Army, 28; Moreman, The Jungle, 91. 
 37 The 27th Mountain Regiment and 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade. Jeffreys, The British 
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of Military Training Pamphlet No. 9 (India): Jungle Warfare, which offered a 
simplified, coherent doctrine to facilitate training;38 and several Army in India 
Training Memoranda for quickly disseminating new thinking.39 The 1940 MTP9 
contained only eleven pages of general guidelines,40 and two expanded editions in 
1943 (eventually to 73 pages) still delivered limited impact due to their late arrival, 
uneven use, and narrow scope.41 But then in September 1943 the fourth edition 
arrived, The Jungle Book, and with it “GHQ India finally produced a comprehensive 
jungle warfare doctrine with the publication of 80,000 copies.”42 Written 
specifically “to assist commanders in training their units to fight the Japanese in 
jungles,” the new manual combined the previous editions with lessons from the First 
Arakan Offensive.43 MTP9 proved the “most important addition by far” to the larger 
body of jungle warfare doctrinal literature, delivering lessons in topography and 
emphasizing offensive action through ambushes and patrols, even when in defensive 
operations.44 MTP9 described specific tactics for using various arms, and discussed 
their coordination using speed, assault parties, weapon skills, and seizing limited 
objectives.45 Patrols were essential for offensive techniques which now prescribed 
encirclement and flanking rather than frontal assaults.46 MTP9 provided a single, 
authoritative doctrine “upon which other training could be based.”47 
 Other lessons regarding minor tactics and specific challenges were assessed 
and disseminated primarily through AITM and supplemented by pamphlets.48  
                                                                                                                
 38 Military Training Pamphlet No. 9 (India) The Jungle Book, Fourth Edition (Delhi: 
General Staff, India, September 1943). 
 39 The shift in emphasis to training for jungle fighting began, most substantially, with Army 
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Patrolling was emphasized, as well as techniques for reconnaissance, ambushes, 
attacks, or to enable larger assaults using encirclement and flanking, that required 
practice and refinement.49 Patrols lasting ten days over seventy miles were not 
unknown for units as large as a company, with the larger size useful for defence if 
discovered.50 Forces prepared for discovery by using consistent RV techniques and 
implementing instinctive immediate action battle drills, to practice pre-determined 
responses from the first moments of being ambushed or unexpectedly encountering 
an enemy at close range.51 The Indian Army training directorate distributed a 
handbook for battle drill instruction, with precise guidance for junior officers to 
implement across sections, platoons, and companies.52 An additional pamphlet 
discussed challenges specific to thick jungle, and these two directives assisted small-
unit leaders to prepare and to perform in the jungle where minor tactics played an 
essential role as units often operated in smaller formations and with greater 
autonomy due to compartmentalizing terrain and the large size of the area.53 Overall, 
corps and army leaders emphasized the need to fight without long defensive lines 
which meant that forces could expect to have IJA formations in their rear, to 
coordinate with mobile reserves, to use hooks to turn flanks, to seize the initiative, 
and that every type of unit had to be prepared to fight and patrol.54 
 For the bunkers, the First Arakan Offensive delivered valuable experience 
for understanding bunker construction, characteristics, counterattacks, and fire 
procedures, which allowed for experimentation, demonstrations, and manuals to 
deliver new tactics. In mid-1943 the infantry schools studied and tested methods for 
attacking bunkers, hosting demonstrations and courses for officers as well as 
distributing pamphlets of general principles.55 In some instances engineers 
constructed bunkers or roadblocks, accompanied by instructional demonstrations for 
attacking the position and discussions afterwards regarding experiences and 
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challenges.56 Separate trials tested infantry and artillery weapons to assess what 
would be more or less effective for destroying bunkers. This combination of 
technical assessment, general principles for attack, and instruction for assaults, all 
contributed to enhanced abilities and a shared understanding about the new methods 
for attacking Japanese defences.57 
 To counter IJA infiltration and encirclement, the army expanded the concept 
of defensive boxes into one of a larger defensive pivot system with mobile strike 
forces.58 Previously, forces attempted to sustain defensive positions during a 
fighting withdrawal, causing defenders to become vulnerable when responding to 
IJA attack: the combination of terrain, distance, and supply made forces too thin and 
therefore a defending line “could always be turned.”59 Instead, defending units now 
had to abandon the concepts of lines of defence or the necessity of holding terrain in 
favour of self-contained pivots and aiming to reduce IJA forces through grinding 
attrition. Senior leaders introduced the new pivots in April 1943, designed to hold 
only vital locations by using strong positions that contained all resources necessary 
for independent defence. The idea “quickly gained widespread acceptance” and was 
taught in formal schools.60 The original concept of defensive boxes was altered to 
one of new locations to concentrate forces and increase their firepower, reduce the 
number of resupply lines that could be attacked, and perhaps induce IJA attackers to 
use limited avenues of approach into prepared killing grounds.61 These pivots could 
then destroy enemy forces by seizing a location that the IJA had to attack in order to 
hold a line of communication, and repulse IJA attackers with defensive firepower 
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supported by mobile strike units to trap IJA attackers, even though these elements 
increased the number of forces to be sustained. Defenders would now weaken and 
exhaust IJA attackers, and then transition to counterattack to annihilate IJA forces.62  
 In practice, implementing pivots required new concepts of operations, 
coordination, preparation, and procedures. Effectiveness depended on a shared 
understanding of how units must execute the revised actions. First and most 
obviously, using defensive boxes implied resupply and reinforcements since isolated 
forces could succumb to a siege or overwhelming firepower.63 Coordinating aerial 
resupply became critical to enable the isolated forces to move and survive, as well 
as to eliminate a key vulnerability – reliance on ground-based lines of 
communication which the IJA previously had repeatedly cut. Indian Army opened 
an Air Supply Training Centre and created companies for this specific purpose.64 
The system was not faultless – commanders would compete for air assets and there 
was a need to coordinate resupply with forward units – but the basic idea was 
established with forces created and prepared to execute the modified mission.65 The 
other, and possibly more important, element of new pivot tactics was the use of 
operational reserves in a coordinated system to trap IJA attackers. Otherwise, IJA 
assault forces could mass personnel and firepower against defensive boxes, or 
simply trap them and wait for exhaustion or possibly ineffective aerial resupply due 
to poor weather or maintenance problems from high operational tempo. The 
defensive box could withstand assaults if it possessed sufficient firepower, but only 
mobile reserves could annihilate an attacking force.66 The isolated defensive units 
“were to form an anvil against which reserves could destroy the enemy forces from 
their rear.”67 This combination of defensive boxes with reserves in a larger system 
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reflected a new concept regarding how units and commanders would need to act. 
Defenders had to be prepared to select and remain in an isolated location, coordinate 
details with other units, and remain confident that they would be resupplied and 
reinforced. Subordinate units had to fight across semi-isolated locations, with 
supporting resources and firepower responsive to enemy actions. Resupply and 
reinforcement units had to understand the new concept of operations, and how they 
should execute in support. Rather than simply defensive boxes or new resupply, the 
pivots represented an altered concept that shaped numerous other methods and 
procedures. 
 Third, individuals and units learned and practiced the new ideas at the 
reformed training divisions, starting in December 1943.68 The 14th Indian Division 
and 39th Light Indian Division had gained experience over the summer as officers 
attended Jungle Warfare Schools, NCOs had training sessions, and larger 
installations were constructed for attending units.69 After three months the units 
began two-month courses with a first phase emphasizing fitness and basic skills in 
field training, weapons, and jungle movement, all largely through drills. The second 
phase moved units to the jungle for a more realistic context of camps, patrols, night 
assaults, and small-unit leadership.70 Additionally, frontline officers and jungle 
warfare specialists would visit to deliver lessons and lectures. Training was 
“intensive, for nine hours a day, six days a week, and often including three nights’ 
work a week.”71 
 Fourth and finally, frontline units conducted small-scale practical 
application. This effort was facilitated by a larger army reorganization in October 
that created the Fourteenth Army under the Eleventh Army Group in Delhi, 
allowing Fourteenth Army to concentrate on Assam and re-attacking through Burma 
after freeing it from responsibilities for other parts of India.72 With better recruits, 
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more time, and the ability to realign personnel, Fourteenth Army improved 
readiness for major combat operations by focusing on basic skills and small-unit 
tactics.  Forces in Assam and Arakan trained during the monsoon and, perhaps most 
importantly, conducted active patrolling to increase proficiency in the new skills, 
gain confidence in their appropriateness, and gather intelligence on Japanese 
dispositions.73 Patrolling was assessed as “the master key to jungle fighting,” and as 
patrols met Japanese forces and experienced success in small skirmishes, the British 
increased their ability to move through the terrain and morale improved.74 Early 
successes caused Fourteenth Army to expand the practice across the entire force for 
giving new units experience, skills, and confidence.75 These traits would prove 
useful in the months ahead. 
 
SECOND ARAKAN ENCOUNTER, JANUARY–MAY 1944 
In early 1944 both Japan and Britain attacked into the Arakan peninsula and fought 
over many of the same objectives as the year before but with a very different 
outcome. The resounding Japanese defeat in the Second Arakan Encounter saw 
British forces decisively repulse IJA attacks and then drive IJA defenders out of 
well-prepared positions, a result labelled the “turning-point in the campaign.”76 
British forces applied the concepts they had learned over the previous months in 
new infiltration tactics, increased coordination between infantry and supporting 
firepower to breach the bunkers, and defensive boxes in a system of mobile pivots to 
withstand IJA assaults and to counterattack. Over several months, British XV Corps 
attacked, withstood a major counteroffensive, and re-attacked down the peninsula.77  
Events during the Second Arakan Encounter must be considered within 
Japanese plans which included two related but distinct efforts, a thrust into Arakan 
followed by an offensive into the Imphal plain. As British forces advanced into 
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Arakan the IJA planned a large attack into India to undermine the impending British 
offensive and perhaps incite a larger popular uprising to tie down forces and 
resources.78 This scale of attack was enabled by the IJA increasing forces in Burma 
to seven divisions over the previous year.79 In 1943 IJA HQ approved the plan, to be 
executed by the newly-formed Burma Area Army which possessed two armies of 
eight ground divisions, commanded by Lieutenant General Kawabe Masakazu.80 In 
early 1944 the IJA HQ ordered Twenty Eighth Army to conduct Ha-Go into Arakan, 
with Fifteenth Army to conduct U-Go into Imphal later in the year.81 The operations 
occurred sequentially and will be analysed separately.82 
 
Forces and Plans 
British XV Corps aimed to seize Akyab Island and nearby airfields, the same 
objectives as 1943, using two divisions to concentrate forces at a few points in IJA 
defences.83 XV Corps would possess operational control, and initial moves by 
commander Lieutenant General Christison pulled back 26th Indian Division and sent 
forward the 5th and 7th Indian divisions to capture the road at Maungdaw.84 The first 
phase aimed to occupy Maungdaw and to attack Japanese defenders along the 16-
mile road linking the port to Buthidaung, to secure lines for operations in 
Kalapanzin Valley.85 The 7th and 5th Indian divisions would move side-by-side down 
the Mayu Range, protected on their flank by parts of the 81st West African Division 
while the 26th Indian Division formed a corps reserve.86 The 5th Indian Division 
would move along the range’s west side to seize the Razabil fortress, while the 7th 
Indian Division would move on the east to seize Buthidaung.87 The 7th Indian 
Division was one of first units to conduct jungle training, while the 5th Indian 
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Division had arrived in June and began jungle training after fighting well in the 
Middle East and North Africa.88 
 As units moved southward the Japanese also prepared to invade Arakan, 
using the new Twenty Eighth Army led by Lieutenant General Sakurai Shozo.89 
Initially stationed in Arakan to defend against a seaborne invasion, now the Twenty 
Eighth Army aimed to attack and to destroy XV Corps as well as to draw its 
reserves to weaken other forces in India.90 The IJA aimed to split the two defending 
divisions by flanking the 7th Indian Division to isolate the unit and then destroy the 
7th and 5th divisions in succession.91 The IJA 55th Division Infantry Group led by 
Major General Sakurai Tokutaro would attack the British near Buthidaung and then 
continue to occupy Taung Bazar in order to attack the rear of 7th Indian Division.92 
Finally, forces would cross the Mayu Range to attack 5th Indian Division at 
Maungdaw.93 The plan reflected an unchanged IJA “formula of attack” using 
encirclement and isolating forces by cutting lines of communication.94 
 
XV Corps Assault Progresses: Infiltration and Closing on the Bunkers 
XV Corps attacked first, and initial engagements indicated benefits of the new 
tactics. In early November the 5th Indian Division moved toward Razabil and began 
active patrolling.95 In the east, 7th Indian Division met IJA bunker systems; and as 
before the IJA had skilfully used the hilly terrain which would make frontal assaults 
very difficult. Accordingly, 7th Indian Division units would need to employ the new 
infiltration tactics to bypass defenders and envelop IJA lines by using the gaps 
between defensive positions.96 Attackers would aim for an objective deeper behind 
the defenders and then attack from the new position against IJA units orientated—
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now incorrectly—against a frontal assault.97 Larger operations began on 30 
November as the division’s 33rd Indian Brigade led assaults near Awlanbyin, and the 
revised infiltration tactics “paid off in practice” as entrenched defenders were 
attacked from the rear, isolated, and forced to withdraw in early December.98 By 
mid-December the division reached Buthidaung and began opening the Ngakyedauk 
Pass for resupply and further operations.99 Throughout December and January the 
7th Indian Division continued to favour patrolling for locating defensive positions, 
followed by infiltration and encirclement against entrenched defenders.  
 Following these initial engagements, in January 1944 the 7th Indian Division 
explicitly directed units to rely on infiltration using the jungle’s concealment to 
exploit opportunities using small-unit initiative and aggression. Frontal attacks were 
to be avoided since, it was now confirmed, “a stereotyped set-piece attack will have 
little chance of success.”100 While frontal attacks remained easier to initiate, to 
control, avoided unknown territory, and therefore leaders might be tempted to 
employ them, only infiltration enabled attackers to manoeuvre into the positions 
behind IJA units that would make defenders sufficiently vulnerable to defeat.101 
Thus, future actions would use reconnaissance patrols to determine the depth of 
defensive positions and then advance behind them, followed by strong attacks on the 
positions while the larger unit prepared for the inevitable IJA counterattack.102 Once 
this position was consolidated, in the final phase units would “steadily and 
methodically” eliminate Japanese positions one-by-one.103 The result would be 
separate pockets of Japanese defenders caught between the British infantry units in 
their rear and the larger supporting arms firing from the front. Emphasizing lessons 
from the updated MTP9, the key element remained consolidation once the initial 
objective was reached and repulsing IJA counterattacks. Retaining control was 
highly difficult but extremely important as “all endeavour is completely wasted 
unless control is regained quickly and consolidation commenced without a 
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moment’s delay.”104 Additionally, units had to abandon past procedures of 
supporting artillery barrages since “all experience in the Arakan has demonstrated 
the utter futility of a formal infantry attack supported by artillery concentrations or 
barrage against Japanese organized jungle positions.”105 The concealment and 
physical strength of IJA defences rendered British artillery, alone, insufficient for 
destroying the bunkers. Yet the problem of closing on the Japanese positions and 
consolidating to repulse counterattacks persisted.106 The prescription for future 
attacks would be infantry infiltration and encirclement using small units, followed in 
the position-clearing phase by artillery fire called by forward observers onto 
specific, isolated defensive positions to eliminate any remaining defenders.107 
 Across the peninsula on Arakan’s western coast, the 5th Indian Division 
began moving southward toward the Razabil defensive bunker complex. Initial 
movements saw the division begin fighting entrenched IJA defenders as it moved to 
seize Maungdaw. Similar to 7th Indian Division, attacking brigades of the 5th Indian 
Division employed the revised tactics of patrols and infiltration between bunkers to 
isolate defenders by cutting lines of resupply or reinforcement, resulting in frequent 
IJA withdrawals to fall-back defensive locations.108 Benefitting from two months of 
jungle training in Ranchi which was “entirely new to most of the division,” by early 
January the division’s operations validated the new tactics, by showing “the only 
way to deal with the [Japanese] defences is by infiltration.”109 Vitally, fighting also 
revealed that the IJA had produced “nothing new in [defensive] tactics.”110 
Therefore, the IJA remained vulnerable in the same ways as had been studied over 
the previous year. The bunkers remained well-hidden and well-covered by 
supporting firepower but could be “eliminated piecemeal by infiltration tactics.”111 
Frontal assaults should be avoided—and remained very costly—but if they had to 
occur then they were applied for isolation rather than annihilation, with the purpose 
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of “strangulation, starvation, and attrition.”112 Similar to the 7th Indian Division, the 
5th Indian Division recognized how consolidation after seizing an objective 
remained essential, issuing additional guidance about the necessity of adhering to 
the new tactics.113 By late January the 5th Indian Division began probing Razabil 
with this same indirect approach, using patrols to identify IJA positions and then 
seizing nearby positions to threaten defenders and provoke either withdrawal or 
counterattack.114 Now positioned near the defensive stronghold at Razabil with its 
extensive bunker system, the British attackers faced the first significant test of their 
new tactics against well-prepared IJA strongholds in a larger fortification network. 
 Subsequent fighting would reveal attackers’ increased effectiveness against 
the heavily-defended fortification network caused by improved coordination 
between infantry and supporting firepower. Shaped like a large horseshoe, Razabil 
presented the first segment of a heavily fortified area using railway tunnels, bunkers, 
and mountainous terrain. In late January, the 5th Indian Division began to attack the 
Razabil bunkers in the face of “tenacious enemy resistance in well prepared 
positions.”115 On 26 January the 5th Indian Division began a four-day assault led by 
161st Indian Infantry Brigade, a unit that had repulsed several IJA counterattacks in 
previous weeks.116 The 161st Indian Brigade led the attack supported, uniquely, by 
extensive artillery, armour, and air power.117 However, the close air support and 
artillery failed to cause any significant damage and infantry remained vulnerable 
when making the open, 1000-yard, approach unprotected.118 Similarly, while tank 
fire proved capable of destroying some IJA bunkers, the covering fire still failed to 
protect infantry crossing the last 50 yards and forces were unable to seize the 
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bunkers.119 Thus, the increase of firepower failed to overcome the challenge of 
coordinating arms to enable soldiers to close with the bunkers, and to do so without 
a significant pause which allowed defenders to regroup.120 Over the next three days 
the 161st Brigade failed to defeat IJA defenders, but supporting tanks had displayed 
their ability “both to knock out bunkers and give very close fire support to infantry” 
as they approached.121 This new ability came from modified armour procedures 
applying a sequence of surface-burst shells to clear vegetation, delayed-action 
rounds to destroy forward bunkers, and armour-piercing rounds to cover infantry in 
the final approach.122 The altered techniques and new cooperation with infantry 
“provided a striking demonstration of the potential of [armoured fighting vehicles] 
in jungle fighting.”123 Attacks by the 5th Indian Division’s 123rd Indian Brigade 
nearby on positions at “Wrencat” and “Wrenkitten” displayed improved cross-arms 
coordination although continued to struggle in consolidating on the seized objectives 
due to Japanese counterattacks. Fighting uphill from a valley floor, tanks and 
medium artillery destroyed IJA bunkers with continuous fire, then used tanks’ 
armour-piercing rounds for the final assault.124 One regiment concluded that with 
the new infantry–firepower cooperation, one or two platoons “can always reach the 
summit of any position.”125 Initial assaults on the north side of Wrencat were 
“completely successful” caused by infantry coordination with supporting fire, 
repeated later in subsequent assaults along the south side.126 The problem, still, was 
that when reaching the bunkers the defenders’ quick and intense counter-fire 
continued to repulse the attackers. Even when British units withstood one 
counterattack, a subsequent, larger, “devastating” counterattack against the multiple 
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positions under consolidation forced a withdrawal.127 The platoon withdrawals 
indicated how immediate artillery and mortar fire was required against “all points 
from which enemy fire could be directed onto attacking infantry.”128 Problems 
remained, but now the attackers possessed a framework and capability to improve 
the coordination required for the final seizure of bunker networks. Thus, by late-
January the British had tested and began to refine the new tactics that eventually 
would enable forces to seize the position. Events had reinforced how forces, after 
seizing the bunkers, must employ supporting firepower immediately to attack other 
nearby locations that could fire upon the seized objectives. Otherwise, consolidating 
at the new positions proved too difficult in the short window of time before being 
fired upon. Ultimately the setbacks combined to halt the initial assault near Razabil 
on 30 January, but the tactics had proven sound and would deliver future gains. The 
British had “solved” a key problem by finding a way to get their infantry close to the 
bunkers “without a pause in the covering fire that kept his enemy’s head down.”129 
 On 5 March, XV Corps resumed the larger offensive and defeated the 
defensive positions. Against the IJA bunker system at Razabil the 5th Indian 
Division restarted its offensive using infiltration and encirclement techniques that 
pushed out the defenders as things “proceeded successfully and according to 
plan.”130 On 9 March the 161st Indian Brigade led the attack by moving into the hills 
and then cut IJA lines of communication, forcing defenders to withdraw.131 On 12 
March the lead brigade overcame remaining IJA opposition, seized the dominant hill 
nearby, and by that afternoon attacking units possessed “the whole of the Razabil 
fortress.”132 Over the next several days, 5th Indian Division pushed into the 
surrounding areas in pursuit of remaining IJA defenders and cleared the tunnels.133 
The 123rd Indian Brigade continued to attack lingering forces in defensive positions 
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around the Razabil area, clearing it and gaining full control.134 By that time the 
events at Razabil had revealed the superior utility of new infiltration tactics 
supported by coordinated firepower against the defensive bunker system. It was 
concluded that “even the strongest [Japanese] position is vulnerable if you can get 
behind it and attack it from the rear.”135  
 
Ha-Go Counterattack Repulsed: Pivots, Boxes, and Mobile Counterattacks 
Concurrent with the fighting at Razabil, British forces withstood and repulsed a 
major Japanese counterattack using new pivots, defensive boxes, and improved 
small-unit tactics. After the 7th Indian Division and its three brigades moved forward 
relatively unopposed in early January, near the end of the month the IJA Twenty 
Eighth Army counterattacked to isolate the division.136 By 1 February the IJA 55th 
Division threatened key positions after executing “a real Japanese breakthrough.”137 
Despite British forces anticipating an attack, the Japanese still surprised defending 
units and advanced several miles into positions behind the 7th Indian Division from 
which they could threaten Ngakyedauk Pass and division headquarters.138 Attackers 
used “similar methods to those that had proved so successful in Arakan in 1943,” 
relying on columns to infiltrate through the jungle under cover of darkness using 
“speed, audacity and boldness.”139 The plan “was based on the old successful 
Japanese formula of encirclement, cutting communications and withering the 
enemy.”140 The IJA 55th Division aimed to isolate units from resupply so that they 
would respond as they had in the past, fighting backwards to clear their 
communications and thereby becoming vulnerable as they struggled to escape.141  
 The IJA main thrust made progress but stalled against the new defensive 
tactics. On 4 February the IJA advance overran 7th Indian Division headquarters at 
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Launggyaung and isolated defenders at Sinzweya.142 But unlike past instances, here 
the division first employed defensive boxes.143 Rather than retreat, the defenders 
followed a prearranged plan to stop, assume all-around defence in the jungle, go to 
half-rations, and to coordinate aerial support.144 The 7th Indian Division formed 
multiple rectangles of approximately two-by-four miles that each housed a brigade, 
one near Buthidaung, one across Kalapanzin Valley, one north of Ngakyedauk Pass, 
and the headquarters element in the Administrative Box at Sinzweya.145 Brigades of 
the 7th Indian Division and one from the 5th dug-in for an all-around defence, and by 
8 February it was surrounded by the 55th Division’s main striking force of 
approximately 7,000 men that “had to destroy the 7th [Indian] Division in the next 
few days” to avoid stalling in the surrounding area.146 Soon, 7th Indian Division 
reported that the Japanese “made further attacks and succeeded in infiltration 
through the thick jungle into [division headquarters] area and established a 
[machine-gun] post on the hill behind.”147 The isolated division headquarters was 
the weakest position since it was hastily prepared and contained mostly non-combat 
units, and became the focus of IJA attacks.148 It remained in place at Sinzweya and 
fought the IJA as they assaulted and flanked the positions.149 Occupying a flat area 
that prevented a continuous perimeter, defensive units formed “a series of small 
mutually supporting defensive localities” and fought across them.150 Commanded by 
Brigadier Geoffrey Evans, the administrative units, supported by several detached 
infantry companies and two tank squadrons, repelled the first IJA attack on 6 
February, beginning an 18-day battle.151 Throughout subsequent days the IJA 
                                                                                                                
 142 Jeffreys, The British Army, 33. 
 143 Jeffreys, The British Army, 34-35. 
 144 Moreman, The Jungle, 119. 
 145 Moreman, The Jungle, 119. 
 146 Slim, 239, 237, 240. The main striking force was formed around the 112th Regiment 
commanded by Colonel Tanahashi who previously had “proved himself the most formidable of the 
enemy leaders in our 1943 Arakan disasters.” Slim, 237. 
147 WO 172/4290, War Diary or Intelligence Summary, Summary of Event and Information, 
12 February 1944, 0630 hours, in 7 Indian Division “GS,” 1944 January–December, TNA. 
 148 Moreman, The Jungle, 119. 
 149 WO 172/4290, War Diary or Intelligence Summary, Summary of Event and Information, 
February 1944, 16–29 February, in 7 Indian Division “GS,” 1944 January–December, TNA; Jeffreys, 
The British Army, 33; Allen, Burma, 176. 
 150 Moreman, The Jungle, 119. 
 151 Moreman, The Jungle, 119. 
   129 
attackers repeatedly attempted to penetrate the area and were repelled by defenders 
who, afterwards, found Japanese bodies in groups up to 50 dead.152  
 The division’s individual brigades similarly repulsed IJA attacks throughout 
the month.153 For the 33rd Indian Brigade, once dug-in on 9 February, the units 
fought Japanese almost daily along the perimeter.154 IJA attackers repeatedly 
attempted to breach the positions, with British forces repulsing the infiltrations and 
sending out fighting patrols.155 On 14 February the forces survived a three-battalion 
night assault.156 The 89th Indian Brigade similarly fought off frequent IJA attacks in 
mid-February.157 Facing continued setbacks against the new British defensive 
positions, hints of IJA inflexibility began to emerge as attackers would repeat failed 
assault routes, changing only the number of attackers rather than how they fought.158  
 Across the operation, forces in XV Corps now battered IJA units as the Ha-
Go offensive “ground to a halt in front of these self-contained all-round defensive 
boxes.”159 Inside the boxes, tanks and artillery acted as mobile bunkers to repulse 
Japanese attacks.160 After supporting the 7th Indian Division during mid-February, 
the 26th Indian Division moved behind IJA units in the Kalapanzin Valley while 5th 
Indian Division fought at Ngakyedauk Pass and then eliminated the IJA’s secondary 
force for the entire offensive.161 By late-February the IJA began to withdraw with 
the main force of 7,000 having lost over 5,000 dead others wounded or sick in the 
jungle.162 Finally, the 7th Indian Division seized Buthidaung and Letwedet 
Fortress.163 On 12 March—the same day the 5th Indian Division reattacked 
Razabil—units of the 7th Indian Division continued killing Japanese defenders 
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whose situations were quickly worsening. In one day “at least 180 bodies were 
recovered… all except 30 of these being killed within the previous 24 [hours].”164 
Intense fighting—including hand-to-hand combat—cleared practically all remaining 
defenders, with many dead “buried beneath the debris of the battered [Japanese 
positions].”165 On 25 March a final 400-member, near-suicide IJA attack against the 
Administrative Box failed, and by late March XV Corps controlled the entire 
Buthidaung–Letwedet area.166  
Reflecting in April, the 7th Indian Division commander likely exaggerated in 
that the division “never lost a position to the enemy or failed in any attack,” but this 
assertion illuminates how forces performed much better compared with the failures 
of 1942.167 Units still fighting to clear the tunnels at Razabil were replaced by the 
26th Indian Division, brought from reserve, and the area was finally secured on 3 
May.168 Separately, the 81st West African Division failed in the Kaladan Valley as 
they were pushed out by forces from the IJA 54th Division and had to withdraw to 
Sangu, but this setback could not reverse the “historic success of British arms” 
during the Second Arakan Encounter.169 XV Corps suffered 3,506 casualties but had 
soundly defeated IJA attackers as well as the defensive bunker positions. The 
operation also revealed the “massive significance” of the new combat techniques.170  
 
Evaluating British Success and Identifying Effectiveness 
The Second Arakan Encounter provides a clear example of operational success. 
First, attacking forces achieved the assigned mission of controlling Arakan through 
the entire Buthidaung–Letwedet area. Second, XV Corps achieved nearly all its 
objectives while suffering casualties within acceptable parameters and a reasonable 
timeframe for the operation.171 Unlike the failed First Arakan Offensive, now the 
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divisions in XV Corps displayed an ability to conduct offensive and defensive 
battles employing improved (and more difficult) tactics. Conversely, IJA defenders 
and attackers applied unchanged tactics with the same skill and tenacity, but their 
unchanged performance allowed British forces to overcome them. 
 British forces increased operational effectiveness to an intermediate level 
while the IJA remained unchanged. Fighting largely as divisions and brigades, 
British forces demonstrated several improved abilities. First, units displayed 
enhanced basic skills and core combat abilities in both the attack and defence. 
Across numerous battles both the 7th and 5th Indian divisions consistently displayed 
core combat skills in unit cohesion, disciplined tactics, weapons employment, and 
basic logistics. Perhaps these abilities are seen most clearly in the Administrative 
Box fighting, as a mix of forces skilfully executed a static defence and repulsed IJA 
assaults by combining manoeuvre and firepower across small-unit engagements. 
Forces across the brigades also displayed improved basic abilities when executing 
the new techniques of patrolling, infiltration, encirclement, bunker attack, and 
pursuit. Without these core skills, the more complex actions would be impossible. 
These improvements likely resulted from the 5th and 7th Indian divisions being 
better-prepared than preceding units in both general abilities and specific skills. The 
5th successfully fought over two years in the Middle East while the 7th was 
considered one of the best-trained units in Southeast Asia.172 But both also had 
benefitted from specialized training. The 5th spent time in Ranchi undergoing 
training for jungle warfare, where also it lightened transport and weaponry.173 It 
incorporated several units with previous experience in Arakan, to include veteran 
officers and NCOs.174 The 7th was “one of the first formations to embark on jungle 
training” and, closer to Arakan, several early skirmishes revealed deficiencies which 
enabled their remedy and improvement.175 The units could use their foundation of 
general readiness upon which to build specialized skills of jungle warfare. 
 British forces also overcame four previous shortcomings. First, forces 
avoided the costly, slow, and ineffective frontal assaults with new infiltration tactics 
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supported by patrols. This improved ability was displayed most clearly in the 7th 
Indian Division’s attacks near Awlanbyin, and the new tactics were employed 
effectively by both divisions as their units consistently infiltrated between and 
behind IJA lines.176 Using low-level initiative and high-level coordination, forces 
located key areas behind IJA positions to make defenders vulnerable, and then 
fought in relative isolation once extended beyond lines of communication to 
continue the attack. Like the 5th Indian Division near Maungdaw,177 infiltration and 
patrols regularly forced IJA defenders into either a costly counterattack or 
withdrawal, in clear contrast to the First Arakan Offensive. Second, new 
coordination to combine armour and infantry overcame the previous inability to 
penetrate and clear IJA bunker systems. The 161st Indian Brigade’s four-day assault 
on heavily-fortified Razabil indicated the capacity of tanks to destroy bunkers when 
airpower and artillery failed, and to cover infantry as they closed on the 
fortifications.178 Later the 123rd Indian Brigade at Wrencat and Wrenkitten used 
armour to give covering fire for the infantry over the final 25 yards with a sequence 
of high-explosive and armour-penetrating rounds, followed by immediate fire once a 
bunker was seized to counter IJA indirect fire against the position.179 These new 
techniques and cooperation combined with altered infantry assaults, ultimately, to 
clear defenders “out of the strongest possible natural positions that they had been 
preparing for months and were determined to hold at all costs.”180 Third, the new 
technique of responding to IJA attacks by employing pivots with defensive boxes 
successfully countered Japanese offensive tactics that had previously proved so 
devastating. When the brigades of 7th Indian Division were surprised and surrounded 
then units established boxes, held them in defence, coordinated resupply, conducted 
patrols, and employed reserves to attack the IJA.181 Pivots and boxes displayed the 
disciplined application of basic combat skills in weapons handling and small-unit 
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leadership, but the larger system entailed a complex interaction that skilfully 
coordinated resupply and reinforcement by brigade and division assets. Fourth, all 
these events occurred in the jungle, where previously British forces struggled to 
move, were quickly encircled, and relied on ground-based lines of communication 
which caused units to struggle with independent action. During the Second Arakan 
Encounter, in contrast, forces indicated an improved understanding of how the 
jungle and related force disposition required changed concepts about battle lines. 
This unique environment required pockets of forces that could move and support 
each other in a coordinated fashion against an enemy from many directions. In some 
ways, all the specific lessons of tank–infantry coordination, tactical infiltration, 
patrols, and defensive boxes reflected this altered conceptualization of jungle 
warfare. 
 In contrast, Japanese inflexibility exacerbated their setbacks. This 
unwillingness or inability to change would play a larger role later in the campaign, 
but it first began to manifest during the Second Arakan Encounter as the IJA 
consistently applied similar tactics despite their reduced effectiveness. Whether 
unchanged assaults against the 7th Indian Division and its isolated units, or repeating 
patterns of attack despite failures against the defensive boxes, or similar attacks 
against the new pivots system, or performing the same pattern of bunker defence 
until attackers learned how to close, to hold, and to clear the tunnels, the IJA 
consistently failed to adapt. It remains unclear if this IJA commitment to 
unchanging tactics was due to previous successes which failed to inspire an impetus 
for change, confidence in morale and will to produce a different outcome, or other 
factors. What is clear is how repeated IJA setbacks did not cause any significant 
change during the operation even as the British indicated new abilities and 
advantages over the Japanese. During the Second Arakan Encounter, evidence 
began to emerge of IJA tactical rigidity that would harm future operations, with 
units repeating mistakes and producing similar failures. In early 1944, this inability 
to change caused unnecessary casualties.182 It also foreshadowed more to come. 
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Findings and Relevance 
Case Study Assessment: British tactical adaptation during 1943 resulted in 
operational success during the Second Arakan Encounter in 1944. 
For this case study, Hypothesis 1 (H1), central vertical information 
mechanism over decentralized horizontal, is affirmed. The Indian Army’s ability to 
assess setbacks, devise solutions, and implement changes to execute as desired 
proved critical for increasing effectiveness and contributing to success. Starting with 
the creation of the Infantry Committee and appointment of the Director of Infantry, 
the larger army leadership recognized a need to adjust practices to improve the 
branch. By assessing battlefield setbacks as displayed in 1942—and particularly the 
need for a single authority to determine, control, and revise doctrine—staff and units 
could then be directed to provide answers in accordance with operational 
requirements. Once ideas were considered, evaluated, and refined, the central 
authority could task subordinate units and training centres to follow the revised 
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methods. Additional lessons could be assessed and disseminated in the AITM or 
other official correspondence. This capacity for standardizing practices, concepts, 
and training appears particularly relevant in the development of defensive pivot 
systems due to the large amount of personnel and units that had to operate within a 
shared conceptual framework that was significantly different from past practices.  
 Hypothesis 2 (H2), anticipation over improvisation, is affirmed. Preparation 
for the known problems and expected challenges of fighting IJA defenders in 
bunkers, using the new pivot systems against IJA infiltration, and inculcating 
infiltration and jungle tactics across the infantry, all contributed to improve 
performance and enabled XV Corps to attain all objectives with reasonable 
expenditures in time and resources. Once prepared in these measures, British forces 
faced essentially no setback for which they were completely unprepared. While the 
isolation of 7th Indian Division and attacks against the headquarters element posed 
the greatest risk to British units during the offensive, defending units responded in 
the pre-planned manner and made no significant changes to the pivot system. When 
the 5th Indian Division failed to clear the Razabil bunker system in the first wave of 
assaults, units adjusted the cooperation between infantry and supporting firepower 
but did not implement any wholesale change in tactics. Rather, units assessed the 
difficulties of closing, consolidating, and repulsing IJA counterattacks, and then 
incorporated improvements within the existing techniques. While improvisation 
may have assisted in modifying some of the new tactics, it was consistently the 
larger changes incorporated before fighting began that delivered the greatest impact 
and contributed to success.  
 Hypothesis 3 (H3), skill over technology, is affirmed. For H3, the new 
concepts, their incorporation through training, and subsequent employment directly 
increased battlefield effectiveness and enabled success. Compared with the invasion 
and First Arakan Offensive when the British possessed advantages in more modern 
equipment and technological sophistication yet attained only low effectiveness, 
during the Second Arakan Encounter the British employed new tactics based on 
changed concepts on which they had been reorganized and retrained. While 
firepower proved valuable—particularly for closing on the bunkers—the key 
difference from the past was how units could coordinate and cooperate with that 
firepower for a synergistic application of effects. The adapted tactics produced a 
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very different outcome than against the bunkers in early 1943, when a small group 
of IJA defenders repulsed multiple brigades. Relatedly, the new infiltration tactics 
required no significant technological enhancement. They remained grounded in 
small-unit tactical training, core competencies, and an updated concept for their use 
built upon improvements in mobility, coordination, and patrols. Regarding the 
pivots, XV Corps did employ new methods of resupply, but this procedure would 
not matter without the broader change in concepts for boxes and reinforcements in a 
larger pivot system. At this time, air resupply remained inherently unsustainable in 
the long-term due to the limited amount of resources that air could deliver, as well 
as challenges associated with weather and maintaining aircraft. Without the broader 
reconceptualization of battlefield tactics into pivot systems to withstand attacks and 
to counter with mobile assault teams, British forces could have been isolated, 
eroded, and defeated. One could argue that the IJA’s position would have been 
different if supplied for a longer operation or if possessing superior firepower to 
breach defences, counter British armour, or even destroy the fuel and ammunition 
supplies vital to the defence.183 However, during the operation the significant 
changes in battlefield performance, seen in the defensive pivots as well as across the 
peninsula, were due to the qualitative changes in new tactics that had been 
considered, taught, and applied by early 1944. Improved IJA resources likely would 
have limited some Japanese setbacks but it must be concluded that they were 
unlikely to overcome the new imbalance in skill caused by British adaptation. 
 
Figure 5.2: Findings for the Second Arakan Encounter 
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Chapter Six  
Adapting toward Failure:  
Long-Range Penetration Groups, 1942–43 
After seizing Rangoon in March 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army reinforced and 
postured for defence with four divisions spread across the country. British planners 
faced decisions about how to respond after units had revealed low readiness, a lack 
of mobility, an inability to fight in the jungle, and poor small-unit skills. One idea 
aimed at restoring speed and movement to attack IJA defenders spread thin across 
the jungle: to create new units of Long Range Penetration Groups (LRPG) that 
could raid, attack, isolate IJA units, and force their withdrawal. By freeing units 
from the requirements associated with conventional firepower and logistical support, 
leaders intended the new force to operate deep inside IJA-held territory and erode 
the Japanese force. This new force and its altered tactics represented a significant 
adaptation, shaping battlefield performance and operational outcome. The result, 
however, was two costly failures. Additionally, wartime adaptation decreased 
effectiveness. Thus, the LRPG indicate two important risks associated with wartime 
change. First, that tactical adaptation may contribute to failure. Second, that 
additional adaptation may exacerbate costs. Therefore, examining the LRPG 
suggests some of the costs when adaptation fails. The cases also warn about what 
conditions may risk additional lives and resources.  
 
Assessment and Change: Light Columns to Disrupt and Induce Withdrawal 
In Summer 1942 Indian Army Commander-in-Chief Wavell authorized a modified 
force to operate behind Japanese lines.1 Fundamentally “there was nothing 
particularly fantastic about the real basis” of LRPG notions but, uniquely, they 
altered tactics by replacing ground supply with air transport coordinated through 
wireless radio.2 The resulting increase in mobility, flexibility, and speed would 
allow LRPG to manoeuvre in the jungle with less restrictions than conventional 
                                                                                                                
 1 As endorsed by senior UK leadership. See Raymond Callahan, “The Prime Minister and 
the Indian Army’s Last War,” in Kaushik Roy, ed., The Indian Army in the Two World Wars (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Brill, 2012), p. 325.  
 2 Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War 1941–1945 (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 
1984), p. 120. 
   138 
units—operating freely but never unsupported. Their target would be Japanese 
defenders dispersed thinly across the country with long lines of communication 
vulnerable to attack. Originally designed as a vanguard force to accompany a larger 
invasion, eventually LRPG deployed as an independent force to disrupt IJA lines, 
operations, and to induce their consolidation around support positions. With four 
IJA divisions in frontier defence against possible invasion, IJA lines appeared 
vulnerable to the increased movement available in LRPG’s raids.3 In addition to 
physical destruction of resources, LRPG could force IJA units to withdraw from 
forward areas and divert forces to protect their supply lines, freeing frontline space 
for future Allied operations.4 For this mission, former jungle warfare instructor Orde 
Wingate assembled a force from conventional units and developed new training for 
operations into Burma.5 
 During 1942 the concept of LRPG evolved through Wingate’s writings into 
the form it would be employed in 1943 as light infantry troops attacking Japanese 
targets to force IJA withdrawal.6 Arriving in Burma soon after the fall of Rangoon 
and tasked to consider guerrilla operations in Burma or China,7 Wingate instead 
proposed a theory of long range penetration.8 The general nature of LRPG likely 
descended from paramilitary and guerrilla units used by Wingate and Wavell in the 
Middle East and Africa, but with several specific differences which render the 
                                                                                                                
 3 Allen, Burma, 120. 
 4 Simon Anglim, “Orde Wingate, ‘Guerrilla’ Warfare and Long-range Penetration, 1940–
44,” Small Wars and Insurgencies. Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 2006), p. 254. Contemporary 
discussions emphasize the LRPG’s special nature, but it bears reminding how the initial force was a 
standard unit with a mission more akin to “a kind of extended cavalry raid” than modern special 
operations forces. Allen, Burma, 116. 
 5 In 1942 Wingate arrived in Burma to run a jungle warfare school in Maymyo. Ian F.W. 
Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750 
(New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 55-56. 
 6 Anglim, 241-262. Anglim delivers a detailed account of Wingate’s personal experiences 
since entering the army and how they influenced his ideas and interests. For additional discussion 
about Wingate’s life and impact on military thinking, see Donovan Webster, The Burma Road (New 
York: Perennial, 2003), pp. 81-110. 
 7 Wingate was temporarily in charge of the Bush Warfare School and Maymyo. The British-
run facility trained Chinese guerrillas to operate in China or Burma. See Frank McLynn, The Burma 
Campaign: Disaster into Triumph 1942–45 (London: Vintage Books, 2010), p. 79; S. Woodburn 
Kirby, India’s Most Dangerous Hour, History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military 
Series Volume II, edited by James Butler (Uckfield, East Sussex: The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 
2004), p. 242, footnote 4, originally published 1958. 
 8 Kirby, India’s Most Dangerous Hour, 242. 
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LRPG distinct.9 The 1942 draft paper “Notes on Penetration Warfare” argued that 
long range penetration could deliver a “great value” but that Burma Command 
lacked an organization with sufficient capacity to conduct this type of operation.10 
To succeed it would be necessary to exit the tactical area of general army support 
and to push beyond where routine support was possible, living and operating over 
100 miles inside enemy territory. By operating small columns directed through 
wireless communications and resupplied from air, the forces could achieve large 
effects by attacking an enemy’s vulnerable vital points and thereby “deliver fatal 
blows at his military organization.”11 During May and June, Wingate presented his 
ideas based on three core ideas. First, the assumption that IJA troops behind the 
frontlines would be inferior in readiness and capabilities compared with frontline 
troops, making them more vulnerable to attack. Second, that a force with sufficient 
preparation could penetrate behind IJA forces, coordinate with wireless radio, and 
resupply from the air. Third, that attacking IJA lines of communication would “tie 
up a disproportionate number of enemy troops.”12 These ideas would be refined over 
the subsequent months, but the overall logic was clear, and the core precepts would 
remain largely unchanged.  
 The new mission of LRPG was to concentrate against IJA units behind their 
forward lines to induce withdrawal. Dispersal served as a preparatory method for 
moving toward undefended vital points and, after an attack, to evade pursing 
Japanese. Writing in September 1942, Wingate clarified the concept of force and 
operations to reflect this refined mission and methods.13 Intending columns to act 
independently behind IJA lines for “indefinite periods,” the LRPG would attack 
“vital objectives” to disrupt IJA plans and operations.14 Now, the LRPG aimed to 
infiltrate 200–300 miles past frontline units and then concentrate attacks which 
would lure defenders in pursuit of the groups of columns, followed by the columns 
                                                                                                                
 9 In Burma, the LRPG would not conduct a guerrilla campaign, would resupply from air, 
and operate under regular command and control, but would use some similar methods in dispersal, 
concealment, field craft, and speed to infiltrate defended areas. Anglim, 254. 
 10 Orde Wingate, “Notes on Penetration Warfare—Burma Command 25/3/42,” draft paper, 
p. 1 Wingate Burma Box Papers, Box I, item 2, IWM. 
 11 Wingate, “Notes on Penetration Warfare,” 2. 
 12 McLynn, 81. See Christopher Sykes, Orde Wingate (London: Collins, 1959), pp. 367-369. 
 13 Orde Wingate, “77 Indian Infantry Brigade,” 22 September 1942, p. 1, Wingate Burma 
Box Papers, Box I, item 11, IWM. 
 14 Wingate, “77 Indian Infantry Brigade,” 1. 
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dispersing to “lead the enemy… on a wild goose chase.”15 The intended effect was 
to “compel the withdrawal from forward operational areas of very considerable 
enemy forces for defence of [lines of communication] installations, and pursuit of 
columns.”16 With thinly-spread IJA units suffering “incessant spasmodic attacks by 
columns,” they would have to withdraw to protect their “long and vulnerable lines 
of communication.”17 This necessity would compel larger alterations of their plans 
and operations, furthering the disruption of Japanese defensive organization.18 With 
the concepts of LRPG formed, now they needed to be incorporated into a unit 
prepared for the new combat purpose, considered a prerequisite for conducting the 
unique mission.19 
 The army’s adoption of LRPG and their underlying principles occurred 
through lobbying and endorsement rather than institutional vetting. A small group of 
advocates gained support via the approval of senior officials, rather than any formal 
body to consider, vet, experiment, or implement new ideas. The initial endorsement 
of LRPG theory and its subsequent support to create the new brigade relied largely 
on a small group of people across the British political-military establishment. First, 
“that Wingate was in India at all was Wavell’s doing.”20 The Commander-in-Chief 
India, who previously worked with Wingate in Palestine and Ethiopia,21 summoned 
him to explore options for “unorthodox warfare” in Burma.22 Initially Wavell 
brought the new colonel to explore guerrilla operations with Chinese forces and, as 
the situation changed, tasked Wingate with overseeing all counter-IJA guerrilla 
operations in Burma.23 But, eventually, Wavell “allowed himself to be persuaded by 
Wingate to give [LRPG] a trial.”24 It would be Wavell that approved forming LRPG 
in the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade in mid-1942. Second, Wingate drove events with 
his advocacy for LRPG concepts. Part of this commitment was displayed in his 
                                                                                                                
 15 Wingate, “77 Indian Infantry Brigade,” 1. 
 16 Wingate, “77 Indian Infantry Brigade,” 1. 
 17 Wingate, “77 Indian Infantry Brigade,” 1. 
 18 Wingate, “77 Indian Infantry Brigade,” 1. 
 19 Wingate, “Notes on Penetration Warfare,” 1. 
 20 Callahan, “The Prime Minister and the Indian Army’s Last War,” 325. 
 21 Anglim, 241-242. 
 22 Allen, Burma, 119. As Commander-in-Chief of Palestine, Wavell authorized Wingate to 
create small counterterrorism teams, the Special Night Squads, and later introduced guerrilla forces in 
Ethiopia against the Italians. McLynn, 71-74. 
 23 McLynn, 78-79. 
 24 Callahan, “The Prime Minister and the Indian Army’s Last War,” 325.  
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“tendency to write strategic manifestos rather than straightforward reports, its core 
being Wingate’s advocacy of long-range penetration.”25 In some instances, this 
tendency toward subjectivity and concern with the perception by others caused in 
Wingate’s writings a “failure to tell the whole truth” and occasionally “outright 
lies.”26 As it turned out, Wingate’s techniques proved successful: “he was granted 
interviews with generals… far beyond what his rank and achievements 
warranted.”27 Wingate then promoted his ideas by presenting the concepts at 
conferences during May and June.28 Initially, senior leaders responded coolly, 
particularly the requirements of air support and allotting personnel.29 The lack of 
support meant that “only the influence of Wavell” prevented the “outright rejection” 
of the new ideas, but Wingate would gain additional believers.30 Third, fourth, and 
fifth were a small nucleus of advocates who would shape the force and command 
leadership positions. Around April 1942, Wingate met Major Michael Calvert31 at 
the Bush Warfare School which had been placed under Wingate, and with Calvert as 
second-in-command they began to guide LRPG development.32 Trained as a sapper, 
Calvert previously saw the Japanese in China, fought in Norway, served at the 
Lochailort commando training centre, and at the Bush Warfare School he mounted 
raids and trained Chinese guerrillas.33 Wingate and Calvert gained the support of 
GHQ Joint Planning Staff member Major Bernard Fergusson, who “had met 
Wingate in Palestine and again in Cairo,” and became convinced over the summer to 
join his plan for Burma.34 Captain George Dunlop, a veteran of the retreat into India, 
provided additional support which, combined with the others, now meant that 
“Wingate had the credibility to press his commander-in-chief harder.”35 
                                                                                                                
 25 Anglim, 248. 
 26 McLynn, 87. 
 27 McLynn, 87. 
 28 McLynn, 81. 
 29 Specifically, the Director of Staff Studies who allotted theatre personnel. McLynn, 81-82. 
 30 McLynn, 82. 
 31 Mike Calvert would become “the most successful of all the Chindit leaders in the field.” 
David Rooney, Burma Victory: Imphal, Kohima and the Chindit Issue, March 1944 to May 1945 
(London: Arms and Armour 1992), p. 108. 
 32 McLynn, 79; Rooney, 108. 
 33 Allen, Burma, 119. 
 34 Sykes, 367. 
 35 McLynn 82. 
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Subsequently, Wavell allotted forces and re-designated them as LRPG. In July 1942 
the new unit formed and moved into India’s central provinces for training.36 
 The new 77th Indian Brigade included about 3,000 people across three 
battalions supplemented by a commando company.37 The organization reflected a 
consistent practice across all LRPG of employing regular personnel, and throughout 
the force’s existence it “never had a formal recruitment or selection procedure.”38 
One battalion served as the first infantry component, pulled from 13th King’s 
Liverpool Regiment, which previously conducted coastal defence and garrison 
duties. Another battalion derived from a Gurkha Rifles unit raised in wartime. The 
final battalion drew from the Burma Rifles that had retreated from Burma.39 
Members from the 13th possessed low overall readiness, the Gurkhas were regarded 
highly, and the Burma Rifles were probably best-suited for the LRPG despite a 
negative view by Wingate.40 Supplements from the Bush Warfare School became 
142 Commando Company, and this group proved “by far the best and most 
experienced.”41 The other forces were less prepared, and during late 1942 “the 
majority of 77th Indian Infantry Brigade needed remedial basic work in addition to 
specialized instructions in the tactics of LRP.”42 The units would be divided into 
columns of approximately 350 people organized around an infantry company and 
commanded by a major. After replacing some personnel, the result was three British 
and four Gurkha columns.43 Uniquely, the 77th Indian Brigade possessed almost zero 
Indian troops. It was mislabelled for operational security.  
 Specialized training emphasized core skills deemed essential for the new 
mission of deep penetration with tactics “very different from that used by 
                                                                                                                
 36 This followed some preliminary moves in May and June. O.C. Wingate, Report on 
Operations of the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade in Burma February to June 1943 (New Delhi: The 
Manager Government of India Press, 1943), p. 2; Kirby, India’s Most Dangerous Hour, 244. 
 37 For Wingate’s account of formation and units, see Wingate, Report on Operations, 2. 
 38 Tim Moreman, Chindit 1942–45, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009), p. 9. 
 39 They also received a commando unit and some RAF signallers. Basil Collier, The War in 
the Far East 1941–1945, A Military History (London: Heinemann, 1969), p. 65.  
 40 McLynn, 83. 
 41 Moreman, Chindit, 10; Allen, Burma, 122. Major Calvert would lead Column 3 during the 
first operation and, as a Brigadier, the 77th Brigade during the second. 
 42 Moreman, Chindit, 13. 
 43 Allen, Burma, 122. Column Six was disbanded and used to replace personnel in the other 
columns due to illness, training failures, or casualties. See Julian Thompson, The Imperial War 
Museum Book of the War in Burma 1942–45 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2002), p. 63. 
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conventional British and Indian units in the Far East.”44 Essential for building well-
trained infantry would be “physical hardness and knowledge,” but the specific 
small-unit skills would not be completely different.45 LRPG would still rely on 
capable small-unit infantry to fight in the jungle, an environment that was “merely 
infantry fighting in conditions of poor visibility without supporting arms.”46 
Training began in Patharia and shifted to the Sauger jungle in central India, with 
vital autonomy from Central India Command which enabled Wingate to lead 
training “on the tactical and strategic side and Major Calvert on the demolition 
side.”47 Initial endeavours used tactical exercises and sand pits to learn basic 
infantry skills, attempting to remedy “the mistakes in minor tactics” seen against the 
IJA earlier in 1942 considered “of the most elementary character.”48 The subsequent 
program followed a, rigorous, eight-week training that emphasized jungle warfare, 
small-unit techniques, core capabilities, and fitness for cross-country movement.49 
The training aimed to build a foundation of hardiness supplemented by specialized 
preparation for the various contingencies that columns might encounter.50   
 Uniquely, the 77th Indian Brigade trained largely independent from GHQ 
India. It also lacked a single, formal doctrine beyond the theoretical writings of 
Wingate. Rather, to produce the skills deemed necessary across LRPG, training 
emphasized jungle marches and resupply. This scenario reflects most of Wingate’s 
guidance that “long range penetration will prove a dismal failure unless it is 
conducted from one centre, with one plan, one doctrine one training and one control 
in the field” while, curiously, ignoring his own recommendation about doctrine.51 
Early stages emphasized living and moving in the jungle, with significant amounts 
of time committed to acclimatization and self-sufficiency like foraging, navigation, 
scouting, and patrols.52 The core tenet of training was long marches to build 
                                                                                                                
 44 Moreman, Chindit, 12-13. 
 45 Wingate, Report on Operations, 3. 
 46 Wingate, Report on Operations, 3. 
 47 Wingate, Report on Operations, 6; McLynn, 84. Located near Gwalior. 
 48 Wingate, Report on Operations, 6. 
 49 Allen, Burma, 122-129; McLynn 84-89. 
 50 “The idea was to simulate every contingency the columns might encounter, short of 
contact with the enemy himself. Wingate believed that human beings underrated the horrors and trials 
they could endure, and his spartan training programme was accordingly designed to push men to the 
limit and beyond.” McLynn, 84.  
 51 Wingate, Report on Operations, 57.  
 52 Moreman, Chindit, 14-15; Webster, Burma Road, 92. 
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endurance, mental toughness, physical hardiness, and to practice moving undetected 
as a column. Specialized training progressed from sections to platoons to columns, 
repeating drills to inculcate the immediate use of movements for various 
situations.53 Battle drills included immediate dispersal during a firefight, whether 
due to unexpected contact or to an engagement going badly, toward a prearranged 
position away from the enemy.54 Others emphasized techniques for patrols, pre-
arranged attacks, booby traps, and river crossings.55 Much time was dedicated to 
learning the new task of coordinating air supply, as well as the old task of how to 
use pack mules—both vital for the mission. In September, 2,000 members of the 
eventual 3,000 conducted a five-day brigade exercise,56 followed by additional 
training in October and November to refine jungle tradecraft, and a final brigade 
exercise near Jhansi in late December.57 In January 1943 the 77th Indian Brigade 
moved alongside the border, technically joining IV Corps but continuing 
independently to prepare for their upcoming raid into Burma.58  
 
Forces and Plans 
The mission for Operation LONGCLOTH followed the tenets of LRPG theory: to 
penetrate IJA defences, to disrupt communications, and to exploit opportunities as 
they emerged.59 Specifically, the operation entailed four goals. First, to destroy the 
railways near Indaw to cut the Mandalay–Myitkyina line. Second, to divide the IJA 
18th and 56th divisions to isolate the 18th Division. Third, to harass the IJA, 
specifically units of the 18th Division. Fourth and finally, if feasible, to cut the 
Mandalay–Lashio railway. With these aims, the troops formed seven self-contained 
columns consisting of 306 to 369 men combined into Northern and Southern 
groups.60 The smaller Southern Group, with columns 1 and 2, aimed to deceive IJA 
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 59 Collier, 321. 
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defenders and distract them from the other group by crossing the Chindwin River 
one day before the Northern Group and then carrying out several movements to 
appear a larger attacking force. The bigger Northern Group consisted of the brigade 
HQ, a group HQ, Burma Rifles HQ, as well as columns 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8.61 It aimed 
to destroy the Mandalay–Myitkyina railway at several points which would isolate 
the two IJA divisions from resupply; to harass forces northwest of Mandalay near 
Shwebo; and, “if circumstances allowed,” to cut the Mandalay–Lashio railway.62  
 Of Japan’s four divisions in Burma—the 18th, 55th, 56th, and 33rd—the 
operation primarily targeted the 18th, located nearby on the road from Taunggyi to 
Kengtung in the Shan States, and aimed to separate it from the 55th Division.63 
Raised from Japan’s southwest in the Kurume Divisional District,64 the division was 
mobilized in 1937 and possessed combat experience from China.65 After landing in 
Malaya on the first day of the invasion and attacking down the peninsula’s east 
coast,66 against Singapore the division “led the Army from start to finish.”67 
Redeployed to Burma, during the initial invasion the division was in reserve at 
Sittang Valley then sailed to Rangoon and occupied Mandalay.68 By early 1943, the 
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division had positioned its three regiments for defence around Indaw, Hukawng 
Valley, and Myitkyina, using garrisons, forward outposts, and regular patrols.69 
Since the invasion, the division had fought sporadic engagements almost only 
against local insurgents. While suffering only limited battlefield casualties, 
personnel remained vulnerable to disease and the environment, and received few 
replacements.70 It was commanded by Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi Renya, who 
had experience in China and later would lead Fifteenth Army. Thus, the division 
may be considered standard for an IJA unit: combat tested with past success but 
experiencing some erosion of capabilities and readiness related to sustained 
deployment and limited support. 
 
Operation LONGCLOTH, February–June 1943  
On 14 February the LRPG began Operation LONGCLOTH, crossing the Chindwin 
River at multiple points over four days to enter the IJA-held jungle.71 As the 1,000-
person diversionary Southern Group with columns 1 and 2 progressed toward 
Kyaikthin, “problems presented themselves almost immediately” when the IJA 
ambushed the two columns that were attempting to sabotage a train station.72 
Following initial mishaps and an IJA attack against Column 2 that proved 
devastating, about half the group had to begin retreating to India.73 Concurrently, 
during the first few weeks the main thrust of the Northern Group “had been largely 
successful in evading the Japanese.”74  The majority of Northern Group, columns 4, 
5, 7, and 8, followed a pre-existing logging trail,75 while the 400-member Column 3 
would lead the group’s actions for most of the operation. First, Column 3 moved 
100 miles overland through the jungle and mountains to the railway line and, in 
early March, demolished two bridges as well as approximately 70 places along the 
line.76 Separately, Column 4 moved slowly, Wingate relieved the commander, and 
in early March the column was decisively ambushed by IJA forces while attempting 
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to cross a river.77 Half the column, assigned to the rear-guard, quickly “fell to panic” 
as the IJA killed half of the defenders and destroyed most of the communications, 
causing the remaining fifteen members to retreat into India.78 Column 4’s other half 
pushed east, became lost, and would “struggle back to India, having stumbled 
hundreds of miles.”79 Thus, by late March two columns had been lost but the LRPG 
had pushed over 200 miles into IJA-held Burma and demolished the railway at 
several points between Mandalay–Myitkyina, a primary objective.80 During these 
six weeks, the IJA 18th Division first reported instances of invading forces just four 
days after they crossed the Chindwin, with initial confusion giving way to a clearer 
picture once assisted by intelligence reports from the nearby 33rd Division.81  
 Next the LRPG transitioned to the operation’s second stage as they moved 
east of the Irrawaddy River to cut the Mandalay–Lashio railway, moving with five 
of the original seven columns. With nearby IJA forces now alerted, the LRPG had to 
evade pursing Japanese as they began crossing the mile-wide Irrawaddy River. 
Column 3 barely escaped and had to abandon wounded personnel.82 Critically, this 
movement across the Irrawaddy caused columns to depart the jungle and to enter the 
plains, a dry, hot, open area that exposed LRPG and proved “far less suited” to their 
tactics.83 It also alerted additional IJA units who worked to confine, trap, and 
destroy the columns using the nearby road, rivers, and mobile forces.84  The 18th 
Division began to trap the columns now operating in the dry forests, accessible to 
IJA units by road and track.85 With the IJA gaining a better understanding about the 
invading force from the demolitions in early March and the river crossing a few 
days later, the Japanese now “planned to confine and destroy the British within the 
triangle formed by the Irrawaddy on the west, the Shweli River on the east and the 
roads” in the south.86 Reinforced by additional units nearby, the IJA countered with 
battalion sweeps and regimental manoeuvres to isolate retreating LRPG and forced 
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them to divide into smaller units. The result was a scenario where, for the LRPG, 
“systematic movement became impossible.”87  
 As the IJA continued to pursue the LPRG and the latter struggled to sustain 
themselves, by late March IV Corps ordered a cease to the operation and the LRPG 
back to India.88 The units dispersed for the return with some splitting as small as 10-
man teams, and parts would march, retreat, and evade Japanese forces for the next 
two months. Most of the units returned to India by early June.89 Rather than dividing 
IJA units to force their withdrawal by increasing and exploiting their vulnerability—
as envisioned in the original plan—the LRPG were increasingly isolated and unable 
to match the IJA battalions armed with greater firepower. With LRPG vulnerable to 
IJA encirclement, after luring the IJA into attack—as had been planned—it 
produced the opposite of the desired outcome. The IJA attacks “proved the undoing” 
of Operation LONGCLOTH.90 Of the original 3,000 personnel in the first operation, 
only 2,200 returned with “most of them unfit for further [LRPG] operations.”91 
Nearly all the animals and equipment were lost.92 Soon afterwards the IJA repaired 
most of the damages, having suffering minimally during the operation. 
 
Evaluating LRPG Failure and Identifying Effectiveness 
The operation’s outcome was “an expensive failure.”93 Regarding goals, the units 
did penetrate IJA-held territory and cut the first railway, but Operation 
LONGCLOTH delivered few tangible gains and cost many personnel and resources. 
The operation failed to force IJA units to consolidate, failed to cut the second 
railway, and failed to harass Japanese defenders to any significant degree. Once 
crossing the Irrawaddy River into the plains, the LRPG struggled to manoeuvre—
supposedly a core tenet of the column and mission—much less deliver any 
significant damage to IJA infrastructure or units. The IJA largely repaired its lines of 
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communication, and suffered only a “negligible” number of casualties.94 The 
operation “had no immediate effect on Japanese disposition or plans,” and defenders 
did not consolidate nor withdraw.95 In total, the LRPG inflicted “little but transient 
damage.”96 For the IJA, “the counter-measures they had adopted were successful” 
and forced the LRPG to disperse and retreat.97 The IJA and jungle conditions also 
inflicted a high rate of casualties across the LRPG, making returning troops largely 
ineffective. The IJA suffered no comparable losses. Exact numbers are unclear, but 
it seems reasonable to conclude the IJA suffered far less than the LRPG’s 26% 
casualty rate (and almost all remaining members requiring recuperation). While 
many supporters praised alleged benefits in morale, propaganda, and insight for the 
operation,98 the reality was that “even Wingate’s own supporters admitted that the 
operation was a failure.”99  
 British operational effectiveness must be rated as low. The LRPG displayed 
proficient basic skills and abilities but failed to indicate the coordination or 
combined effects of complex tactics. Granted, the 77th Indian Brigade’s mission did 
not entail all the elements required for complex tactics or sophisticated manoeuvre, 
creating some challenges for applying this measure for effectiveness. However, 
assessing performance in basic skills reveals how units managed to maintain core 
combat skills and proficiencies across several battles but struggled when straying 
from the basics of infiltration and movement. The LRPG proved unable to combine 
efforts to deliver their intended tactical effects. On the positive side, most units that 
had retrained in jungle warfare and small-unit skills proved capable of moving in the 
jungle, an improvement from 1942. Columns 3 and 5 conducted the most significant 
actions and displayed skills in ambush and planned attacks, notably against the first 
IJA railway connecting Mandalay with Myitkyina. Throughout the operation, 
columns generally maintained their core skills and proficiency throughout many 
arduous days. Yet this must be weighed against the immediate loss of Column 4 
when attacked by the IJA near the Chindwin, and the “disaster” of losing Column 
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2.100 Additionally, the brigade’s overall abilities may be questioned. In one 
assessment, when faced by IJA forces the columns struggled in basic dispersal 
which “more often than not resulted in chaos.”101 In addition, several units tended to 
retreat when faced with small IJA patrols that they “should have easily ‘rolled up’ 
following correct jungle-contact drills, and instead dashed off in all directions.”102 
The attempt to coordinate Northern Group with Southern Group near the Irrawaddy 
River may have been the largest disaster of the operation, as it contributed to the 
subsequent dispersal and withdrawal by fleeing groups of vulnerable soldiers. The 
forces proved unable to operate after departing the jungle “shelter” in which they 
had learned to live and operate.103 Adaptations in jungle fighting and mobility 
improved basic skills but the underlying logic of harassing IJA units to force their 
withdrawal may have been faulty—a core tenet of the LRPG. Units struggled to 
deliver intended objectives, but even when they did (as seen by columns 3 and 5) 
then the objectives failed to produce the larger expected results. One result was 
increased danger in fighting the Japanese, displayed by the IJA trapping and 
isolating columns east of the Irrawaddy. LRPG proved too small to mass sufficient 
firepower against the IJA battalions but were too big to escape, forcing their 
dispersal simply to survive. For the Japanese, they performed the same as in 1942, 
in an unchanged manner that coordinated actions across two divisions and the larger 
army to assess the unexpected scenario, to limit the damage it caused, and to expel 
the LRPG at a minimal loss of life and resources.  
 Thus, if using a cost-benefit assessment of objectives attained and resources 
expended then it becomes difficult to disagree with criticisms of the 1943 mission as 
“achieving nothing of strategic value, suffering heavy casualties (one third of the 
force deployed) and teaching nothing of specific tactical value to the regular 
army.”104 Adaptations did address past shortcomings in jungle skills, immobility, 
and an inability to counter IJA offensive tactics; however, the forces were unable to 
achieve nearly any of their goals, suffered high costs in their pursuit, and displayed 
faults in the underlying logic of concepts of the LRPG. The mobile units lost their 
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mobility when trapped by IJA responders; the units designed to harass IJA 
infrastructure proved unable to cause any significant damage; the columns were 
quickly outmatched when facing IJA firepower; and teams had to disperse in a 
desperate withdrawal, more closely representing Wingate’s “wild goose chase” than 
any of the Japanese.105 Therefore, the LRPG must be considered a failure in any 
measure beyond basic survival. Uniquely, future adaptations seemed to exacerbate 
these shortcomings. 
 









































Findings and Relevance 
Case Study Assessment: Tactical adaptation before the LRPG’s Operation 
LONGCLOTH contributed to operational failure. 
 For this case study, hypothesis 1 (H1), central vertical mechanism over 
decentralized horizontal, is supported. The first LRPG operation suggested how the 
absence of an external, higher authority to assess new ideas allowed concepts to 
develop independently within the unit that proved questionable in practice. There 
was no comprehensive vetting of ideas outside the brigade, and the unit did not 
participate in any larger, external, formal institutional mechanism for information 
collection, integration, evaluation, or assessment. After initial resistance in Summer 
1942 at GHQ India and “a long wrestle with authority,”106 once endorsed by C-in-C 
Wavell then the brigade prepared independently with its core concepts unchallenged 
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and essentially unchanged. Without a formal doctrine or any participation in larger 
doctrinal development,107 the LRPG trained independently with their own process 
and without systematic assessment from a higher authority. With of this autonomy, 
ideas and decisions were considered and disseminated through the brigade 
commander, with directives addressing specific needs rather than any broader 
reconceptualization of efforts. This intra-unit process resulted in numerous 
directives and guidance but continued to reflect unchanged concepts and 
expectations. Additionally, the brigade exercises in late 1942 unfolded without 
significant external evaluation, higher assessment, or subsequent revisions. Thus, 
77th Indian Brigade disseminated its ideas and concepts without a thorough, 
comprehensive evaluation process beyond a small number of personnel, and in 
many instances only one. The resulting adaptations produced some new abilities but, 
ultimately, a costly failure. The development of LRPG and their first operation 
indicates a risk arising from authoritative assessments without thorough vetting or 
external analysis, supporting the hypothesis that a centralized, vertical mechanism 
may contribute to more effective adaptations.  
 Hypothesis 2 (H2), anticipation over improvisation, is disputed. Adaptation 
by the LRPG for Operation LONGCLOTH indicates the risks of anticipation when 
expectations fail to meet reality. Put simply, planners anticipated wrong. Facing 
setbacks from IJA offensive tactics and superior jungle movement, the resulting idea 
of penetration and harassment to erode IJA units and to force their repositioning 
failed to cause expected outcomes. The result did have a high impact on operational 
outcome but failed to provide superior perspective, foresight, or collaboration. Not 
all anticipation was completely wrong; units improved their ability to move in the 
jungle and fought better than in 1942. However, the units still fought at a low level 
of effectiveness. Critically, once the LRPG were noticed by the Japanese then the 
columns struggled to move or to fight. This case may be considered an example of 
anticipating wrongly when operations are planned without sufficient consideration 
of likely challenges and probable adversary responses, concentrating instead on 
possible benefits and hopeful reactions. The LRPG’s performance and the 
subsequent outcome dispute the proposal that anticipatory adaptation is likely to 
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improve effectiveness and contribute to success due to superior perspective from 
more information, greater insight and additional foresight. 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3), skill over technology, comes out as neutral. This case 
presents a difficult scenario for H3. Technological improvements in resupply and 
communications enabled the new concept of long-range penetration, but these 
capabilities remained within the larger idea of harassing columns which failed to 
deliver significantly increased effectiveness or avoid a costly failure. The larger 
shifts in reorganization and training had greater impact on performance and 
outcome—and contributed to many of the challenges. These concepts relied on the 
technological advancements for basic functions. But the problems and setbacks were 
caused primarily by the new concepts, rather than the new technological 
capabilities. Therefore, H3 is rated as neutral. 
 
Figure 6.2: Findings for the First LRPG Operation 




















CENTRAL NEUTRAL SUPPORT AFFIRM SUPPORT    
H2: 
ANTICIPATE DISPUTE DISPUTE AFFIRM DISPUTE    
H3:  
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Chapter Seven  
Maladaptation and Higher Costs:  
LRPG Special Force, 1943–44 
After the first operation in early 1943, the LRPG in 77th Indian Brigade grew to 
become the 20,000-member Special Force with expanded capabilities and 
ambitions. The force also experienced substantial adaptation during this period, 
shifting to aerially-inserted brigades using defensive strongholds to erode IJA forces 
by using extended positions for deep raids and patrols. However, the new 
capabilities did not deliver an improved performance or a better outcome. In fact, 
the changes likely exacerbated setbacks, delivered limited chances for success, and 
contributed to a failure that was costly in lives, resources, and time. Taken together, 
these changes and the performance of LRPG in Special Force deliver additional 
warnings about the risks of tactical adaptation. In particular, Operation 
THURSDAY indicates costs associated with implementing new ideas during 
warfare without an authority outside the combat unit to assess them. Therefore, this 
case suggests the dangers of anticipating wrongly when solutions are inappropriate 
for meeting operational goals. 
 
Assessment and Change: Strongholds and Mobile Columns to Fight Regiments  
During 1943, the LRPG expanded its force and ambitions for a second mission into 
Burma based on a similar concept but with altered techniques. Rather than ground 
insertion, the next mission aimed to infiltrate by air using light aircraft, gliders, and 
transport planes. The purpose also expanded from infrastructure destruction and 
force reorientation: now LRPG aimed to insert behind IJA lines to establish fortified 
positions and lure IJA units “into situations where they could be destroyed in detail, 
making a major contribution.”1 The expanded mission would eliminate bigger IJA 
units as they contested territory or force them to retreat by threatening their lines.2 
To conduct this revised mission, by December 1943 the LRPG had consolidated 
numerous units in India that lay outside Fourteenth Army and would expand into a 
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six-brigade force with 20,000 members, re-designated the 3rd Indian Division and 
labelled “Special Force.”3 
 Personal advocacy and senior endorsement again helped grow the LPRG 
from a brigade to nearly a corps, along with its more ambitious goals. Wingate 
advocated for an increased role and relevance for the LRPG, to include his “highly 
coloured report” on the first operation that “exaggerated his success.”4 The report, as 
well as others about the first operation, interested Prime Minister Churchill who met 
with Wingate and proved receptive to many of the latter’s expanding ideas about the 
LRPG. Wingate joined the British delegation for the Quadrant Conference in 1943 
where, despite reluctance of some senior leaders about allocating additional 
resources and personnel, the advocates for LRPG secured support to expand into 
Special Force.5 Now supported by key allies and with authorization from the prime 
minister, newly-promoted Major-General Wingate travelled to GHQ in August 1943 
and began to grow the force. 
 With the directive to expand, 77th Indian Brigade reformed in August 1943 at 
Jhansi, where the 111th Indian Brigade also formed.6 Critically, Special Force 
received the 70th British Division in early October. Incorporating this combat-
experienced division allowed brigades each to add another infantry battalion and 
expand from six columns to eight.7 Fortunately for Special Force, the 70th British 
Division commander accepted a demotion to become Wingate’s assistant and 
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cooperated with building the new force.8 Finally, the 3rd West African Brigade 
arrived in India and joined the unit in November 1943.9 The organization into 
columns remained from the first operation, often created by halving battalions with 
the battalion commander leading one half and a senior major the other.10 While 
including various people, the newly-created 3rd Indian Division was “predominantly 
a British formation, and exceptional for the Burma campaign both in that respect 
and, remarkably, not including any Indian units.”11 
In considering lessons from the first operation and preparing for the second, 
Special Force never possessed a formal doctrine produced by an entity outside the 
unit. Internal assessments identified lessons, needs, and proposed significant 
changes, yet failed to question the underlying assumptions regarding deep 
penetration. Wingate’s post-operation report concluded that the first mission 
validated the theory underlying LRPG: it “prevented a number of developments and 
upset the enemy’s plans.”12 Also it “demonstrated the power of columns to penetrate 
as far as they please in enemy-occupied Burma.”13 The subsequent conclusion 
reflected Wingate’s continued advocacy, recommending that “when Long Range 
Penetration is used again, it must be on the greatest scale possible and must play an 
essential role in the re-conquest.”14 With an expanded conceptualization of what 
could be accomplished by LRPG the growing ambitions for the future also would 
require broader changes in mission purpose. 
 The concept of operations evolved to brigade-controlled strongholds 
supported by mobile columns, aiming to employ defensive tactics for offensive 
                                                                                                                
 8 Some other officers also dropped rank to join, most notably Brigadier Fergusson who 
chose to command a column. Rooney, 114. 
 9 WO 203/4204, Despatch, 25. For additional details about the West African Brigade, see 
Jesse Shaw, Special Force: A Chindit’s Story (Gloucester, England: Alan Sutton, 1986). 
 10 Julian Thompson, The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Burma 1942–45 
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2002), p. 232. Special Force temporarily included a U.S. infantry 
force, the 3,000-member “Merrill’s Marauders” officially named 5307th Provisional Unit, but the 
American unit was removed long before the second operation. 
 11 Thompson, 232. For an order of battle see Rooney, 115-116. A short versions: 16th 
Brigade (Fergusson) with eight columns of British troops; 77th Brigade (Calvert), with twelve 
columns total, six British and six Gurkha; 111th Brigade (Lentaigne) with four British columns and 
one Gurkha; 14th Brigade (Brodie), with eight British columns; 23rd Brigade (Perowne) with three 
regiments, trained as LRPG but removed from the division and Special Force before the second 
operation; 3rd West African Brigade (Gillmore), with six columns from across the 6th, 7th, and 12th 
battalions of the Nigeria Regiment.  
12 Wingate, Report on Operations, 57. 
 13 Wingate, Report on Operations, 57. 
 14 Wingate, Report on Operations, 57. 
   157 
effects.15 The previous mission revealed dangers in attacking IJA defensive 
positions because when LRPG could not mass sufficient firepower. A conclusion 
was that “it is foolish to direct attacks against defended enemy positions if by any 
means he can be hit in the open.”16 In addition to fighting Japanese units as they 
manoeuvred in the open, now LRPG would attempt to induce the Japanese “to 
attack us in our defended positions” and therefore reverse the firepower imbalance 
seen before by using the new strongholds.17 Ideally, the strongholds would be 
forward bases with an airstrip established by two columns and supported by light 
aircraft, gliders, transport planes, and aerial firepower.18 The core area would be 
approximately 500 yards in diameter, supported by a larger defensive scheme and 
airstrip aligned with local terrain to reduce its accessibility by motor transport and to 
provide all-around fire.19 After arriving by air and securing an area, engineers would 
prepare an airstrip, followed by arrival of the remaining elements of the brigade with 
artillery, anti-aircraft guns, and a regular infantry battalion for garrison support. 
Light aircraft could land to evacuate wounded and to deliver minor supplies, but 
most supplies would still need to arrive by nearby air-drops. Floater columns would 
patrol the area to detect IJA patrols, as well as to provoke IJA regiments into 
attacking, ideally through the limited approaches to the base.20 Then, stronghold 
forces would reinforce the external patrols to fight outside the base. If IJA units 
reached the base then defenders could assist with additional firepower, luring 
reinforcements from the division into battle for their destruction.21 At these 
strongholds, about 8,000 men could be inserted to form “a network of larger, more 
heavily manned and more permanent” bases.22 The stronghold concept was not 
completely unprecedented; in North Africa during 1941 the British Army used 
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fortified positions in a system of boxes each held by a brigade,23 and in 1942 
considered using company-sized boxes with platoons forming a reserve strike 
force.24 In Burma the strongholds would resemble these boxes but inserted behind 
enemy lines and resupplied by air. 
 Inside Special Force, the unit produced numerous reports, directives, and 
pamphlets regarding lessons from the past and prescriptions for the future. 
Throughout this process, ideas emerged from within the organization and were 
disseminated with the authority of the division. The unique nature of long-range 
penetration meant that some of the “principles and tactics of LRP were simply too 
specialized and largely irrelevant to regular troops.”25 One result of this internal 
focus was that Special Force provided “little contribution to the development of 
doctrine for conventional jungle operations.”26 However, and more important for 
this examination, this autonomy enabled Special Force to develop ideas with limited 
oversight or evaluation. Training documents by GHQ India made “surprisingly little 
reference to LRP methods, except in the most general terms.”27 Instead, Special 
Force “jealously guarded independence from GHQ India.”28  Lessons remained 
within the unit without sharing ideas or cooperating with the Directorate of Military 
Training. Special Force supplemented its own training memorandums with various 
tactical pamphlets, ranging from general concepts to short training notes. The 50-
page commander’s pamphlet on the first operation outlined “the theory and 
principles” of LRPG with subsequent chapters addressing “the column in detail, its 
day to day routine in operations, and certain special problems that will confront it 
from time to time.”29 Additionally, the Special Force Commander’s Training Notes 
aimed “to throw additional light on the various problems in order to stimulate 
officers to think for themselves, and to obtain a comprehensive grasp of the warfare 
                                                                                                                
 23 Anglim, 256. 
 24 Military Training Pamphlet No.52 – Forest, Bush and Jungle Warfare against a Modern 
Enemy, in PRO WO 231/126 pp. 24–26, cited in Anglim, 256, footnote 116. 
 25 T.R. Moreman, The Jungle, The Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War 
1941–1945: Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare (New York: Routledge, 
2013), p. 9. 
 26 Moreman, The Jungle, 9. 
 27 Moreman, The Jungle, 9. 
 28 Moreman, The Jungle, 9. 
 29 “Force Commanders Pamphlet on First LRP – Burma,” on cyclostyled copy of Major-
General O.C. Wingate's original Long Range Penetration (LRP) memorandum, undated, written 
following the 1943 Chindit operations, p. 1, in Major WVH Martin, 91/9/1, item 1, IWM. 
   159 
they will have to wage.”30 Beginning with a general overview of LRPG, their 
purpose, and concept of operations, the series then addressed specific tactical 
situations in preparation for the second operation. Topics included bivouac security, 
weapons, resupply procedures, ambush techniques.31 The directives and pamphlets 
discussed ways to improve procedures as well as some new techniques but failed 
fundamentally to alter the underlying principles of disrupting the IJA’s rear and 
communications, now using larger units housed in strongholds to provoke attack. 
 To implement the revised ideas and to prepare for the operation, Special 
Force units participated in a 20-week training program in central India during late 
1943.32 Training culminated in a three-week exercise in December, “during which 
we marched 200 miles… swam rivers and carried heavier packs than we ever carried 
in Burma,” followed by a “large scale conference for all Special Force officers.”33 
Then from December to February, “training was spasmodic, as much time had to be 
spent on checking arms, ammunition, mule loads, saddlery and equipment,” with 
rehearsals and “practice firing, several long marches and expeditions through dense 
bamboo country.”34 For the columns, extra attention was given to coordinating air 
supply, animal husbandry, and river crossing, but the programme still tended to 
emphasize individual hardiness and marching. This emphasis would cause some, 
later, to criticize a dearth of infantry tactics as would be required to fight larger IJA 
units if lured, as intended, into battle against the strongholds.35  
                                                                                                                
 30 Special Force Commander’s Training Notes No. 1, Lecture No. 1, General Rules for the 
employment of Forces of Deep Penetration in modern warfare,” p. 1, undated, in Major WVH 
Martin, 91/9/1, item 2, IWM. 
 31 Special Force Commander’s Training Notes No. 2, Lecture Security in Bivouac, in 
Martin, 91/9/1, item 3, IWM; Special Force Commander’s Training Notes No. 3, Infantry Anti-Tank 
Projector (PIAT), in Martin, 91/9/1, item 4, IWM; Special Force Commander’s Training Notes No. 
4, Supply Dropping, in Martin, 91/9/1, item 5, IWM; Special Force Commander’s Training Notes 
No. 5, Supply Dropping Drill, in Martin, 91/9/1, item 5, IWM; Special Force Commander’s Training 
Notes No. 6, Employment of Aircraft with Troops of Deep Penetration, in Martin, 91/9/1, item 7, 
IWM; Special Force Commander’s Training Notes No. 7, The Column in Ambush, in Martin, 91/9/1, 
item 8, IWM. 
 32 Thompson, 235; see also Rooney, 115. 
 33 Captain N. Durant, transcript of letter to home, p. 2, 80/49/1, Private Papers of Captain N. 
Durant, IWM. Durant would command the machine-gun platoon of 80 Column, 1st Battalion South 
Staffordshire Regiment (77th Indian Infantry Brigade) during Operation THURSDAY. 
 34 Durant letter, 3. 
 35 Thompson, 236. 
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 While the tactical columns received significant attention during training, at 
least one staff officer questioned the readiness at headquarters.36 Expansion into 
Special Force included creating a larger headquarters in Gwalior, near the main 
training area at Jhansi, with several officers pulled from England where “all our time 
had been devoted to training for the forthcoming battle in Europe.”37 One result was 
that “while the columns themselves were well trained and ready to go, the 
Headquarters organization as a whole was uncertain of exactly what it was supposed 
to be doing.”38 The “root of the trouble,” as assessed later, was that division 
leadership “simply didn’t know how to use a large staff.”39 It is unclear to what 
degree these critiques accurately reflected readiness at the division headquarters or 
impacted operational performance, but they bear remembering alongside the internal 
nature of Special Force operational planning. Combined with the lack of an external 
doctrine from GHQ India and intra-division training materials providing the sole 
official guidance on preparations, this scenario raises questions about the degree to 
which ideas being produced within Special Force and the 3rd Indian Division 
underwent critical review or rigorous examination. Because, by early 1944, Special 
Force was committed to employing these ideas in battle. It would lure larger IJA 
units to fight at higher intensity than before. The troops were finally briefed on the 
operation a few days before the insertions would begin.40 
 
Forces and Plans 
The operation would be less aspirational than some of the theoretical plans but still 
it would be quite ambitious. Using multiple brigades from the 3rd Indian Division, 
Operation THURSDAY aimed to support larger operations in northern Burma by 
cutting communications of the IJA 18th Division, harassing its rear, preventing 
reinforcement, and inflicting general damage and confusion.41 The units would drop 
behind the Japanese to disrupt lines of communication and any IJA attempt to attack 
                                                                                                                
 36 David Noel Hugh Tyacke, extracts from private memoirs, Chapter Six, pp. 2-7, collection 
Maj Gen David Noel Hugh Tyacke, written [1970–1990], LHCMA.  
 37 Tyacke, 2.  
 38 Tyacke, 2. 
 39 Tyacke, 9. 
 40 Durant letter, 3. 
 41 William J. Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945 
(New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), p. 259, unabridged republication of edition originally titled 
Defeat Into Victory published in 1956. 
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toward Imphal by blocking resupply to 18th Division.42 With one overland and three 
aerial insertions at points surrounding Indaw, the division aimed to cut road and 
railway lines of communication through three objectives: Indaw, the Mandalay–
Myitkyina rail, and the Bhamo–Myitkyina road.43 Specifically, in the first wave, 16th 
British Brigade would march inland from Ledo, destroying an IJA garrison at 
Lonkin on the way to Indaw where it would seize the two airfields and establish a 
stronghold. The 77th Brigade would insert by glider into two landing zones and then 
march to seize the nearby railway and form another stronghold. The 111th Brigade 
would fly by glider into two landing zones and move south of Indaw, to protect 16th 
Brigade by using road blocks and demolitions to prevent Japanese reinforcements 
from Mandalay.44 The 3rd West African, 14th and 23rd brigades would form a second 
wave to be inserted later, most likely to attack Indaw.45 These units also would drop 
behind the Japanese to disrupt lines of communication and to block resupply.46  
 
Operation THURSDAY, February–July 1944 
On 10 February the 16th Brigade embarked on the 300-mile march to the Mandalay–
Myitkyina railway and to prepare airstrips for the following two brigades.47 The first 
thirty miles “took nine days to cover”48 due to difficult terrain, poor conditions, and 
failing communications.49 One column did attack the IJA garrison at Lonkin but 
“this diversion achieved very little” and it “caused further delay.”50 Eventually, 16th 
Brigade arrived at Indaw and established the “Aberdeen” stronghold, but the late 
arrival would cause problems for future inter-brigade cooperation.51  On 5 March 
the leading 77th Brigade began flying to the lading zones code-named “Piccadilly” 
                                                                                                                
 42 Rooney, 121. 
 43 Slim, 267; Thompson, 237. 
 44 Thompson, 238. 
 45 Thompson, 245. 
 46 Rooney, 121. 
 47 Collier, 418. 
 48 Thompson, 239. 
 49 16 Infantry Brigade Operations in Burma, February – May 1944, in WO 172/4395, 16 
British Infantry Brigade HQ, 1944 January, May–December, TNA. 
 50 Rooney, 128. 
 51 Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War 1941–1945 (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 
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and “Broadway.” After some initial mishaps,52 on the second night large parts of 
77th Brigade had arrived and began to construct the stronghold, also to be named 
Broadway.53 Next, from 6–8 March, 111th Brigade flew 1,200 people and their 
supplies to Chowringhee.54 The 77th Brigade experienced some early success as it 
constructed and reinforced the Broadway stronghold while sending out columns to 
attack IJA infrastructure north of Indaw, so that by 13 March the brigade had cut the 
rail and road communications to the IJA 18th Division as well as to elements of the 
IJA 31st Division near Kohima.55 Next, the brigade began to create a defensive 
position at Mawlu, to include a landing strip and a drop zone, named “White 
City.”56 Forces moved into positions, which “we were to occupy for the next seven 
weeks” as defenders had to withstand IJA attacks by units as large as regiment.57 
Separately, 111th Brigade struggled. Within five days it suffered from a poor river 
crossing which split the brigade; a supply drop went awry; and the brigade failed to 
reach its railway objective south of Indaw, preventing support to 16th Brigade.58 
 Having established Aberdeen stronghold on 20 March, members of 16th 
Brigade quickly moved to attack Indaw.59 Concurrently, in late March, the 14th 
Brigade and 3rd West African Brigade inserted by gliders and transports, with parts 
of the 14th landing at Aberdeen and moving to attack away from Indaw.60 Tired and 
unsupported, the 16th Brigade attack “proved disastrous” after its leading columns 
were surprised by IJA defenders on 26 and 27 March.61 Attackers “blundered into 
Japanese outposts” and struggled as “16 Brigade turned out to be ill-disciplined and 
poorly trained and ended up firing on each other during the battle.”62 Columns failed 
to coordinate or to concentrate attacks, resulting in weak assaults conducted 
piecemeal.63 Units failed to seize the airfields or supply stores, and had difficulty 
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 53 Rooney, 126. 
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maintaining coherence.64 A separate column fought the IJA near Lake Indaw and 
lost most of its ammunition, heavy weapons, and radios.65 A third column reached 
the airfield east of Indaw but, alone, was too weak. The brigade had to abandon the 
airfield. Thus, 16th Brigade had failed in the Indaw attack, a critical goal, and the 
exhausted unit required evacuation.66 Special Force had failed to seize the Indaw 
airfields, to occupy the area, to prevent IJA reinforcements, or to destroy the road or 
railway south of Indaw.67 Aberdeen was abandoned.68 
 Wingate’s death on 24 March caused Special Force to change command but 
the operation continued.69 The remaining three brigades roamed near Indaw and 
fought local engagements but eventually IJA attacks forced the abandonment of 
White City. On 6 April an IJA Independent Mixed Brigade attacked 77th Brigade by 
shelling the airstrip and employing infantry assaults, causing six days of “confused 
battle” as the defenders, attacking IJA infantry, and counter-attackers fought each 
other.70 On 15–18 April the IJA “launched a most determined attack” that penetrated 
the perimeter, reaching a nearby hill and was barely repulsed.71 This last IJA attack 
against White City from the IJA 24th Mixed Brigade saw Japanese penetrate parts of 
the defences and nearly push deeper.72 Fighting ultimately repelled the IJA force but 
left the 77th Brigade severely weakened.73 Two weeks later the LRPG abandoned 
White City. In early May, many of the remaining LRPG in 3rd West African, 77th, 
and 14th brigade moved northward to the “Blackpool” strongpoint near Hobin with 
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111th Brigade.74 Now with a weakened force and a new commander, this move to 
Blackpool signalled what “was really the end of the Chindits.”75   
Before consolidating Blackpool into a full stronghold “the Japanese attacked 
in strength” with parts of the 53rd Division, which was in the surrounding area as 
well as nearby Mogaung.76 The brigades became increasingly factionalized and, by 
mid-May, the LRPG “were in considerable disarray” as units failed to cooperation 
or coordinate.77 Over the next few weeks they struggled fighting regular units of the 
IJA 18th Division near Blackpool which rendered the LRPG “combat ineffective.”78 
Also, they were “almost out of ammunition and supplies.”79 Blackpool was 
abandoned. Special Force shifted theatre command on 17 May and from that time 
they were used like standard infantry. LRPG near Mogaung attempted to seize the 
road bridge in late May, causing 77th Brigade to suffer 130 killed and wounded. 
Massive airstrikes were required to prevail, and the remaining forces suffered 
severely from rain and disease.80 By the time of the Mogaung attack, previous 
motivation had been “replaced by a resigned fatalism.”81 The continued fighting at 
Mogaung did manage to cut the railway to Myitkyina but it rendered 77th Brigade 
“no longer an effective fighting force” as it suffered 800 dead and wounded. 
Afterwards, the unit possessed only about 300 people “who could walk, let alone 
march.”82 Casualties, exhaustion, and weather combined to render the remaining 
LRPG “not fit to continue operating throughout the monsoon.”83 Special Force 
finally withdrew 77th Brigade in July 1944. It left the 3rd West Africa Brigade to 
patrol, and the 111th Brigade to consolidate for future action.84 
 Overall, Special Force suffered approximately 3,606 casualties with 1,034 
killed and 2,572 wounded, losing approximately one-fifth of its total strength. In 
addition, “most of those who survived never fought again” due to sickness and 
                                                                                                                
 74 Slim, 270. 
 75 Rooney, 136. 
 76 Rooney, 136. 
 77 McLynn, 342, 344. 
 78 Millett and Murray, A War to be Won, 230. 
 79 Thompson, 259. 
 80 McLynn, 351. 
 81 Durant letter, 17. 
 82 McLynn, 352. Allen, Burma, 369. 
 83 Slim, 280. 
 84 3730 SITREP from 3 Ind Div to Main & Adv 11 Army Gp, in WO 203/138, 3 Indian 
Division: Situation Reports, 1944 March – July, TNA. 
   165 
malnutrition.85 The casualties were “out of all proportion to its achievements.”86 
Special Force would not conduct long-range penetration again.87 By early 1945, the 
Long-Range Penetration Groups ceased to exist. 
 
Evaluating Special Force Failure and Identifying Effectiveness 
Operation THURSDAY and the second expedition must be considered a failure. 
Special Force “failed to produce the results its creators hoped for” as it proved 
unable to achieve the critical objectives near Indaw, notably securing the airfields.88 
All the strongholds and blocks had to be abandoned earlier than planned as they 
proved unsustainable and events unfolded contrary as anticipated in the stronghold 
concept papers. The goal of eroding the IJA 18th Division and hindering its 
movement proved unattainable, as multiple brigades—essentially the equivalent of 
two divisions—delivered no significant setbacks. Rather, the LRPG spent a large 
amount of time and effort moving, establishing positions, and trying to survive as 
events occurred differently than planned with problems accumulating and cascading. 
Only the one brigade achieved its specific objectives, the 77th when it severed the 
railway and established a stronghold, but it proved unsustainable. The 16th Brigade, 
unsupported, failed in the critical attack against Indaw’s airfield which had to be 
abandoned. The 111th Brigade failed to establish an effective block against the IJA. 
The insertion of the second wave produced no significant improvements. The 
operation was also costly in lives and resources. Casualties rendered the Special 
Force units combat ineffective, with over one thousand killed and 2,500 wounded—
20% of the force. By the end of the second expedition, the force “was so reduced by 
casualties and sickness… that its rehabilitation became impossible.”89 The personnel 
performed with “courage and hardihood” but, ultimately, the LRPG were 
particularly inefficient.90 It seems right to conclude that “the results achieved were 
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not commensurate with the resources diverted.”91 The LRPG failed in their 
objectives and were inefficient in this pursuit to a point of possible wastefulness.  
 The 3rd Indian Division’s operational effectiveness during the LRPG’s 
second expedition was low. The leading 77th Brigade achieved its first objective and 
fought well, particularly at White City, but it operated largely in isolation as the 
111th Brigade struggled and the 16th Brigade failed in the critical attack at Indaw. As 
preparations necessary for the three-brigade attack failed to occur, setbacks forced 
the brigades to fight alone or as smaller columns. Almost immediately the 111th 
Brigade had to split after a failed river crossing, and the 16th Brigade fought only 
once as a brigade-sized unit—in the disaster near Indaw. Inserting the 3rd West 
African Brigade and 14th Brigade in mid-March failed to enhance inter-brigade 
cooperation or the division’s ability to combine effects. Rather, inserting the 14th 
Brigade created confusion about whether it would support the 16th Brigade 
(exhausted after marching since February) and this inability to coordinate columns 
for combined effects likely contributed to the disaster over 26–27 March. 
Additionally, during this battle (and other instances throughout the operation) many 
of the units struggled in their basic skills. One example is the 16th Brigade near the 
airfield, whose columns were surprised by IJA defences and suffered such losses as 
to require evacuation. As did the 111th Brigade, almost immediately upon insertion. 
By late March other units were similarly rendered combat ineffective. Many units 
struggled with basic tactical skills and eventually several lost cohesion, discipline, 
and core combat abilities.  
 Thus, Special Force’s effectiveness in the second operation is rated as low. 
Challenges were compounded by larger setbacks, resulting in the loss of the 
strongholds and failure to reduce the IJA as intended. More broadly, these 
shortcomings indicated larger problems regarding adaptation between the first and 
second operation. Critically, LRPG lost mobility when moving to the new 
strongholds without gaining the ability to hold the positions and to repel attacking 
units as desired. This new role for the LRPG rendered them more vulnerable to IJA 
firepower while also removing one of the basic virtues of an extended patrol or 
raid—moving speedily and unnoticed relative to the adversary. The IJA could attack 
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the strongholds and repulse Special Force attacks with greater effect than predicted. 
This deeper problem reflected a larger challenge in adapting into the stronghold 
concept. Compared with the first operation, it may be argued that the LRPG reduced 
effectiveness and that their adaptations exacerbated setbacks. 
 
































Findings and Relevance 
Case Study Assessment: Tactical adaptation by Special Force before the LRPG’s 
second operation contributed to failure.  
 For this case, hypothesis 1 (H1), central vertical mechanism over 
decentralized horizontal, is supported. Special Force indicates how the absence of an 
external, higher authority to assess information allowed concepts to develop 
independently within the unit and resulted in a costly failure. When expanded into 
an enlarged division there was no corresponding change in how ideas were created 
or evaluated. Still, the LRPG lacked any comprehensive vetting of ideas outside the 
unit and a limited evaluation of ideas within it. Aside from the report after the first 
operation by Wingate which proposed expanded use of LRPG (without a critical 
review), all other assessments occurred internally and with limited staff review. 
Once leaders endorsed the concept for additional operations and expanded the force 
then 3rd Indian Division continued to issue changes with intra-unit memorandums 
and directives rather than participate in any larger doctrinal development or 
assessments outside of the unit. After breaking apart the 70th British Division and 
incorporating them into Special Force, the units trained independently with their 
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own processes over 20 weeks that emphasized many methods like 1943: marching 
and small-unit jungle movement. Once the division commander endorsed the 
stronghold concept, there was limited external formal review despite receiving a 
significant increase in personnel, resources, and air assets—something in perpetual 
short supply. New ideas and decisions were considered and disseminated through 
the division commander, with lessons (again) addressing specific problems. Thus, 
Special Force disseminated new ideas and concepts without a thorough, 
comprehensive evaluation process beyond a small number of personnel, and in 
many instances only one. The resulting adaptations produced a failure costlier than 
the first. The LRPG and their second operation indicate the risks of authoritative 
assessments without thorough vetting or external analysis, supporting the hypothesis 
that a centralized, vertical mechanism may contribute to more effective adaptations. 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2), anticipation over improvisation, is disputed. After facing 
setbacks in the first operation related to insufficient firepower that obliged columns 
to run away, the resulting solution of strongholds with floater columns proved either 
incorrect or too difficult to execute. The LRPG still possessed insufficient firepower 
to battle the larger IJA units and proved unable to hold the positions. Establishing 
these positions also made the LRPG easier to attack while removing their small-unit 
manoeuvrability. Likely combined with the problems caused by H1, the lack of 
external staff to deliver superior insight or foresight, the result did have a high 
impact on operational outcome; unfortunately for Special Force, it was poor as 
anticipation failed to provide superior perspective, foresight, or collaboration. The 
LRPG’s performance and the outcome of Operation THURSDAY dispute the 
proposal that anticipatory adaptation is more likely to improve effectiveness and 
contribute to success due to increased battlefield perspective from more information, 
greater insight regarding current developments, and additional foresight regarding 
operational goals and future actions. 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3), skill over technology, comes out as neutral. As in the 
first operation, Operation THURSDAY presents a strange case for H3. The 
development of aerial insertion for deep penetration behind enemy lines was an 
impressive achievement. So was the coordination between ground units to create 
airfields, strongholds, and to land thousands of people, animals, and supplies by 
plane and glider. However, the concepts of strongholds and LRPG were 
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fundamentally about developing skills and using existing technological capabilities 
in new ways. It was the shortcomings in skill—particularly regarding coordination 
and small-unit abilities—that undermined effectiveness and contributed to failure. 
The larger shifts in reorganization, expansion, and training had the bigger impact on 
performance and outcome. Technological developments enabled many of Special 
Force’s basic functions, but it was the qualitative changes in skill that were 
responsible for the majority—and most significant—of challenges. 
 
Figure 7.2: Findings for Special Force LRPG Second Operation 




















CENTRAL NEUTRAL SUPPORT AFFIRM SUPPORT SUPPORT   
H2: 
ANTICIPATE DISPUTE DISPUTE AFFIRM DISPUTE DISPUTE   
H3:  
SKILL AFFIRM AFFIRM AFFIRM NEUTRAL NEUTRAL   
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Chapter Eight 
Adaptation, Success, and Costs of Inflexibility: 
Imphal, March – July 1944 
A five-month series of battles across India’s Imphal plain during 1944 crippled IJA 
Fifteenth Army, significantly reduced the Burma Area Army, and dealt IJA forces 
their largest single defeat of the campaign. During Imphal the BAA failed to gain 
any of its objectives, lost over half its forces participating in the operation, and 
opened the path for British-led Allied units to reconquer Burma in 1945.1 The 
operation caused over 53,000 IJA casualties and decisively shifted power in the 
theatre to the Allies, enabling their subsequent overland assault.2 During mid-1944, 
this risky but feasible operation to attack British forces in India and forestall an 
invasion turned into a disaster as setbacks accumulated and combined to result in 
comprehensive failure. More broadly, the operational failure led to the regional 
scenario it was designed to prevent and initiated seventeen months that shattered 
Japanese forces and rendered the 1944–45 Burma campaign “one of the worst 
debacles of the Pacific War.”3 What had caused such a failure?  
 This chapter posits that changes across British forces since 1942 
significantly improved their effectiveness by delivering new combat purposes suited 
to the jungle environment and to counter IJA tactics, while IJA stasis decreased its 
ability to execute complex tactics and reduced its effectiveness. The resulting 
imbalance of relative effectiveness, exacerbated by altered force ratios and 
equipment, led to IJA failure. Additionally, the British had begun to reveal several 
of these larger changes in Fourteenth Army prior to Imphal during the Second 
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Arakan Encounter but the Burma Area Army failed to change before or during 
Imphal. While resources would remain important throughout the operation, the 
critical development was how forces had learned to use existing resources “in fresh 
ways to achieve more than would have been possible” had the British “clung to 
conventional methods.”4 Thus, during the Imphal operation, British wartime tactical 
adaptation increased operational effectiveness and contributed to their success; the 
IJA’s unchanged performance decreased effectiveness and contributed to failure. 
This case study suggests that if forces are evenly matched in size and equipment 
then wartime adaptation may deliver critical relative tactical advantages that 
accumulate into larger operational success. On the other hand, an unwillingness to 
adapt before operations may cost lives, resources, and risk failure, while additional 
inflexibility during operations may exacerbate costs and decrease effectiveness. 
Therefore, examining the Imphal operation suggests some of the benefits of wartime 
change and costs of inflexibility.  
 
Opposing Forces and Plans 
Since early 1943, the IJA in Burma had consolidated its positions and increased 
forces in accordance with a defensive orientation.5 In March 1943 forces 
reorganized into the Burma Area Army (BAA) with three subordinate armies: Thirty 
Third Army in the north, Twenty Eighth Army in the south and, the largest, 
Fifteenth Army in central Burma.6 IJA strategic policy remained defensive in 1943 
as it reinforced units, and by March 1944 the BAA had increased to seven total 
divisions with three of them in Fifteenth Army.7 The BAA position was strong, but 
could not be defended indefinitely as the Allied forces gradually prepared to invade 
from India. Earlier, in 1942, IJA Southern Army considered an operation into 
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Assam, India, and ordered Fifteenth Army to draft plans for a limited offensive.8 
Now, Fifteenth Army commander Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi, recently 
promoted from leading the 18th Division in Burma, revived the plans and advocated 
their implementation to BAA which approved the proposal. So did Southern Army.9 
The updated U-Go operation presented a considerable risk that was judged 
acceptable since success would forestall the looming British advance, establish a 
stronger defensive position to protect Japanese assets in Southeast Asia, and 
possibly incite discontent inside India which would draw Allied resources, 
manpower, time, and disrupt inter-theatre cooperation.10 The Imphal plain, several 
hundred square miles surrounded by jungle-covered mountains and seventy miles 
from the border, represented the only flat ground between Burma and India which 
provided a vital staging point for movement in either direction.11 Therefore, losing 
control of the plain would remove Allied capabilities to mount any major offensive 
into Burma during the upcoming fighting season. The IJA plan was not infeasible: 
the BAA possessed “a reasonably accurate picture of the Allied dispositions,” and 
with a quick success—like all the others the IJA had experienced so far in Burma—
the BAA could consolidate gains before the monsoon and thereafter prevent British 
resupply or reinforcement.12 Then, the isolated British forces would lack capacity to 
sustain operations. The danger was that anything other than a quick victory could 
cause Fifteenth Army divisions to be outnumbered and outgunned on the Imphal 
plain.13 Fifteenth Army planners anticipated three weeks for the operation and 
allotted supplies accordingly. After that time, forces would rely on captured stores.14 
 The BAA planned a twin operation in Arakan where the Twenty Eighth 
Army would destroy 7th Indian Division to prevent Allied reinforcements from 
arriving in the Imphal plain, but the sequencing and execution failed. A longer 
amount of time passed between the two operations than planned since Fifteenth 
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 9 Callahan, 131. 
 10 Callahan, 130; Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 446; Max Hastings, Retribution: The Battle 
for Japan, 1944–45 (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 66, originally published in United 
Kingdom as Nemesis: The Battle for Japan, 1944–45 (Harper Press, 2007). 
 11 Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War 1941–1945 (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 
1984), p. 193; Slim, 286. 
 12 Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 446-447. 
 13 Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 447. 
 14 Allen, Burma, 193. 
   173 
Army required additional preparations, resulting in the two operations unfolding 
separately. If the Second Arakan Encounter had succeeded, then the separation 
would not have mattered since the destruction of 7th Indian Division would prevent 
it from reinforcing at Imphal. The delay also could have even benefitted Fifteenth 
Army since the Second Arakan Encounter revealed new tactics, techniques, and 
procedures among British forces. However, Twenty Eighth Army’s failure in the 
Second Arakan Encounter meant that Fifteenth Army would have to be fast in 
achieving its objectives. 
 For IJA planners and Fifteenth Army commander Mutaguchi, the Imphal 
concept of operation depended on surprise, speed, boldness, and unchanged tactics 
which had “hitherto almost invariably brought them success.”15 Fifteenth Army 
would cross the Chindwin River and assault into Assam over 150 miles to destroy 
IV Corps in the Imphal plain, seize vital supplies, and remove the Allies’ 
“springboard for operations into Burma.”16 The plan aimed for 33rd Division to 
attack from the south against 17th Indian Division in the Chin Hills, and then move 
southward to Imphal along Tiddim Road as a brigade battle group moved through 
Kabaw Valley to attacked parts of the 20th Indian Division, also near Imphal. The 
15th Division would attack from the east, through the Naga Hills, to cut the key road 
to Kohima called the Imphal Road, and then attack southward toward Imphal. The 
31st Division would move through the Naga Hills to attack further north at Kohima 
to block IV Corps reinforcements and isolate the Imphal plain, afterwards following 
the other units at Dimapur and Imphal.17 In sum, from southwest to northeast: 33rd to 
Imphal plain, 15th to Imphal Road to sever Imphal from Kohima and isolate the 
forces, and 31st to Kohima to block the railroad and other transport from India. 
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 With an operational plan that was prepared well in advance with specific 
timetables, Fifteenth Army plans remained unchanged despite the Second Arakan 
Encounter indicating that British forces had altered tactics. By mid-February, in 
Arakan the isolated 7th Indian Division was holding its brigades in defensive boxes 
and repulsing IJA assaults, indicating the potential for aerial resupply to sustain a 
surrounded unit for at least a few weeks. Both the 5th and 7th Indian divisions 
indicated an increased capacity for small-unit tactics and basic skills, and “did not 
quickly succumb to Japanese pressure” in the way units had in 1942—and as the 
Japanese anticipated in the Imphal plan.18 Also, since British units could now 
maintain positions for longer and fight better than before, the IJA expectation of a 
short campaign supported by seized supplies could prove problematic.19 Granted, 
only a few months had passed since British forces began applying the new fighting 
techniques during the Second Arakan Encounter and the beginning of Imphal so it 
may be unfair to criticize commanders and planners for failing to assimilate fully the 
events unfolding and to recognize them as a larger trend or a lesson for the future. 
However, indications had begun to emerge that Fifteenth Army’s attack plan might 
face setbacks from new British tactics which the current plan failed to incorporate.  
 British plans relied on precise sequencing and coordination across IV Corps 
and Fourteenth Army in relation to IJA movements.20 Once the BAA’s main attack 
appeared imminent, the first phase entailed a corps-level in-depth withdrawal back 
from the Chindwin River and Tiddim to Imphal.21 Next, defending units 
concentrated on the Imphal plain would fight from defensive boxes to destroy 
attacking forces with firepower and reserves.22 After IJA units exhausted themselves 
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then a corps counteroffensive would attack with reserves of artillery and armour.23 
In a broad sense, the defensive plan reflected Fourteenth Army’s larger conceptual 
shift to using defensive engagements around pivots to attrit the Japanese when 
attackers became vulnerable due to their extended lines of communication. IV Corps 
would concede the initiative to Fifteenth Army by consolidating in the Imphal plain, 
contracting three divisions dispersed over a 200-mile front.24 
 The three infantry divisions and tank brigade in IV Corps possessed 
sufficient readiness to execute the plan. Forward-positioned at Tiddim, 17th Indian 
Division (under a new commander since the failures in early 1942)25 had 
reorganized, retrained, and gained small-unit experience in jungle warfare through 
patrols and small-scale actions.26 The 20th Indian Division, also forward at Tamu 
and Sittaung, had arrived in 1943 after being created specifically for fighting in the 
Burma theatre. It benefitted from rigorous pre-deployment training as high as 
division echelon before gaining more practical experience in India.27 The 23rd Indian 
Division, the corps reserve located north of Imphal near Kohima and Ukhrul, had 
spent two years patrolling the Assam–Burma border.28 The 254th Indian Tank 
Brigade arrived in early 1944 and trained extensively with the 23rd Indian Division 
for coordinating in jungle conditions.29 Additionally, in early March the 5th Indian 
Division fighting in Arakan would be relieved and moved to IV Corps area by mid-
April.30 Other units from Fourteenth Army and Eleventh Army Group would assist 
during the defence but, overall, IV Corps would conduct the majority of fighting, 
particularly in the critical first six weeks.31 In late January, IJA reconnaissance in 
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force began across the Chin Hills and units started to clash with parts of 17th Indian 
Division.32 By late February, the “two approximately equal forces faced one 
another, each manoeuvring for the initiative.”33 The BAA would attack in March. 
 
March 6 to April 19: IJA Attack Repulsed 
During the first six weeks of Imphal, British units withstood the critical threat of a 
large-scale IJA attack by using new tactical abilities. Fifteenth Army attacked on 6 
March with speed and depth that quickly disrupted IV Corps plans for the 
coordinated withdrawal to Imphal by its two forward divisions.34 The Japanese 
“achieved tactical surprise”35 and shortly thereafter two regiments of the IJA 33rd 
Division had encircled the 17th Indian Division near Tiddim, cutting its lines of 
communication.36 The IJA “attacked in front and hooked around behind as usual”37 
which quickly endangered the entire unit, and required IV Corps reserves to enable 
the escape.38 On 7 March IV Corps reoriented stockpiles and began organizing self-
contained defensive boxes near Imphal town and the nearby airfields, essential for 
support as it retreated to the plain.39 The 17th Indian Division initiated multiple 
defensive boxes while also attempting small-scale counterattacks until 14 March 
when 63rd Brigade suffered from intense fighting.40 The brigade failed to secure a 
key area overlooking nearby Tiddim Road which was now cut by the Japanese, 
isolating the division which would need to break the roadblock. The 17th Indian 
Division began retreating along the Tiddim Road, a “narrow, twisting 160-mile long 
road to the Imphal Plain,” with additional support from the 23rd Indian Division.41 
But unlike in 1942 and past encirclements by 33rd Division, now the British began to 
move amidst the heavy fighting, to inflict casualties, to withstand attacks, to clear 
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IJA personnel from positions, and even to destroy Japanese tanks.42 The 17th Indian 
Division fought through roadblocks, established defensive boxes, disbanded them 
while underway, and moved at a sufficient rate to prevent more substantial, 
additional roadblocks.43 These new techniques were accompanied by air supply 
which allowed the 16,000 troops and 2,500 vehicles to move into the Imphal plain 
and to prepare for the subsequent fighting.44 From 20–26 March, IV Corps gained 
the 5th Indian Division (minus one brigade) as it repositioned from Arakan where it 
had been fighting in the Second Arakan Encounter.45 Eleventh Army Group placed 
the 2nd British Division under Fourteenth Army as a reserve and added the 7th Indian 
Division as a mobile reserve in the central front, where it would join 5th Indian 
Division.46 As forces shifted in late March, against IV Corps the IJA “put in a heavy 
attack and repeated attacks of increasing weight,” but failed to halt the movement 
while also suffering “very heavy casualties.”47 
 By early April, IV Corps had moved its three divisions onto the central plain 
and gained reserve support to form a large defensive pivot consisting of several 
pockets along avenues of approach on a 90-mile arc.48 Now with four divisions and 
one armoured brigade, the corps had reinforced and reoriented itself, but the unit’s 
position remained vulnerable. IV Corps “was cut off at Imphal,” the 161st Brigade 
was isolated near Kohima, 2nd British Division was near Dimapur, and all the lines 
of communication to Assam remained exposed.49 Separately, the attacking IJA 15th 
Division crossed the Chindwin River near Ukhrul, before turning east and blocking 
the Dimapur-Imphal road at Kangpokpi on 28 March.50 By early April, Fifteenth 
Army cut the last overland link between IV Corps and India, completing its isolation 
as planned.51 Then, the 155,000 personnel of IV Corps shifted to aerial resupply and 
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prepared counterattacks.52 On 10 April, Fourteenth Army began the 
counteroffensive, with IV Corps to hold IJA forces south of Imphal, hold Ukhrul to 
cut IJA lines, and then attack the 15th and 33rd divisions while 2nd British Division 
(with supporting elements of XXXIII Corps) would hold Kohima and fight the 31st 
Division. 53 From this point forward, the next three months were “confused, bitter, 
and mainly and infantryman’s war.”54 The battles “tended to be along, and for 
control of, the six main routes” oriented like the face of a clock, and units 
“outflanked each other and were outflanked in their turn.”55 Still, as the BAA and 
Fourteenth Army battled in close tactical contests during these months, across the 
region a larger pattern emerged of IJA forces unable to exploit fleeting advantages 
while the British managed to mitigate the costs of setbacks and counter for small 
gains that accumulated into larger advantages. 
 From 7–11 April, the BAA threatened IV Corps headquarters and aerial 
resupply when an IJA battalion fought, seized, and entrenched on Nungshigum Hill 
overlooking Imphal. It was the “nearest that any Japanese force larger than a patrol 
ever got to Imphal.”56 The hill’s summit formed a four-mile ridge with linked hills 
and a plain up to 400 meters wide, accessible only by a steep ascent.57 Led by 
elements of 5th Indian Division, tanks and infantry fought up the hills against the IJA 
battalion, combining arms—slowly but effectively—to destroy, slowly but 
effectively, the Japanese positions with fighting as close as five yards apart.58 As the 
tank firepower destroyed defensive bunkers, fighting cleared away the IJA battalion 
and killed over 250, although the attackers also suffered with “every single tank and 
infantry officer” killed or wounded.”59 The IJA regimental commander, observing 
from nearby, “saw the tanks bury the Japanese alive,” contradicting IJA tenets that 
tanks could not be employed up the hilly terrain.60 The enhanced infantry–armour 
coordination with disciplined tactical leadership and superior technical skills 
repulsed “the most dangerous threat” to the plain, and proved “the turning point in 
                                                                                                                
 52 Moreman, The Jungle, 131. 
 53 Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 302. 
 54 Thompson, 192. 
 55 Thompson, 192. 
 56 Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 307. 
 57 Allen, Burma, 253. 
 58 Thompson, 194-195. 
 59 Allen, Burma, 258; Evans and Brett-James, Imphal, 223, cited in Allen, 258, footnote 1. 
 60 Allen, Burma, 257. 
   179 
the operations north of Imphal.”61 Repulsing the IJA from Nungshigum Hill 
removed a key threat to IV Corps for the operation and halted the IJA’s regimental 
thrust that threatened communication with forces astride the Imphal–Kohima road.62 
By 19 April, the repulse at Nungshigum Hill and IJA setbacks nearby at Sengmai 
necessitated Japanese forces “to adopt a defensive role.”63 At this point the Japanese 
had lost the initiative, and the BAA would not regain it the rest of the operation. 5th 
Indian Division transferred responsibility for Nungshigum and Ukhrul Road to 23rd 
Indian Division, and the latter began clearing the road towards Ukhrul. 
 Concurrently, to the south near Moreh, 33rd Division’s Yamamoto Brigade 
Group attacked 20th Indian Division to open the main road to Imphal defended by 
80th and 100th brigades, with the 32nd moving to corps reserve.64 In late March the 
32nd Brigade “held off attacks by tanks and infantry” as it shifted to reserve at Palel, 
while the 80th and 100th brigades began “a course of battle for the next two months” 
as forces captured, lost, and recaptured networks of hills.”65 From 22–26 March, IJA 
infantry and tanks attacked 20th Indian Division from multiple directions, with the 
latter employing indirect fire to repulse attacks and to cover movements to new 
positions.66 The 80th Brigade fought a series of fierce attacks against the parts of the 
Yamamoto Brigade Group which “from the point of view of firepower” was “the 
best equipped in the whole of [Fifteenth] Army” due to its artillery and tanks.67 On 1 
April its 213th Regiment seized a key hill and threatened a nearby road from the 
position, subsequently repelling six British counterattacks over nine days by an 80th 
Brigade battalion.68 On day ten, for the seventh assault, the battalion called 
Hurricanes to bomb the hilltops followed by artillery and another infantry assault up 
the hill.69 Now “the whole… top of the hill was blown away” and assaulting forces 
fought Japanese defenders in hand-to-hand combat and they seized and held the 
                                                                                                                
 61 Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 307, 310. 
 62 Allen, Burma, 259. 
 63 Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 310. 
 64 The 32nd Brigade moved to corps reserve on 01 April. WO 172/4318, War Diary for April 
1944, 20 Indian Division “G Branch,” 1944 January–December, TNA; Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 
238; Thompson, 196.  
 65 Allen, Burma, 211; Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 238-239. 
 66 WO 172/4318, Consolidated Report of VCOs & NCOs on the Attack of Shark; WO 
172/4318, War Diary for March 1944, 20 Indian Division “G Branch.” 
 67 Allen, Burma, 206. 
 68 Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 238-239; Thompson, 197. 
 69 WO 172/4318, War Diary entry from 11 April 1944.  
   180 
area.70 Fighting continued for several days as remaining Japanese attacked from 
both outside and inside the area but failed to re-take it.71 With 20th Indian Division 
now responsible for airfields near Palel and holding the area, on 14 April it ordered 
units to prevent Japanese penetration using defensive boxes “concentrated to 
withstand ground attack,” as well as patrols and reserves, to hold “to the last man.”72 
These defences were tested through the end of April as Japanese forces repeatedly 
attacked using “normal tactics of infiltration round the flanks” but with limited 
success as defenders combined patrols with firepower to repel IJA assaults.73 
 Eighty miles north of Imphal at Kohima, outnumbered British defenders 
withstood the other severe threat to Fourteenth Army by repulsing a sustained 
divisional attack. On 4 April the IJA 31st Division attacked Kohima to sever the 
Imphal Road against defenders prepared for a much smaller attacking force.74 The 
(unexpected) large-scale defence fell upon a 2,500-member garrison which 
organized defences in four boxes along the ridge to fight until relief arrived.75 
Fighting at Kohima occurred largely isolated from other battles at Imphal but 
remained vital for the larger outcome since control of the ridge delivered control of 
the larger pass—the best route between Assam and Burma, to include the key rail 
network.76 Parts of 5th Indian Division’s 161st Brigade flew from Chittagong to 
Dimapur to support the Kohima garrison under siege, as aerial resupply maintained 
the small force engaged in close combat that slowly reduced the defensive boxes to 
one hill.77 On 7 April patrols from 161st Brigade first accessed the trapped garrison 
while also becoming isolated by a Japanese roadblock.78 On 9 April parts of 2nd 
                                                                                                                
 70 W.J.P. Aggett, The Bloody Eleventh: History of the Devonshire Regiment, Volume III, 
1915-1969 (The Devonshire and Dorset Regiment, 1995), cited in Thompson, 198, footnote 2. 
 71 Thompson, 198-199. 
 72 WO 172/4318, 20 Ind Div Op Instr No 32, p. 2, paragraphs 7-8, 20 Indian Division “G 
Branch,” TNA. 
 73 WO 172/4318, War Diary entries from 18-30 April 1944. Quote from 28 April. 
 74 Moreman, The Jungle, 129. 
 75 The garrison was now under operational control of XXXIII Corps, since 1 April, when 
XXXIII Corps headquarters opened at Jorhat with operational command of all troops in Kohima and 
Assam and Surma valleys. Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 245, 466. Arthur Swinson, Kohima (London: 
Head of Zeus Ltd, 2015), p. 41, originally published in 1966 by Cassell & Company Ltd, United 
Kingdom; Moreman, The Jungle, 129. XXXIII was assigned to SEAC in late 1943, and in April–July 
1944 it possessed the primary fighting groups of 2nd Infantry Division (British) and 7th Indian 
Infantry Division. In Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 245, 466, 500. 
 76 Allen, Burma, 228. Rail network assessment from Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 328. 
 77 Jeffreys, The British Army in the Far East, 77; Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 305. 
 78 Thompson, 154. 
   181 
British Division arrived at Dimapur and took command of operational troops at 
Kohima, assumed command of all operations around Dimapur–Kohima, began 
attempts to clear the surrounding area of IJA forces to assist the 161st Brigade, and, 
ultimately, “to open the [road] to Kohima and to relieve the Kohima garrison.”79 For 
fourteen days IJA forces continued to attack the garrison using frontal attacks in 
both day and night.80 From 11–15 April the 2nd British Division fought through 
multiple IJA roadblocks to link with 161st Brigade, allowing the division’s 6th 
Brigade to relieve the isolated 161st and enable it to move toward the garrison.81 On 
18 April the siege ended when 2nd British Division advanced from Dimapur which 
allowed the 161st Brigade to relieve the garrison.82 Japanese attacks continued over 
the next several days but now defending forces could counterattack the nearby 
ridges which blocked the road.83 The 5th and 6th brigades began flanking Japanese-
held hills, supported by artillery and some tanks, and through early May the units 
fought IJA defenders in their defensive positions as well as against repeated 
counterattacks.84 With numerous casualties on all sides, this fight culminated 
“thirty-four days of some of the toughest fighting in the Second World War.”85 The 
IJA threat to the pass was over. 
 For Fourteenth Army the fighting in April, like the broader Imphal 
operation, was “not easy to follow.”86 17th Indian Division continued to fight IJA 
infantry and tanks throughout the month from its three boxes in the Imphal plain.87 
To the south, two brigades of 20th Indian Division continued to withstand Japanese 
attacks, encircled IJA units to cut their lines of communication, fought numerous 
small-unit engagements, captured roadblocks, cooperated with artillery to clear hills 
of IJA defenders, and seized key terrain.88 By mid-April the British forces had 
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withstood the IJA’s opening assault which severely threatened Imphal, a time when 
“crises might have slipped into disaster.”89 Then the situation began to resemble 
more closely the original battle for which Fourteenth Army had planned. 
 Thus, by 19 April IV Corps and Fourteenth Army had countered the three 
critical threats: it withdrew 17th Indian Division from encirclement to the plain, 
cleared the Nungshigum Hill, the principal IJA threat to the pivot’s resupply, and 
relieved the Kohima garrison to stay connected with India. Other IJA attacks in the 
east and southeast had slowed and appeared unable to defeat defending forces. By 
this time, the combination of skilfully retracting IV Corps units into defensive 
boxes, using counterattacking pivots, consistently applying disciplined core abilities 
in defence and skilfully coordinating infantry units in attack, particularly with 
armour to clear IJA defences, had caused sufficient setbacks for Fifteenth Army 
which prevented it from attaining its objectives. On 20 April, IJA Fifteenth Army 
commander Mutaguchi visited frontline Japanese units, with an opportunity to halt 
the operation.90 Instead it would continue. 
 
April 20 to July 4: Defeat Becomes Disaster 
The second phase of Imphal reflected IJA inflexibility that effectively destroyed 
Fifteenth Army as a fighting unit. British forces had repulsed the critical threats 
during the operation’s first phase, and now during the second phase the re-opening 
of the Imphal–Kohima road in late May removed any realistic possibility for 
Fifteenth Army to achieve its objectives. Yet the IJA would continue to fight. 
Fifteenth Army, having fired two divisional commanders and soon to fire a third, 
was ordered to continue operations by Burma Area Army and Southern Army 
Group.91 For three more months Fifteenth Army fought with costly attacks against 
                                                                                                                
 89 Slim, 315. 
 90 Ushiro Masaru, Biruma Senki [The War in Burma] (Tokyo: Nihon shuppan kyodo 
kabushiki geisha, 1953), p. 30, cited in Arakawa, 118-119, footnote 36. 
 91 In late May and early June 1944, Burma Area Army commander Kawabe visited Fifteenth 
Army and its commander Mutaguchi. In late May Fifteenth Army commander Mutaguchi relieved 
33rd Division commander Yanagida for being ineffective, and on 6 June the 15th Division commander 
Yamauchi was relieved due to an illness that would soon kill him. In July, the last of Fifteenth 
Army’s original three divisional commanders, 31st Division commander Sato, would be fired after 
defying orders of Fifteenth Army. BAA commander Kawabe directed Fifteenth Army to continue 
fighting, and when he returned to his headquarters the Southern Army Group had sent a message to 
continue fighting as well. Allen, Burma, 264-266; Arakawa, 118. 
   183 
forces who repeatedly countered with devastating effects. Overall, Fifteenth Army’s 
continued lack of cooperation and unchanged tactics or plans led to a disaster. 
 By early May the Fifteenth Army attacks around Imphal from multiple 
directions followed a costly pattern.92 Continuous thrusts against the plain followed 
key routes blocked by British defenders that attackers attempted to infiltrate and 
outflank. Attacks were fierce but uncoordinated as small units pushed one or two 
miles deep before being repulsed by counterattacks. Then IJA units positioned 
themselves in the nearby hills which required clearing slowly.93 Gradually, Fifteenth 
Army was “worn down by grinding combat, hunger and disease, almost to 
nothing.”94 By mid-May the 31st Division (that had failed to seize Kohima) was 
“being slowly driven from the vantage points,” the 15th Division was halted and 
being forced back, and the 33rd Division was stalled while preparing to re-attack 
against difficult odds.95  
 Now both Fifteenth Army and IV Corps moved to gain initiative before the 
monsoon. The IJA 33rd Division was to reattack 17th Indian Division near Bishenpur 
to break through to the Imphal plain, while IV Corps reinforced the unit with all 
reserves in order to remove this last threat from Fifteenth Army.96 In late May 33rd 
Division attacked, outflanked defending units, moved behind Bishenpur, and nearly 
seized the 17th Indian Division’s headquarters before the counterattacking 63rd 
Brigade infiltrated past 213th Regiment and established a position “in the very heart 
of 33 Division.”97 The 33rd Division, now with a new commander and supported by 
a tank regiment,98 made some progress and inflicted casualties but the attackers lost 
too many personnel and the capacity to succeed. By late-May the 33rd Division had 
acknowledged the unlikelihood of survival and ordered final attacks in a desperate 
attempt to seize Bishenpur.99 Reflecting later, the Fourteenth Army commander 
considered the attacks “remarkable in their boldness and desperation” but by this 
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time there was no realistic chance of breaking through.100 The division continued to 
fight through June but with no more success and, ultimately, would become a shell 
of a unit. By 30 June the 33rd Division had lost 70% of its forces—12,000 people—
in 7,000 killed or wounded and 5,000 sick.101 And still the division had to fight back 
across the Chindwin River. 
 At Kohima, 2nd British Division spent two months clearing entrenched IJA 
defenders across the four-mile front while continuously harassed by IJA 
counterattacks.102 By early May the Allied forces outnumbered Japanese defenders, 
and units slowly cleared the bunkers and “very strong defences.”103 As British 
forces reinforced against the 31st Division—a unit now essentially abandoned by 
Fifteenth Army—attackers infiltrated past defensive positions to capture positions 
and destroy bunkers using increased firepower.104 By late May the final clearings by 
5th Brigade opened the area east of the Imphal road and outflanked the remaining 
IJA defenders.105 From 2–6 June the 31st Division independently withdrew from 
Kohima with only implicit approval by Fifteenth Army, ending the battle, and the 
division slowly disintegrated.106 Soon the retreating personnel “were in headlong 
flight” as troops discarded weapons and equipment.107 Over sixty-four days at 
Kohima the British lost approximately 4,000 personnel compared with 7,000 
Japanese, within the larger and ongoing Imphal operation.108  
 Separately, the IJA 15th Division fought near Ukhrul and the Imphal–
Kohima road against 23rd and 5th Indian divisions but “the weakest link by far in the 
Japanese encirclement” was battered and “gradually lost cohesion.”109 In early May 
the 23rd Indian Division cleared the road toward Ukhrul and “dominated the enemy 
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over the whole of the Ukhrul Road sector.”110 IJA 15th Division abandoned attacking 
and entrenched, shifting to a defensive posture while needing reinforcements.111 In 
response, British attackers hooked around enemy positions to seize the nearby hills 
and to push out the 15th Division as a threat to the plain. In early June it attempted a 
final thrust with “the most intensive bombardment put down by the Japanese in the 
entire Burma campaign,”112 but the 23rd Indian Division held and by the end of June 
the 15th Division was so reduced it was “a division in name only.”113 On 23 June the 
commander was relieved114 while attacking forces “drove a wedge between the two 
halves of 15 Division and started to annihilate it piecemeal.”115 By early July, the 
IJA forces as Ukhrul were encircled, isolated, cleared, and “wiped out.”116 
Remaining members of 15th Division joined others “in rapid retreat for the 
Chindwin, covered by small but tenacious rearguards.”117  
 
Identifying Effectiveness and Evaluating IJA Failure  
Fifteenth Army’s Imphal offensive provides a clear example of operational failure. 
First, it failed to achieve any of the objectives. Second, the IJA’s battlefield 
performance produced high costs in casualties, resources, and time. Fifteenth Army 
was reduced to 36% of its pre-battle strength after losing 53,505 casualties from a 
total force of 84,280; “five divisions were destroyed, two more badly mauled,” and 
the remaining 30,775 personnel were largely of wounded, sick, or malnourished.118 
In comparison, the British suffered 16,700 casualties across a larger force.119 
Granted, Fifteenth Army’s short timeline of twenty-one days to seize its objectives 
with limited logistical support increased the difficulty of achieving its goals, but 
previously IJA units (including several that fought at Imphal) had experienced a 
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comparable rate of success. Additionally, after the initial setbacks in mid-April 
which caused the original objectives to become unattainable, the subsequent losses 
in lives and resources proved disproportionately high compared with past IJA 
operations. It also took five times longer than planned. Measured against the 
missions assigned, relative expenditures in material and human resources, and time 
required, Fifteenth Army’s Imphal offensive must be assessed as failure. 
 The battles around Imphal indicated how the balance of effectiveness was 
shifting to favour Fourteenth Army over the BAA, and how Fifteenth Army 
capabilities had stalled and reduced during the operation. By the end of the Imphal, 
the British displayed intermediate effectiveness while Fifteenth Army showed low. 
However, the clashes had been close; very likely they could have ended differently 
if not for the new skills and capabilities across British forces. One must not overlook 
how the initial stages of fighting during late March and early April proved quite 
close and required the application of significant new skills across multiple divisions 
within Fourteenth Army to repulse the Japanese attacks. The 17th Indian Division’s 
extrication from encirclement by 33rd Division likely avoided losing a division 
which would have significantly increased IV Corps’ vulnerability. After the 
Japanese hooked around 17th Indian Division—using the same tactics as two years 
prior—now defenders overcame setbacks with new techniques. The division 
implemented defensive boxes, fought through roadblocks with combined-arms 
firepower, and counterattacked out of the vulnerable position while IV Corps 
coordinated support from the 23rd Indian Division. The unit executed a fighting 
withdrawal to the Imphal plain with sufficient capacity to continue fighting 
alongside the other divisions. At Kohima against the IJA 31st Division, a small 
garrison withstood a fourteen-day siege while XXXIII Corps coordinated inter-
division assistance from the 161st Brigade, which also required assistance from the 
2nd British Division. The garrison’s tactical defence against IJA infiltration, 
defensive consolidation on the Kohima hilltop, 161st Brigade attacking to relieve the 
garrison, and divisional support, all combined to prevent the Japanese from 
indefinitely severing the resupply route to Imphal. Around Nungshigum Hill, the 5th 
Indian Division applied infantry and armour in new ways against defenders 
entrenched on the slopes and hilltops, applying improved small-unit coordination 
and combined-arms firepower to eliminate the threat to the plain below. In the 
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south, the 20th Indian Division repulsed numerous attacks by the 33rd Division, the 
IJA’s most heavily-armed unit, cleared defenders entrenched in the hills, and then 
used defensive boxes to hold the terrain. These initial battles through mid-April 
critically threatened British forces and if Fourteenth Army had not applied the 
adapted tactics then the threats may not have been overcome, or at least not without 
suffering a much greater cost. Thus, across four close, critical battles during the 
Imphal operation’s early stages, Fourteenth Army blocked IJA objectives and 
rebalanced power in the theatre by using its new capabilities against IJA tactics that 
had worked so well in the past. Once in the central Imphal pivot, defenders 
continued to repel Fifteenth Army assaults using the new techniques. In late May 
and June during repeated attacks and counterattacks, Fourteenth Army consistently 
counterattacked IJA positions and displayed a new ability to infiltrate and encircle 
while coordinating tactical assaults into larger operational counterattacks. Overall, 
this performance indicates increased operational effectiveness across British forces. 
 For the Japanese, Fifteenth Army initially indicated an ability to execute 
some elements of complex tactics but, after the critical battles through late April, the 
stalemate became disaster as army effectiveness shifted to low. Fifteenth Army 
repeatedly applied unchanged tactics, exacerbated setbacks, and contributed to 
failure as forces eroded and lost the ability to sustain operations outside one 
division. At Imphal the Japanese appeared inflexible, unwilling to withdraw after 
setbacks, and unexceptional in the conduct of operations.120 When IJA divisions 
experienced these setbacks the forces repeated similar mistakes; the common 
response tended to favour an unchanged method, technique, or procedure, only now 
applied with greater vigour, conviction, or number of personnel. Although some of 
the changes by Fourteenth Army were revealed previously in the Second Arakan 
Encounter, no indications suggest that the larger BAA made any changes in 
response. Then, during the operation, the BAA and its subordinate Twenty Eighth 
and Fifteenth armies did not make any significant alterations or adjustments during 
the Imphal operation. It may be tempting to blame the commanding officers but 
replacing all three division commanders also failed to cause any significant changes. 
Precise numbers are unclear, but a significant number of IJA casualties—and 
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possibly a majority—occurred after the initial failures, suggesting some of the costs 
were associated with applying unchanged tactics and ineffective attacks. According 
to one researcher, the 33rd Division suffered 13,376 dead during the Imphal 
operation with 7,500 (56%) of those after June.121 
 Forces across Fifteenth Army maintained basic skills and fought well across 
regiments but struggled to combine divisions or to coordinate inter-division actions 
appropriately. This limited ability further reduced as fighting continued. As IJA 
units simultaneously attacked IV Corps in the central Imphal plain, the penetrating 
thrust proved intense but lacked sufficient concentration to break through, much less 
deliver an opportunity for exploitation.122 Even if one had successfully penetrated 
defences then it seems unlikely that the damage would be so severe that it could 
achieve an operational objective. With over a third of the combat forces engaged 
separately at Kohima, Fifteenth Army applied attacking units piecemeal with little 
overall coordination and consistently employed unchanged tactics as forces 
continued to diminish.123 Some forces retreated effectively, notably with members 
of 33rd Division that continued to fight across the Chindwin River, but large parts of 
the 31st collapsed.124 As fighting continued, cooperation broke down between 
Fifteenth Army and its divisions.125 Fifteenth Army’s inability to coordinate actions 
across divisions caused them to fight alone. 
 In addition to these challenges of readiness and sustainability, Imphal 
revealed a new dilemma for the Japanese that would grow in the future: the IJA’s 
relative inferiority in firepower and resulting challenges for small-unit tactics. IJA 
attackers and defenders revealed sufficient skill to coordinate firepower with 
movement throughout 1942 and early 1943 but once facing forces supported by 
armour, artillery, and sometimes airpower, the situations were less tenable. Without 
effective anti-tank weapons and facing consistently improved armour-infantry 
coordination, the IJA possessed no true countermeasure other than stout defence and 
operational reserves—both of which were reducing. As Fourteenth Army refined its 
ability to use a relatively small number of tanks to support advancing infantry to 
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within five yards of Japanese defences—as displayed at Nungshigum Hill—the 
Japanese struggled to respond, and would continue to do so in the future.  
 
Figure 8.1: Measuring Adaptation, Effectiveness, and Outcome: Imphal  
























































Findings and Relevance 
Case Study Assessment: British tactical adaptation during 1943 resulted in success 
for Fourteenth Army during the Imphal operation in 1944. The use of unchanged 
tactics by IJA Fifteenth Army exacerbated setbacks and contributed to failure. 
In this case study, hypothesis 1 (H1), central vertical information mechanism 
over decentralized horizontal, is affirmed. Like the Second Arakan Encounter, the 
new combat techniques employed at Imphal that increased effectiveness and enabled 
success relied on larger centralized vertical information mechanisms to collect 
information, evaluate ideas, and disseminate them with the authority to task 
subsequent reorganization and training in accordance with the new ideas. With these 
new ideas, divisions and brigades across Fourteenth Army countered IJA infiltration 
tactics and roadblocks that had proved so devastating in 1942, fought well through 
the jungle, used the new pivot system with multiple defensive boxes, repulsed IJA 
counterattacks, and cleared IJA bunkers. For the IJA, in contrast, Fifteenth Army 
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employed no formal, central, vertical information sharing mechanism beyond 
limited unit reporting, and the organization proved unable to counter the new 
techniques at Imphal. Related closely with H2, British forces outside the battlefield 
collected information, studied how to respond, and disseminated the lessons, relying 
on lower echelons to train in the skills necessary for their implementation.  
 Hypothesis 2 (H2), anticipation over improvisation, is supported. The Imphal 
operation indicates virtues of anticipation and risks of insufficient improvisation. 
Allied forces appropriately planned new tactics, prepared for their use, and 
Fourteenth Army executed them effectively against IJA attackers throughout the 
operation. While Fourteenth Army experienced losses and challenges, aside from 
the unexpected force imbalance at Kohima the operation unfolded largely without 
major setbacks or surprises for the British. Imphal suggests that with a sound plan 
that requires only minor adjustments then operational success may be attained and 
disaster averted. Of course, battlefield forces had to act and react quickly to 
changing circumstances, but the most significant challenges were anticipated before 
the battle and met throughout the fighting with preconceived tactics. The lesson 
from Fifteenth Army appears to be a related alternative: when things fail to unfold 
as expected then the consistent application of unchanged tactics may cause events to 
transition from defeat to disaster. Inappropriate expectations continued to produce 
setbacks that exacerbated and grew, inducing greater costs and ultimately destroying 
the equivalent of a corps. A tentative conclusion from the Imphal operation is that 
anticipation may be more favourable for exploiting successes, while improvisation 
may be necessary for reducing costs in setbacks and preventing disaster. 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3), skill over technology, is supported. British forces trained 
and retrained extensively during 1943 in the tactics applied during the 1944 
operation, with relevance for both the basic and specialized skills displayed. The 
new abilities to counter IJA infiltration tactics, fight through the jungle, and to 
counterattack relied almost exclusively on new skills and abilities. The use of 
defensive boxes, clearing IJA defensive positions, and breaking roadblocks, all 
employed existing technology with better coordination and more effective 
application. While additional resources assisted British effectiveness and the IJA’s 
lack of resources eventually limited their capabilities, it was the new employment of 
these resources which most significantly influenced effectiveness and operational 
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outcome. Notably, this issue of basic resources displays a challenge underlying H3: 
the difference between technological advancements and basic resources for routine 
support and sustainment. The ability for British and IJA forces to sustain combat 
relied on resupply of core items for daily use such as food, manpower, and 
ammunition. While not decisive to the operation’s outcome, certainly it influenced 
battlefield performance. This scenario suggests how resources needed continuously 
by large amounts of people may have less obvious or immediate impact compared 
with a new weapon system or larger technological advancement but failing to 
consider their significance may deliver an incomplete understanding of what makes 
tactical adaptation effective under certain conditions or circumstances. Sustained 
support may not necessarily deliver new capabilities, but lacking access to routine 
core items may limit the opportunity to develop them. 
 
Figure 8.2: Findings for the Imphal Operation 
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Chapter Nine 
High Effectiveness: 
Breakout to Meiktila, December 1944—March 1945 
From late 1944 to mid-1945, British-led Allied forces would attack from India down 
central Burma to push Japanese forces out of all critical locations and back to the 
border with Siam. During this time, Fourteenth Army operations would display a 
new, high degree of effectiveness using sophisticated manoeuvre as it moved out of 
the jungle, crossed the Irrawaddy River, and fought across the plains to seize 
Meiktila and cripple IJA forces in Burma. This breakout operation across three new 
environments—one anticipated and two not—produced clear operational success 
and contributed to the IJA’s staggering losses in 1945 with more than 40,000 
casualties since Imphal.1 This breakout, exploitation, and pursuit across Burma to 
isolate and effectively to destroy two IJA armies reflected Fourteenth Army 
adaptation for devastating effects. However, the fighting lacked significant changes 
during the operation: “practically all the tactical points” were the same as taught in 
Indian Army schools.2 How did this type of adaptation relate to such an 
overwhelming success? 
 This chapter posits that tactical adaptation prior to 1945 enabled British 
attackers to exploit advantages while exacerbating IJA setbacks from which the 
Burma Area Army would not recover. The imbalance in small-unit capabilities, 
particularly the improved British skill combining small-unit, infantry-led firepower, 
led to British success. Therefore, this case study indicates how wartime change 
before an operation can enable high effectiveness and deliver a sufficient foundation 
in concepts and shared practices so that further tactical adaptation is not required 
during fighting, as long as an adversary does not significantly increase capabilities. 
In addition, this case reveals challenges for assessing operational effectiveness when 
a force fails to challenge an adversary at their points of vulnerability, which might 
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deliver inflated perceptions of abilities by masking weaknesses. Thus, the breakout 
to Meiktila suggests some of the benefits, risks, and limitations of wartime change. 
 
Opposing Forces and Plans 
In late 1944, the Allied strategy for Burma aimed to confront Japanese forces in the 
country’s centre or south to battle and decisively destroy the IJA Burma Area Army 
(BAA).3 Seizing vital locations would supplement this goal by enabling resupply 
and isolating Japanese forces. After some reorganization and the creation of a new 
command structure, Fourteenth Army, with IV Corps and XXXIII Corps, would 
focus on the upcoming operation through central Burma.4 Planners expected IJA 
forces to fight north of Mandalay on the Schwebo plain between the Chindwin and 
Irrawaddy rivers.5 For the upcoming operation, both corps would cross the 
Chindwin River and align on the plain to move forwards and to destroy the bulk of 
IJA forces. IV Corps, with its 7th Indian and 19th Indian divisions, would move 
through the Sittaung bridgehead, shift to the plain and seize Japanese airfields. 
XXXIII Corps, organized around the 2nd British and 20th Indian divisions, would 
cross at the Kalwa bridgehead.6 Some of these units were relatively fresh: the 19th 
Indian Division arrived from India after jungle training, supplementing pre-war 
preparations for open warfare; the 255th Indian Tank Brigade arrived in October and 
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prepared with the 19th Indian Division while also learning from the 254th Indian 
Tank Brigade; and the 28th East African Independent Brigade joined Fourteenth 
Army after “extensive jungle training in Ceylon” followed by combined-arms 
training at Imphal.7 Also, Fourteenth Army mechanized two brigades of the 17th 
Indian Division.8 The plan was good but nothing was certain. Numerically, “the 
opposing forces in Burma were pretty evenly matched,” and the Japanese were “on 
the defensive behind the best natural obstacle in Burma with good lines of 
communication.”9 The key development would be how to use these forces in the 
new environment against IJA divisions operating with modified defensive postures 
and goals. Few changes had occurred in the IJA units’ purposes, methods, or 
techniques since Imphal. 
 As it came to be, the operation would require parts of Fourteenth Army to 
fight over three environments new to most of the forces: over large open plains, 
across a major river, and inside a city. By early 1945, most forces had trained 
primarily—sometimes only—for fighting in the jungle while on foot. Before 
entering the plains of central Burma, “tanks had… been used essentially as mobile 
pill boxes and there had been only one serious tank versus tank action—at 
Imphal.”10 Compared with the 1943 changes for jungle warfare, engaging IJA 
defensive bunker systems, or countering Japanese infiltration tactics, the 1945 
British tactical practices and concepts underwent limited changes regarding 
preparations or recommendations about fighting in plains, rivers, or cities. The 
January 1945 Army In India Training Memorandum delivered a one-page discussion 
about crossing the Garigliano River in Italy, emphasizing the importance of rafting, 
bridging equipment, engineers, and reconnaissance, but failed to deliver 
comprehensive recommendations about crossing a major river like the Irrawaddy.11 
Broader army recommendations continued to emphasize jungle warfare, particularly 
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patrolling of foot, with no substantial discussion about open terrain or mobile 
operations.12 Urban warfare was practically undiscussed. 
 Fortunately for the British, their general concepts and training would provide 
an appropriate foundation for the upcoming fights despite lacking specific, 
comprehensive prescriptions regarding the new environments. By early 1945, the 
British offensive and defensive tactics, especially the emphasis on increased 
cooperation between the infantry and supporting firepower, would ensure that “very 
few new points came to light” during the fighting in Burma as the underlying 
concepts proved fundamentally sound.13 By September 1944, the Indian Army 
recognized the importance of “closest cooperation between the various arms of the 
service,” but acknowledged that insufficient actions had been taken to learn how it 
could be conducted: “what is not so clearly understood is how to set about 
obtaining” inter-arms cooperation.14 Leaders needed an improved understanding of 
shared operating concepts and joint planning as low as the platoon level, as well as 
opportunities to practice together.15 The larger Indian Army had begun to address 
these needs at officer training schools, tactical training centres, and the staff 
colleges, but true proficiency would require shared practical experience.16 Past 
events in the Chin Hills revealed new lessons about infantry and tank cooperation, 
particularly regarding the coordination required in approaching Japanese positions 
and then closing with them. The process needed to be methodical, with infantry 
finding locations, tanks approaching under the cover of infantry firepower to destroy 
outlying positions, and then a second detachment of infantry supported by more 
tanks (or artillery) assaulting the main position.17 The main attack would be “a 
process of taking on one centre of resistance after another at point blank range,” and 
“was never anything like the nature of a quick blitz.”18 Eventually, advancing 
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infantry would find the supporting defensive positions and the process would repeat 
itself as forces then moved to the next position. The key, again, was of “tanks and 
infantry planning together as they go along” so that the advance progressed with 
appropriate inter-arms cooperation.19 In examples of forces conducting assaults not 
according to these prescriptions, the result was often confusion, casualties, and 
tactical failure.20 
 The Indian Army prescribed tactical methods for the use of tanks and 
recommended units to train in the techniques, but it is unclear to what extent the 
forces attacking into Burma prepared with them beyond initial training. Many would 
need to learn as they went along. In some cases, the value of prior combined-arms 
training proved to be “overestimated” due to personnel turnover and eroded of 
capabilities.21 In other cases during the operation, many “who had no training with 
tanks, were called upon to work with them with only a very short time,” sometimes 
only “a day or two.”22 By late 1944, there was still no common doctrine for 
infantry–tank cooperation,23 with army training continuing to emphasize jungle 
fighting.24 Additionally, division commanders were responsible for implementing 
inter-arms cooperation even though much of the supporting firepower was outside 
the division.25 Thus, in late 1944, Fourteenth Army possessed general tactical 
concepts, some codified and some not, that aimed to exploit a superiority in 
firepower, mobility, and logistics, by destroying the core of Japan’s Burma Area 
Army in the Schwebo plain.26 The IJA, however, planned to fight differently. 
 After the Imphal loss, Japan’s Imperial General Headquarters changed 
priorities with a new focus on defending southern Burma which meant they 
effectively ceded the north.27 By September 1944 the Southern Area Army similarly 
altered priorities in Burma by now ordering the BAA to subordinate any plans for 
northern defence in favour of holding southern Burma to maintain a defensive zone 
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across Southeast Asia.28 Also, the IJA replaced BAA senior staff and leadership in 
“a pretty thorough sweep-out, unprecedented in the Japanese Army at such a high 
level.”29 The new BAA commander, Lieutenant General Hoyotaro Kimura, would 
prove to be skilled and realistic,30 traits critical for managing the weakened BAA 
across its three armies.31 Fifteenth Army, devastated by Imphal, possessed only 
21,000 personnel in three divisions across central Burma; the Twenty Eighth 
Army’s two divisions were positioned near the Arakan front and Irrawaddy Valley; 
and the Thirty Third Army operated its two divisions in the northeast.32 The BAA 
received some additional weapons, tanks, supplies, and reinforcements to join 
existing divisions, so that “the divisions received about 2,000 reinforcements 
each.”33 Most divisions would be much weaker than the prescribed strength of 
10,000 men apiece. With this force and new mission, the BAA aimed to destroy 
invading forces by retreating from the Chindwin River to lure Fourteenth Army into 
a vulnerable position near the Irrawaddy, trapping isolated and over-extended 
attackers.34 The IJA referred to the entire operation as the Battle for the Irrawaddy, 
suggesting a conceptualization of defence around the river.35 
 In order to slow the Fourteenth Army advance, Kimura and the BAA 
planned to allow British forces to advance deep into central Burma to strain their 
lines of communication and then to fight the invaders north of Mandalay as they 
crossed the formidable Irrawaddy.36 The BAA would cede parts of the northwest 
plain using light, rear-guard forces to delay the advance while positioning itself east 
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of the river.37 The BAA defined its specific aims as securing a line linking Lashio, 
Mandalay, the Irrawaddy south of Mandalay, Yenangyaung, and Rangoon, with “the 
front of the decisive battle to be on the banks of the Irrawaddy downstream from 
Mandalay, or the triangle area of the Irrawaddy delta.”38 By late 1944 the BAA 
positioned the Thirty Third Army, with its 18th and 56th divisions, in the north; the 
Fifteenth Army, with its 15th, 31st, 33rd divisions, in central Burma near Mandalay 
and Meiktila; and the Twenty Eighth Army, with its 54th and 55th divisions, in the 
south surrounding Rangoon and its approaches.39 The 53rd Division remained part of 
Fifteenth Army, caveated that it might be placed directly under BAA.40  
 Subsequently, these IJA actions required Fourteenth Army to change plans 
as BAA forces would not fight where anticipated. After some preparatory 
movements, in November XXXIII Corps moved into the central front and by 
month’s end Fourteenth Army approached the Chindwin. By late November they 
had two bridgeheads and, in early December, began to cross with the 20th Indian 
Division at Kalwa and the 19th Indian Division at Sittaung.41 Advancing forces 
fought IJA units in small engagements and encounter battles but as Fourteenth Army 
progressed it became apparent that the Japanese had repositioned units away from 
the attackers.42 Thus, during the first weeks of December, Fourteenth Army needed 
to adjust plans to pursue the defenders before the BAA consolidated in southern 
Burma under protection of the monsoon.43 The new plan aimed to bring battle in 
southcentral Burma through two stages.44 The first would send XXXIII Corps with 
the 2nd British, 20th Indian, 19th Indian divisions (the latter transferred from IV 
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Corps), and the 254th Indian Tank Brigade, to enter the Schwebo area and draw out 
IJA defenders. IV Corps would travel 200 miles south with the 7th Indian and 17th 
Indian divisions, 255th Indian Tank Brigade, and 28th East African Brigade, moving 
down the valley and toward the Irrawaddy at Pakokku. Then in the second stage, 
XXXIII Corps would cross the Irrawaddy in a feint toward Mandalay to lure “the 
greatest possible concentration” of IJA units, while IV Corps would cross the 
Irrawaddy at Pakokku to breakout from the bridgeheads and make a decisive thrust 
to seize Meiktila. Control over the city would sever the line of retreat for IJA 
Fifteenth and Thirty Third armies, isolating them from Rangoon.45 Finally, after 
fighting in central Burma to destroy the two IJA armies, Fourteenth Army would 
need to seize a southern port for resupply and sustainment throughout the upcoming 
months.46 With these new plans, Fourteenth Army began to pursue the BAA. It also 
began its shift to the plains.47  
 
To the Plains, December 1944–January 1945 
Fourteenth Army enacted no major tactical adaptations as it shifted from the jungle 
to the plains, instead adjusting existing practices to meet the slight Japanese 
resistance that did not present a significant challenge to British forces or their 
operating concepts. As units crossed the Chindwin River and moved from their 
bridgeheads to begin Fourteenth Army’s broader shift into the Burmese plains, the 
open terrain allowed for a quicker rate of movement as did the lack of resistance. 
During this time, IJA Fifteenth Army delivered rear-guard efforts to delay and 
harass advancing units but without defending the jungle-covered hills and ridges 
east of the river.48 The leading 19th Indian Division moved through the difficult 
terrain and advancing units began to move into central Burma with its “low hills and 
flat level plain, hot and dusty.”49 Division headquarters encouraged personnel to 
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keep learning in order to “profit from our experiences” while also acknowledging 
that mistakes had occurred but no radical change in tactics was recommended.50 
Rather, personnel with recent battlefield experiences should “graft it on to all the 
training we have gone through.”51 IV Corps continued to prescribe infiltration and 
blocking movements against the IJA rear-guards, locating units through 
reconnaissance patrols, and then applying overwhelming firepower as infantry 
moved to kill or capture the remaining personnel.52 Leadership labelled this process 
the “’earthquake’ technique,” indicating the growing advantages of Allied firepower 
over IJA defenders as the frontlines shifted into more open terrain. After passing 
through the tall grass and banana fields, units began to use the larger fields of fire, 
open terrain, and improved manoeuvrability against IJA rear-guards.53 This lack of 
IJA resistance at the Chindwin River enabled Fourteenth Army to overcome a 
moment of vulnerability without suffering serious setbacks or costs, and to continue 
relatively unopposed into terrain that would prove more conducive for mobility, 
larger formations, and firepower. 
 Initially, poor roads and long distances limited the usefulness of tanks, 
compared with “far greater and more effective use of supporting artillery, now 
encountering little difficulty in finding suitable positions to deploy.”54 However, 
fighting remained limited due to the light opposition; the BAA “never had any 
intention of making Schwebo a last-man last-round battle” as they had already 
begun withdrawing to the Irrawaddy.55 Additionally, this re-posturing southward 
would require fighting further inland than anticipated, so the pursuing forces would 
have to push farther and faster to prevent stalling in southcentral Burma without 
resupply.56 XXXIII Corps pushed its three divisions into the Schwebo plain and 
seized the region by mid-January, still using company-level infantry techniques that, 
again, demonstrated how “the days of frontal attacks, except when unavoidable, had 
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long gone.”57 In late January the Fourteenth Army made its final movements toward 
the Irrawaddy, and the lead units received additional motor vehicles from nearby 
units to move quickly across the dry belt after crossing the river.58 More serious 
clashes would occur at the bridgeheads. 
 
Crossing the Irrawaddy River, January–February 1945 
Over five weeks Fourteenth Army crossed the Irrawaddy River in a complicated 
endeavour that enabled it to trap and, eventually, to shatter the BAA. Forces had to 
move across “an alarming obstacle” at multiple locations averaging 2,000 yards 
wide that required crossers to manoeuvre around islands and sandbanks in “the 
longest opposed river crossing” of the Second World War.59 In executing this 
enterprise, Fourteenth Army benefitted from skilful planning, good staff work across 
the army’s two corps, and Japanese resistance that failed to exploit vulnerabilities to 
push attackers off their bridgeheads.  
 Senior planning, staff work, and “careful and comparative study during the 
weeks preceding the crossing” produced accurate assessments and contributed 
significantly to preparations for a successful crossing.60 The combination of corps 
and division staff planning would prove critical. Division planning teams were 
supported by corps staff,61 and as forces approached the river “daily planning 
conferences had been held at IV Corps headquarters and later divisional 
headquarters, when the most thorough instructions were issued for the crossings.”62 
While some forces had conducted water training months before the crossing, it 
remained fairly limited in that it “was mainly concerned with improvised methods of 
taking jeeps, guns, etc., over ‘chaungs’ and the equipment was not available for 
training in handling standard equipment.”63 Despite recognizing the need for more 
specialized training, the combination of operational necessities and physically 
moving units meant that “co-ordinated training was not possible and each arm had 
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to train itself more or less independently.”64 This lack of specialized training and 
passage of time since previous general training meant that forces were not highly 
prepared and could be vulnerable during the crossings.65  
 Like the transition out of the jungle, British divisions conducted no major 
tactical changes as they crossed in the face of Japanese resistance that failed 
significantly to challenge forces or their operating concepts. The combination of 
effective planning and limited resistance enabled crossers to establish bridgeheads 
and then use small-unit combined-arms firepower to repulse Japanese counterattacks 
against a critical vulnerability of the British—the need to consolidate the seized 
bridgeheads and expand them into a larger area of control. The northern feint with 
XXXIII Corps succeeded in establishing its bridgeheads and repulsing IJA attackers 
using established tactical practices. In January the 19th Indian Division created two 
beachheads on the east bank and began to move out on 11 February which started to 
draw IJA forces north.66 Leading elements of the 19th Indian Division approached 
the river’s west bank on 9 January, pushed IJA defenders from the hills and 
established a small position across the Irrawaddy, with a second position established 
further south five days later.67 IJA forces from the nearby 15th and 53rd divisions 
responded, to include “hurriedly assembled tanks and artillery,” and for the next 
three weeks harassing Japanese attacks slowly battled the British as they 
consolidated on the bridgehead and pushed outward in patrols.68 This reinforced 
position repelled the first significant attack against the bridgehead on 22 January as 
well as the more determined attack on 30 January against 63rd Brigade, after which 
the IJA shifted to suppressing the position with artillery.69 These IJA attacks 
reflected a larger desire to neutralize the bridgehead before they could expand, but 
responders were too little too late. By the end of the month 19th Indian Division had 
retained the bridgehead and repulsed the IJA 51st Regiment from another at Kawbet. 
The IJA 15th Division lost “about one-third of its already depleted strength,” and the 
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53rd Division “suffered severe casualties.”70 In early February the 20th Indian 
Division crossed near Myinmu and began assembling a large bridgehead for the 
corps’ right flank that struck between the IJA 31st and 33rd divisions.71 The 
subsequent counterattack included “suicide attacks by two battalions” that saw the 
33rd Division lose “953 men out of 1200.”72 By late February, “identifications of no 
fewer than thirteen Japanese battalions belonging to four different divisions (2nd, 
31st, 33rd and 53rd) had been obtained” in the attacks against the 20th Indian 
Division’s bridgehead.73 The 2nd British Division crossed in late February near 
Ngazun, sequenced after 20th Indian Division due to a shortage of boats and rafts, 
deepening the bridgehead to over four miles wide and two miles deep.74 After 
overcoming “a perilous crossing” due to opposing IJA firepower and some initial 
mistakes, the division placed two brigades across the river.75 Fighting in early 
March to expand the positions “was chiefly characterized by fanatical attacks on 
tanks by individual soldiers” that failed to prevent the consolidation.76 The 2nd 
British Division finished crossing by 5 March. 
 Further south near Pakokku, the main thrust of IV Corps advanced and 
crossed the Irrawaddy largely unopposed. Well-planned and benefitting from BAA 
attention focused further north, units attained objectives and any setbacks did not 
cascade into more-costly shortcomings. After beginning its advance on 19 January, 
by early February the IV Corps moved from the west side of the Chindwin and 
began crossing the river with its two divisions and tank brigade for the main thrust 
to Meiktila.77 With Japanese attention drawn to XXXIII Corps and without a 
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significant IJA counterattack,78 the southern IV Corps attackers moved two 
divisions and an armoured brigade across the river between Pakokku and 
Nyaungu.79 After fighting defenders spread thin along on their approach to the river 
and some initial struggles on 13 February caused by confusion and mistakes,80 the 
next morning 7th Indian Division crossed the Irrawaddy near Nyaungu and began to 
establish the beachhead for the 17th Indian Division and 255th Tank Brigade from 
which they would race toward Meiktila.81 The units struck between the IJA’s 
Fifteenth and Twenty Eighth armies, and in three days had crossed the river in a 
“complete success.”82 This light resistance was enabled largely by the Japanese 
focusing further away against XXXIII Corps near Mandalay rather than the southern 
thrust, as the former “acted as a magnet.”83 By mid-February, IV Corps controlled 
an east-bank bridgehead and on 22 February the two mechanized brigades and 255th 
Tank Brigade began toward Meiktila.84  
 
City Clearing and Mobile Defence, March 1945 
Seizing, clearing, and defending Meiktila revealed an effective application of 
combined-arms tactics, defensive boxes, and the pivot system versus Japanese 
forces that fought with similar defensive methods as in rural terrain. Inside the 
“brick built town,” Japanese defenders would “not fight from room to room” but 
rather from “a series of strong points by digging bunkers inside the foundations of 
the houses, and sometimes in the ground floor rooms.”85 These bunker positions 
could be cleared “the same way as other bunkers” with the known tactical drills 
proving “satisfactory.”86 Additionally, the improved tank and infantry cooperation 
allowed British forces to defend the Meiktila airfield, critical for resupply and 
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sustaining the operation. Therefore, over several weeks in March, IV Corps units 
drove east to Meiktila, flanked the Japanese, isolated them from their supply lines in 
a seizure which “finally destroyed any chance” for the IJA to reverse its setbacks in 
central Burma, and left it open for the push out of the country.87 
 In preparation, the 17th Indian Division pushed through the plains with two 
motorized brigades, the 48th and 63rd, with the 99th to arrive by air once controlling 
the airstrip.88 During the approach, 17th Indian Division used tanks advancing across 
a wide front to clear the Japanese defenders, moving 80 miles to position around the 
city.89  The general tactics remained those “taught in our training pamphlets and at 
our tactical schools,” and recommendations addressed the technical use of weapons 
or assault manoeuvres which did not challenge underlying concepts—the same used 
in the main attack.90 On 21 February “the real [advance] began” along two axes, led 
by the 48th infantry and 255th tank brigades, with all forces encountering persistent 
but limited IJA resistance.91 The next day units repulsed IJA assaults which were 
outnumbered, outgunned, and “easily pushed aside.”92 Similar actions occurred over 
the following three days. The “strongest and most determined” Japanese attempt to 
stall 17th Indian Division’s advance was faced near the road to Meiktila, countered 
by 63rd Brigade outflanking in a wide northern hook with tanks attacking from the 
front.93 The IJA was “rapidly overrun” as defenders struggled against the “massed 
armoured attacks and seemed incapable of dealing with them.”94 By 27 February, 
17th Indian Division and its supporting units from IV Corps were outside Meiktila 
and preparing to assault the city.95 Fortunately for them, the 99th Brigade had just 
arrived by air.96 
 For the assault on Meiktila town, defending the area would be 12,000 
personnel across several detachments and locations, with the centre held by a 
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garrison of approximately 3,200 armed with “a large number of guns.”97 Additional 
forces would arrive in March. The garrison did not have a long time to prepare but 
did manage to dig “under houses, in the banks of lakes, in concrete and earth 
covered timber strong-points.”98 Thirty Third Army would lead the defence, 
supported by forces arriving from Fifteenth Army which planned to deliver 
supporting counterattacks around 10 March with the 18th Division, a regiment each 
from the 15th and 33rd Divisions, and most of the army’s artillery.99 For British 
attackers, the axes of assault would be dictated by lakes, irrigation channels, and 
ditches, which required the avenues of approach to be from the east or west with the 
city sitting between.100 The 17th Indian Division aimed to capture the city by using 
63rd Brigade to block the west, while the main attack led by 255th Tank Brigade and 
supported by 48th Brigade would circle around the north lake and attack the city 
from the east, and divisional artillery positioned in the west.101 The division 
established static defensive positions to protect key locations surrounding the 
Meiktila airfield, and established roadblocks with defensive boxes from which 
patrols could find and attack IJA positions.102 
 Now the 17th Indian Division, supported by IV Corps, attacked the city using 
established techniques to clear the IJA defenders. Over four days the division fought 
from the eastern plains, gained control of the city’s airfield, and seized the town.103 
On 1 March the 17th Indian Division attacked with the 63rd Brigade to seize the 
urban area between the two lakes, the 48th Brigade to seize the shore of the southern 
lake, and the looping 255th Tank Brigade moving to seize the airfield east of 
Meiktila.104 The infantry attacks penetrated the town while the tank brigade 
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progressed until stalling on the nearby hills due to Japanese firepower using 
artillery, defensive bunkers, and well-placed snipers across a screen of fortified 
bunkers and houses.105 Inside the city, forces faced bunkers and defensive systems 
that required methodical attacks by platoons of infantry with tanks.106 Once inside 
the city, attackers manned positions which the Japanese re-attacked during the night, 
resulting in hand-to-hand fighting.107 As “throughout the whole battle for Meiktila, 
the [Japanese] were in very strong bunkers, were very strong in automatic 
weapons… fought fanatically, refusing to vacate a single bunker.”108 On 2 March 
the division started clearing areas while experiencing “intensive fighting against 
pockets of resistance.”109 The 63rd Brigade made two attacks using tanks and a 
battalion to clear the west of Meiktila, fighting through buildings until halted near 
the railway, and 48th Brigade similarly fought to clear the east.110 The 63rd Brigade 
cleared defenders from the west while 48th Brigade cleared houses of IJA fighters 
and pushed them southward towards the water in the midst of IJA mines, artillery, 
and tough individual resistance.111 Infantry and tanks fought IJA artillery “at point 
blank range” and 48th Brigade fought the guns which “were gradually eliminated, 
one by one.”112 Meanwhile, the 255th Tank Brigade seized the airfield and continued 
to send patrols around the nearby area.113 In addition to the standard IJA defences, 
attackers encountered individual soldiers using suicidal, manually-detonated anti-
tank mines: a soldier crouched in a hole or narrow trench with an aircraft bomb that 
he manually detonated with a rock or brick when passed over by a tank; however, 
the technique did little to reduce attackers’ capabilities.114 By 3 March the 48th 
Brigade finished clearing north and east of Meiktila, as the division finished clearing 
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the town and controlled most of the area.115 Final attacks occurred 4 March which 
consolidated gains, notably at the airstrip which was operating the next day.116 
 After seizing Meiktila, the 17th Indian Division applied defensive boxes and 
mobile sweeps to defeat the IJA counterattack, the most significant threat to the 
operation. The division had cut off IJA Fifteenth and Thirty Third armies further 
north, but now it was “surrounded, besieged” and would be subjected to “fierce 
counter-attacks” as the BAA attempted to reconnect its armies.117 From 6–10 March 
the 17th Indian Division prepared for the upcoming Japanese counterattack and 
probed approaching forces. The 99th Brigade would defend the airfield and secure a 
larger position from which the division could mount mobile operations, while the 
division also created six “harbours” for mobile patrols which would be manned by 
parts of three brigades.118 The division minimized the number of forces in static 
defence to enable more personnel to conduct mobile offensive sweeps, a key 
element of holding Meiktila and undermining counterattacks. This orientation and 
tactics enabled the division to attack Japanese formations before they could 
assemble with full strength and exploited British advantages in mobile firepower. 
The points housed combined forces which would deploy columns of tanks and 
infantry while a company remained to defend the position.119 Operations began on 6 
March. The columns “went out daily to hunt, ambush, and attack approaching 
Japanese columns of various sizes in a radius of twenty miles of the town.”120 Raids 
continued along with “extensive patrolling” during the nights of 9–10 March to 
locate and fight approaching IJA forces.121 On 14 March the first reinforcing IJA 
units approached and took positions east of the airfield,122 and clashes during 15–16 
March revealed that “a Japanese force of unknown strength succeeded in digging 
itself in on the eastern side of the runway, dominating the whole of it.”123 
Subsequent patrols discovered more Japanese relief forces closer to the town, with 
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day-long operations overrunning several IJA locations and seizing nearby artillery 
but without removing the IJA threat to the critical airfield.124 With IJA forces 
threatening the airfield through harassing fire and sporadic patrols on the airfield 
itself, from 15–17 March the Fourteenth Army committed its reserve by flying the 
9th Brigade into a defensive box near the Meiktila airstrip, and forces joined 99th 
Brigade in its daily battles to control the crucial location.125  
 From 14–15 March the larger IJA counterattack began the battle’s “most 
critical stage.”126 Thirty Third Army led the regional assault with “the equivalent of 
a corps of two divisions,” in a plan to overwhelm 17th Indian Division holding 
Meiktila town, while also cutting its resupply line at the Nyaungu bridgehead.127 
The latter failed as IJA 33rd Division and 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade attacked 
the 7th Indian Division, still at the Nyaungu bridgehead, with attackers suffering 
losses so severe that “two battalions of 72 Independent Mixed Brigade ceased to 
have any value as a fighting unit.”128 But the larger attack on Meiktila would be 
much more sustained, and for the next three weeks BAA forces re-attacked with all 
available units in an “all-out effort to recapture the town” and to open a route to 
withdraw south.129 Personnel from at least three divisions and an artillery group 
attacked the town in “a series of fierce albeit piecemeal, uncoordinated Japanese 
attacks.”130 Control of the airfield remained critical and on 17 March BAA attackers 
infiltrated the area, burned aircraft, destroyed fuel tanks, and made “landing of 
aircraft no longer possible” which necessitated airdropping all supplies for the 
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occupying units.131 With insufficient British forces to form a full perimeter defence, 
the IJA infiltrated the area, entrenched several positions with anti-tank guns, laid 
mines, waited in ambush, patrolled onto the airfield, and began a larger effort to 
seize the area.132 IJA artillery strikes continued with “several strong attacks” that 
“succeeded in gaining the main [airfield].”133  
 To reopen lines of communication, now 17th Indian Division battled Thirty 
Third Army for control over the airfield using small-unit assaults supplemented by 
brigade sweeps from defensive positions.134 The brigades coordinated patrols and 
attacks from their defensive boxes while also enduring IJA assaults and indirect fire 
as forces contested control of the airstrip for several days.135 From 21–26 March the 
IJA delivered “continuous pressure” against the airfield in fighting that was “grim 
and at close quarters” and supported by effective artillery.136 On 24 March fighting 
peaked as IJA tanks, infantry, and artillery attacked the airfield’s west and multiple 
defensive boxes with precise fire and successful infiltration.137 The result was a 
“desperate fight” through the dawn, until attackers were finally pushed away.138 
Simultaneously, Japanese forces entrenched on the airfield and required clearing 
while others, unnoticed, attacked aircraft bays. Over the next three days, 48th 
Brigade led the area’s clearing as infantry supported by tanks pushed forces back 
from the airfield. Nevertheless, it remained covered by Japanese artillery and would 
receive numerous IJA counterattacks that seized portions, often at night, before 
being cleared away with British firepower.139 By 29 March, the final IJA elements 
had been pushed off the airfield, “having suffered disastrous casualties.”140 On 31 
March the airfield had “planes landing for first time in seven days.”141 
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 By this day “it was plain that the Japanese had abandoned all hope of 
recapturing Meiktila.”142 With the airfield lost, the 5th Indian Division approaching, 
the IJA greatly outnumbered and suffering from significant casualties, the Japanese 
withdrew.143 Thirty Third Army and other units drawn into the counterattack had 
suffered unsustainable casualties in a major defeat. The 18th Division lost one-third 
of its personnel and half of its guns. The 49th Division lost 6,500 personnel—nearly 
two-thirds of its total—and almost all its guns.144 Thirty Third Army effectively 
ceased to function as a fighting unit, with the Fifteenth and Twenty Eighth armies 
also severely reduced. For the IJA, losses “were extremely heavy” as the Burma 
Area Army “had virtually ceased to exist as a fighting force.”145 Since crossing the 
Irrawaddy, IV Corps lost approximately 8,198 personnel.146 By 20 March, other 
elements of Fourteenth Army had cleared Mandalay, combining to deliver control 
over central Burma’s rail and road network for a push toward Rangoon.147 Now 
vastly outnumbered and outmatched, IJA campaign defeat was largely inevitable.  
 
Identifying Effectiveness and Evaluating British Success 
The breakout to capture Meiktila provides a clear example of operational success. 
Fourteenth Army destroyed Fifteenth Army, most of Thirty Third Army, and eroded 
the Burma Area Army so that it could no longer hold Burma’s vital centres. The 
operation “represented the high peak of Britain’s war in the Far East” as forces 
advanced over four hundred miles and completed all assigned missions in the 
window of time before the monsoon would halt operations.148 Regarding costs, the 
British suffered more casualties but only 12.7% were fatal, for 2,307 out of 18,195, 
compared with the approximately 13,000 Japanese casualties which died at a higher 
                                                                                                                
 142 Kirby, The Reconquest of Burma, 313. 
 143 Marston, 282; Moreman, The Jungle, 195. 
 144 IJA 18th Division, not including the additional attached units, lost about 33% of its entire 
force by suffering 1,773 casualties, as well as 22 out of 45 artillery pieces. The 49th Division lost 
65%, 6,500 of its 10,000, as well as 45 out of 48 artillery pieces. The other units engaged “are not 
available but would presumably be of a similar order… casualties suffered by [Fifteenth Army] are 
not recorded but it is evident that they were equally heavy.” Kirby, The Reconquest of Burma, 313. 
 145 Kirby, The Reconquest of Burma, 313. 
 146 Calculated as 835 killed, 3,174 wounded, 90 missing, and approximately to 4,000 lost 
from sickness. Kirby, The Reconquest of Burma, 311. 
 147 Hastings, Retribution, 330. 
 148 Hastings, Retribution, 328-330. 
   212 
rate.149 Thus, as a measure of achievement and efficiency, the 1945 battles through 
Meiktila represent a striking success for attacking forces. 
 British forces indicated high operational effectiveness by displaying 
sophisticated manoeuvre. Fourteenth Army executed breakthrough and exploitation 
operations against BAA defences by uniquely tailoring British strengths against 
Japanese weaknesses. Once information revealed that neither the Fifteenth nor 
Thirty Third armies would fight in the Schwebo plain, Fourteenth Army altered 
plans and executed a multi-division river crossing which coordinated a two-corps 
pincer movement in mutual support. Next, the multi-division movements applied 
consistent tactical abilities through complex, fluid unit actions that entrapped and 
critically isolated elements of two Japanese armies. Exploiting Japanese weakness at 
Meiktila, the British assault and mobile defence against IJA counterattacks crippled 
the BAA. Throughout this time, British tactical leadership performed consistently 
well across numerous fluid actions. As such, British forces exacerbated IJA setbacks 
from which the larger BAA would not recover.150 
 During the operation, British forces displayed high effectiveness across three 
new environments without significant changes to their tactics or concepts. Unique 
from the other case studies, forces displayed increased operational effectiveness 
without significant tactical adaptation beyond those from before the operation and 
did not suffer from this consistency. Rather than changing procedures to meet the 
new environments, Fourteenth Army applied existing tactics to the new situations. 
Transitioning to increased motorization, coordinating a river crossing, and fighting 
at Meiktila, all presented altered environments compared with the jungle fighting 
since late 1941, but the British response reflected improved small-unit firepower and 
cross-unit cooperation that was learned in 1943 and tested in 1944. Later, when 
considering the lessons from 1945 operations, the army assessed:  
It was very noticeable that practically all the tactical points… were 
the same points which are taught in our training pamphlets and at our 
                                                                                                                
 149 The BAA’s three remaining armies were unable to mount a strong defence as British 
forces continued to pursue the retreating BAA, and over the next 26 days Fourteenth Army would 
capture Rangoon. Hastings, Retribution, 332. 
 150 Moreman, The Jungle, 197-198. 
   213 
tactical schools. Very few new points came to light. Generally 
speaking it may be said that or teaching is up-to-date.151 
For the critical combination of tanks and infantry, “our present teaching about the 
use of tanks in the attack has proved correct.”152 The existing lessons and concepts 
had proved fundamentally sound. However, possessing concepts did not ensure that 
all forces had trained in them. Reflecting again on the Burma operations of 1945: 
It was surprising what results were achieved when infantry, who had 
had no training with tanks, were called upon to work with them with 
only a very short time to marry up. But all COs emphasized that 
efficiency went up by leaps and bounds after units had worked 
together for a day or two.153 
These assessments indicate how, by early 1945, tactical concepts underlying British 
warfighting tenets were fundamentally sound for fighting the IJA in Burma. Tactics 
rested on a foundation that did not require significant change or new training as 
indicated by the ability of British troops to apply small-unit combined arms 
firepower across new environments. 
 For the IJA, the Burma Area Army displayed intermediate effectiveness, 
consistent with essentially all the past performances in Burma since 1941. IJA 
forces—again like most instances in this analysis—conducted no significant tactical 
adaptation, and during this operation the IJA’s unchanged methods contributed to 
operational failure. Yet throughout this costly failure the Fifteenth and Thirty Third 
armies still performed several of the effectiveness criteria with considerable skill; 
this operation was not the disaster of Imphal. BAA repositioned three armies (each 
equivalent to a corps) and conducted a gradual fighting withdrawal across the 
Chindwin River, Schwebo plain, and around the Irrawaddy. Across numerous 
environments the IJA regiments counterattacked with small-unit initiative to include 
the rear-guard actions in the plains, the tactical counterattacks on the Irrawaddy 
bridgeheads, and the repeated assaults around Meiktila. Regiments and companies 
maintained core combat skills across basic small-unit engagements even when 
outnumbered and outgunned, as seen around Meiktila when 17th Indian Division and 
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IV Corps methodically cleared IJA positions. The BAA shifted responsibility from 
the eroding Fifteenth Army and once Thirty Third Army was defeated at Meiktila 
then it conducted a timely retreat that avoided slipping into further disaster. Granted, 
the BAA also continued to display shortcomings that limited their battlefield 
performance. When attempting to operate units as large as a division, the elements 
often operated independently and failed to combine effects above the level of the 
regiment. For example, during the main counterattack at Meiktila, the Thirty Third 
Army used 18th Division minus one regiment, one regiment each from the 53rd and 
33rd divisions, the 49th Division minus one regiment, various army units, artillery, 
parts of a tank regiment, and (eventually) a regiment from the 2nd Division.154 This 
shortcoming was particularly severe around Meiktila—the one true situation where 
BAA attempted to mass counterattacking units—as the IJA elements fought 
ferociously but in an uncoordinated, piecemeal manner. As a result, division-sized 
units would fail to fight together like a coherent division synergistically applying 
effects. This shortcoming aggravated the larger IJA limitation of failing to tailor its 
strengths against British weaknesses, seen along the Chindwin shore, Irrawaddy 
bridgeheads and Meiktila town. This problem was also exacerbated by the BAA’s 
unchanged methods. 
 Like past operations, the IJA failed to adapt and this inflexibility proved 
costly, particularly in the missed opportunities against fleeting British 
vulnerabilities. When British forces were susceptible at the Irrawaddy bridgeheads 
(and slightly vulnerable as they crossed the Chindwin), Fifteenth Army failed to 
repel the attackers while using the same techniques that already had proven 
vulnerable to British firepower. Most pointedly, the Meiktila defenders orientated 
themselves like other defensive positions, providing attackers with a problem they 
had solved since the Second Arakan Encounter. This scenario also failed to exploit 
advantages for defending city terrain. The result was that attackers could use 
established practices to clear the city, and IJA forces missed an opportunity to 
deliver additional costs while defending the city. The BAA failed to create new 
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setbacks which could require British adjustments to new defensive scenarios.155 In 
addition to these specific instances, the BAA continued to reflect a larger problem 
displayed by Japanese forces since the Second Arakan Encounter in that small units 
remained outmatched in tactical skill compared with their British counterparts. 
While British tactical firepower delivered advantages, and contributed to success, it 
was the consistent relative advantages in British small-unit skill that enabled 
operational success and doomed the IJA to failure. The Japanese also had tanks, 
anti-tank weapons, and artillery; the British had more but, more importantly, had 
learned to use them better. Against British infantry and tank firepower—adjusted 
and improved since Imphal but not fundamentally different—the one new IJA 
technique of human mines proved ineffective and a costly use of limited manpower. 
 Related to these assessments, this case raises two additional questions about 
operational effectiveness. First, might British effectiveness appear falsely high due 
to BAA battlefield choices? Throughout the operation, except for the Meiktila 
airfield, Japanese resistance was relatively light, often intentionally. If operational 
effectiveness must be identified during a dynamic clash between adversaries and 
measured relative the performance of another, then this scenario raises questions 
about how to measure British effectiveness when the Japanese were not truly 
contesting them in the plains or at the Irrawaddy. Put simply, did the British fight 
well or did the light resistance make them appear better than they were? More 
specifically, would the British have been able to conduct sophisticated manoeuvre 
had the Japanese challenged them sooner or harder on the plains, at the river, or in 
the city? These questions suggest that forces may indicate a higher level of 
effectiveness against light resistance than would be displayed against forces with 
similar capabilities only applied in a different manner. Very likely it is easier to 
appear highly skilled when one’s own vulnerabilities are not tested—such as the 
Irrawaddy bridgeheads, along the eastern bank of the Chindwin, or inside Meiktila 
town. Increased BAA resistance at these areas may not have increased the likelihood 
for a different outcome—and may even have been costlier for the Japanese with 
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forces spread thinner—but when considering the measurement of British 
effectiveness then this question bears remembering. 
 Second, if Fourteenth Army fought across three new environments with high 
effectiveness but without major tactical adaptation then what else might have 
contributed to this performance and outcome? The expanded scale of actions and 
changed role of tactical events may have played a part. As units moved into the 
plains there was also a larger expansion in the number of forces and the size of their 
units. What began as regiments and brigades fighting in the First Arakan Encounter 
had become two full-sized corps with numerous divisions moving across greater 
distances at a faster rate. As forces, units, time, space, and firepower expanded in 
size and scale, the tactical developments remained an invaluable foundation but the 
critical changes, to include the key adjustments for the operation, occurred at a 
higher level. The coordination of logistics, planning, manpower, mobile reserves, 
extended lines of communication, and movements of two corps across a major river 
required substantial staff work and planning precisely so that the actions would 
occur with minimal surprise once executed, limiting the need for tactical change. 
Moving forces to Meiktila occurred at a rate faster than Japanese defenders 
responded, enabling British units to fight from an advantage and undermining Thirty 
Third Army’s counterattack. The larger movement of divisions between corps and 
different locations, along with supporting firepower, by ground, rail, and air, 
provided benefits on the Meiktila airfield which enabled tactical advantages to 
accumulate. The aerial resupply of defensive boxes continued at several points 
through the operation, representing tactical efforts that had to be aligned by higher 
command to avoid isolating units and removing resources for their routine 
sustainment—a key deficiency in IJA planning. While presumptuous to claim that 
Fourteenth Army conducted a variant of modern mission command,156 it does seem 
fair that:  
                                                                                                                
 156 Graham Dunlop argued that Fourteenth Army commander Slim employed a form of 
mission command due to an environment and dispersal of forces that, after some initial setbacks, 
developed into a proficient system. Dunlop concluded: “By the time of the Irrawaddy River battles of 
early 1945, mission command was clearly well understood by the corps and division commanders.” 
Graham Dunlop, “British Tactical Leadership in the Burma Campaign, 1941–45,” in Brian Bond and 
Kyoichi Tachikawa, eds., British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War, 1941–
1945 (Abingdon, Oxon, England: Routledge, 2012), p. 103, originally published 2004. 
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The art of tactical command by this stage was characterised less by 
the sort of cunning which had been required in the confines of the 
jungle, and more by the special awareness needed to co-ordinate a 
complex, multi-disciplinary, combined arms organisation, 
manoeuvring at greater speed.157 
This increased emphasis on army-level control, corps planning, and division staff, 
indicates how larger operational decisions were having a significant impact on the 
tactical battlefield in greater proportion than in previous operations. If the tactical 
level may culminate at the corps—a reasonably high ceiling and one slightly above 
this study’s emphasis on brigades and divisions—then success in the Meiktila 
breakout relied significantly on decisions made at the operational level by a few 
commanders. This expanded operational size may have altered the nature of tactical 
adaption regarding who are the most relevant actors, the role of time, and how 
missed opportunities relate to exploiting advantages or exacerbating setbacks. This 
intersection of individuals, their impact on tactical change, and on measuring 
effectiveness also applied in some ways to the Japanese, albeit on a smaller scale. 
The decision by Commander Burma Area Army Kimura to reorient his armies—not 
an unsound decision—indicated how decisions above the tactical level shaped the 
operation and subsequent tactical events as forces delivered limited resistance which 
reduced the need for British tactical change. It also enabled Fourteenth Army to act 
relatively unchallenged, possibly concealing vulnerabilities. Future examinations of 










                                                                                                                
 157 Dunlop, “British Tactical Leadership,” in Bond, 103. 
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Figure 9.1: Measuring Adaptation, Effectiveness, Outcome: Breakout to Meiktila 





































































Findings and Relevance 
Case Study Assessment: Tactical adaptation by British forces contributed to high 
operational effectiveness and resulted in success during the breakout to Meiktila. 
 In this case study, hypothesis 1 (H1), central vertical information mechanism 
over decentralized horizontal, is supported. By collecting, examining, and assessing 
the tenets of IJA tactics and operations in 1942 and 1943, by 1945 the British had 
devised solutions and incorporated them into shared tactical concepts and common 
training. This process provided sufficient readiness and capabilities to deliver 
operational success in the breakout to Meiktila. With this foundation of small-unit 
infiltration, tactical combined-arms firepower led by the infantry, procedures for 
clearing defensive bunkers systems, and techniques for repelling Japanese attacks, 
the fighting in 1945 required no significant changes as Fourteenth Army effectively 
destroyed the Burma Area Army. Critically, the shared understanding of general 
tenets and concepts—even when not fully incorporated into one comprehensive 
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doctrine, as was the case with infantry-armour coordination—enabled cross-unit 
coordination to mass effects across brigades and divisions. Combined with the 
enhanced coordination and planning at the corps and army echelon, these shared 
tenets enabled Fourteenth Army, and particularly IV Corps, to concentrate its power 
and relative strengths against Japanese defenders and their general weaknesses. In 
addition, decentralized, horizontal mechanisms for sharing information had minimal 
impact on either British or Japanese units during the operation. H1 would have been 
affirmed if the process of learning through centralized, vertical mechanisms had 
occurred throughout the operation rather than only prior to it. 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2), anticipation over improvisation, comes out as neutral. By 
1945, the British had studied the general tactical challenges posed by the IJA in 
Burma and had developed concepts that required no major revision during the 
breakout to Meiktila. Applying these concepts to practical scenarios would require 
some battlefield adjustments since none of the specific environmental challenges 
during the breakout operation were studied in significant detail before it, but combat 
units possessed a fundamentally sound body of tactics for fighting as brigades and 
divisions which facilitated these adjustments without requiring major change. 
Combined with the light Japanese resistance until arriving at Meiktila, this scenario 
meant that essentially no new specialized skills were required. In the central plains, 
forces employed a core proficiency in basic skills and complex tactics to exploit 
advantages across a larger area. Similarly, the Irrawaddy River crossing occurred 
largely unrehearsed and with remarkable success for moving two corps while 
simultaneously deceiving IJA headquarters to believe that Mandalay was the 
primary target. Finally, since the IJA continued to use consistent tactics defending 
Meiktila city and in the counterattack against 17th Indian Division, the British 
forces’ previous solutions were sufficient for clearing the town and holding the area. 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3), skill over technology, is supported. British forces 
consistently applied superior small-unit, infantry-led combined-arms firepower for 
significant impact during the operation. Rather than any unique equipment 
modernization or technological advancement, throughout the breakout to Meiktila it 
was the consistent, coordinated application of existing technology that contributed 
to British advantages and IJA setbacks. No specific technological advancement or 
superior modernization occurred prior to the operation, and none appeared to occur 
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during it. While growing Allied resources contributed to success, particularly in 
logistics, movement, and coordination across units, it was the improved skill in 
combining effects at the tactical level that proved decisive across numerous 
engagements that aggregated to larger success. Since 1943, British forces had 
reorganized and retrained with new tactics that significantly improved operational 
effectiveness and contributed to success. H3 would have been affirmed had the 
Japanese delivered a greater challenge to invading forces, which would have 
enabled a better assessment of tactics in the new environments. 
 
Figure 9.2: Findings for the Breakout to Meiktila 




















CENTRAL NEUTRAL SUPPORT AFFIRM SUPPORT SUPPORT AFFIRM SUPPORT 
H2: 
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H3:  
SKILL AFFIRM AFFIRM AFFIRM NEUTRAL NEUTRAL SUPPORT SUPPORT 
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Chapter Ten 
Findings and Conclusions  
In 1945 the Indian Army faced another mission for which it was unprepared: 
occupation in Malaya, Burma, French Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies.1 
Disarming Japanese forces, liberating Allied POWs, and attempting to re-establish 
control led some Indian Army units to fight counterinsurgency campaigns against 
local guerrillas.2 After fighting in Imphal and pursuing the IJA down central 
Burma,3 in September the 20th Indian Division arrived in Saigon to assist the re-
imposition of French colonial authority.4 To regain control of surrounding territory, 
the division began fighting Viet Minh around Saigon and, as operational challenges 
mounted, some units used Japanese soldiers for “more offensive roles” alongside 
and sometimes commanded by British officers.5 In this new situation, 100th Indian 
Brigade “defaulted to their wartime experience”6 using mobile, combined-arms 
columns to assault the Viet Minh, not unlike those displayed at Meiktila months 
prior.7 Before the French resumed control in January 1946, the 20th Indian Division 
had killed over 2,000 Viet Minh while suffering 40 dead and 100 wounded. The 
British departed, but fighting would continue, eventually leading to the events at 
Red River Delta referenced in this paper’s opening.8  
                                                                                                                
 1 Daniel Marston, “The 20th Indian Division in French Indo-China,” in Alan Jeffries, ed., 
The Indian Army, 1939–1947: Experience and Development (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2012), pp. 157-178. For a more comprehensive analysis of post-Second World War 
operations, see Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: Freedom and Revolution in 
Southeast Asia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
originally published in 2006 by Penguin Group, United Kingdom. 
 2 Marston, 159. The campaigns in Dutch East Indies (DEI) and French Indochina (FIC) 
began the same time. Those in DEI continued through most of 1946 while in FIC they concluded “for 
all intents and purposes” by March 1946. Marston, 163. Slim, now commander of Allied Land Forces 
South East Asia (ALFSEA) ordered the military occupation of Malaya, Burma, Dutch East Indies, 
and French Indochina. ALFSEA Operational Directive No. 8, 23 August 1945, Gracey 4/2, LHCMA. 
 3 Burma operations were for what the division was established and trained. Alan Jeffries, 
The British Army in the Far East 1941–1945 (Oxford, Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2005), p. 50.  
 4 Area of responsibility included modern-day southern Vietnam, Cambodia, and parts of 
Laos. Marston, 163. 
 5 Marston, 168. 
 6 Marston, 172. 
 7 Simultaneously, the 80th and 32nd brigades cleared local areas and transitioned to French 
forces while the 100th pursued local fighters and patrolled outwards. 
 8 In early February 1946, nearly all the 20th Indian Division’s 12,000 personnel departed 
French Indochina. Two battalions remained to conduct guard duties until the end of March 1946, 
after which only “small miscellaneous sub-units remained” until May. Marston, 176-177.  
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 The 20th Indian Division’s experience in Indochina identifies themes that 
underlie this project and its conclusions about wartime adaptation and broader 
implications. To start, this example indicates how the impact of wartime adaptation 
often continues beyond immediate scenarios and may form the procedures used in 
future conflicts. New operational problems may be answered with previous 
solutions, shaping future tactics and battles. These ideas suggest how wartime 
tactical adaptation can be more complex than some may assume, as well as possibly 
more important when considering broader context, legacy, and implications. This 
broader perspective frames this final chapter, as it considers generalizable themes 
and implications about wartime tactical adaptation, operational performance, and 
achieving success. 
 This examination has not delivered a comprehensive answer to its primary 
research question: When does tactical adaptation enable operational success or 
failure, and when does it makes no difference? However, patterns across the seven 
case studies suggest that failing to account for the relationship between tactical 
adaptation and operations, as measured by effectiveness and outcome, will deliver 
incomplete assessments of wartime change and its relationship with battlefield 
performance. In addition, evidence from across the cases suggests that failing to 
account for what conditions cause wartime tactical adaptation to be more or less 
effective at changing operational performance, and how different types of adaptation 
cause different effects on operational outcome, risks distorted assessments of 
wartime change. This chapter considers these findings within the larger subject of 
wartime change and their relevance for the future. It suggests three broad 
conclusions that will be explored throughout. First, that wartime tactical adaptation 
may deliver critical contributions to operational success or to preventing operational 
failure. Second, that using observable criteria about operational effectiveness to 
identify, measure, and rate performance, may enable more accurate assessments 
about changes in battlefield abilities and force capabilities. Third, that assessing 
operational outcome as a relative measure of efficiency between goals, resources, 
and time provides a useful measure for rating outcome. Overall, findings indicate 
how viewing adaptation as a process measured against purposes may deliver greater 
precision regarding wartime adaptation, improved understanding about its 
relationship with battlefield events, and offer a framework to develop generalizable 
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patterns toward a richer theory about wartime change. Specifically, the cases 
suggested how factors about the conditions for adaptation and types of adaptation 
may significantly influence the nature of change, its impact on performance, how it 
raises or lowers effectiveness, and to what degree it contributes to success or failure.  
 
FINDINGS 
By examining the relationship of tactical adaptation processes with operational 
performance and outcome, this analysis delivers a modest contribution to the 
subfield of wartime change regarding how tactical adaptation may alter 
effectiveness and contribute to success or failure. Significantly, this paper’s analysis 
indicated that the project’s tentative argument was incomplete. Rather than wartime 
tactical adaptation being capable of only reducing setbacks or allowing forces to 
exploit opportunities, this paper identified circumstances where wartime adaption 
was a critical contribution to operational success or to preventing failure. 
Furthermore, the cases supported assessments that a primary driver of wartime 
adaptation is operational setbacks and environmental challenges,9 although the 
existence of these challenges is not guaranteed to produce change. Additionally, the 
research supported assessments that failure to adapt entails risks while also 
displaying how, in some circumstances, these risks may not significantly undermine 
success or reduce effectiveness. Finally, and rather distinct, this study’s findings 
suggested that wartime adaptation always entails some cost in resources or time.  
 Considering combat performance, this analysis developed and employed a 
model for identifying levels of battlefield effectiveness as well as criteria for 
assessing changes between them. Examining how wartime adaptation manipulated 
these tenets of effectiveness supported their employment as identifiers for measuring 
performance and how it may change. This analysis demonstrated the feasibility of 
assessing operational outcome as a measure of efficiency between goals and 
resources, providing a tool for use in other research. Thus, this refined framework 
and its use across the case studies contributes to a more complete understanding of 
what wartime adaptation can or cannot deliver, and how it may alter risks or costs. 
  
                                                                                                                
 9 Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James Russell, eds., Military Adaptation in Afghanistan 
(Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2013), pp. 8-10.  
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Case Studies Summary 
Seven cases explored how wartime tactical adaptation relates to operational 
performance and outcome, indicating how understanding this relationship may 
provide valuable insights into the processes of wartime change, its impact, and how 
these elements may be affected by different conditions and circumstances. 
Structured, focused comparison proved useful and appropriate to analyse the core 
elements of wartime adaptation, identify distinct lessons, and suggest broader 
conclusions about wartime learning.  
 Chapter Three examined the 1941–42 invasion of Burma and considered 
how inflexibility relates to performance and outcome. The success of IJA Fifteenth 
Army indicated how adaptation is not a prerequisite for operational success. Also, 
that inflexibility does not necessarily undermine effectiveness, as IJA forces fought 
using a doctrine designed for against the USSR in Manchuria yet consistently 
outperformed better-equipped defenders throughout the Burma jungle. This case 
displayed how a force may be inflexible yet experience no significant setbacks or 
require change when significantly more skilled than its adversary. For the British 
defenders, in contrast, their lack of adaptation exacerbated setbacks. However, these 
problems derived from a deeper, significant skill imbalance. This case suggests that, 
in some circumstances, once fighting begins then it may simply be too late to 
overcome core deficiencies in skill or readiness. 
 Chapter Four examined the British First Arakan Offensive that ended in 
abject failure as Japanese bunkers proved insurmountable for the larger attacking 
force. This case also considered how inflexibility contributes to failure, arguing that 
insufficient tactical adaptation exacerbated setbacks. With no changes after the 
invasion and retreat, British forces used standard frontal assaults against prepared 
positions that broke against the bunkers for six months. The 14th Indian Division 
pushed seven brigades against an enlarged regiment at Donbaik and Rathedaung, 
then suffered for two more months from IJA counterattacks. This case emphasized 
the value of skill, as a force inferior in numbers, equipment, and firepower repulsed 
a larger one that used its material advantages poorly. 
 In Chapter Five, British tactical adaptation for the Second Arakan Encounter 
indicated how wartime change may raise battlefield effectiveness and contribute 
directly to operational success. In contrast, the Japanese remained unchanged which 
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made them predictable and vulnerable. With the time, space, and resources to learn, 
British forces developed new tactics to fight in the jungle, counter IJA infiltration, 
and to overcome the defensive bunker system. This case suggests that wartime 
adaptation may deliver critical advantages to improve performance and contribute to 
operational success. On the other hand, unchanged tactics—even those with proven 
effectiveness—may create vulnerabilities through predictable patterns exploited by a 
learning adversary. 
Chapters Six and Seven considered Long Range Penetration Groups 
(LRPG), and how their two operations indicated risks of wartime change. From 
1943–44, tactical adaptations exacerbated costs, decreased effectiveness, and 
contributed to failure. These cases displayed how the absence of an external, higher 
authority to assess concepts allowed tactics to develop independently within the unit 
which contributed to failure.    
 Chapter Eight considered how British tactical adaptation during 1943 
resulted in increased effectiveness and operational success for Fourteenth Army 
during the Imphal operation in 1944. At Imphal the new pivot system, patrols, and 
improved small-unit coordination prevailed against established IJA tactics. This case 
demonstrated how the British had learned to use existing resources in new ways, and 
suggests how wartime adaptation may deliver numerous relative advantages that can 
accumulate into larger, critical impact. On the other hand, the continued use of 
unchanged tactics by IJA Fifteenth Army exacerbated setbacks and contributed to 
failure. Thus, an unwillingness to adapt prior to operations may cost lives, resources, 
and failure, while inflexibility during them may raise costs and lower effectiveness. 
 Chapter Nine examined how British forces displayed high effectiveness in 
1945 through central Burma to Meiktila. Fighting across three new environments, 
this case revealed how forces may improve performance and succeed despite no 
significant tactical change during the operation if preparations before the operation 
prove fundamentally sound. In short, changes before 1945 produced imbalances 
which delivered British success. This case suggests how wartime change before a 
specific operation can enable high effectiveness and deliver a sufficient foundation 
in concepts and shared practices so that no tactical adaptation is required during 
fighting. Also illuminated was a challenge for measuring operational effectiveness 
when assessments may be inflated by masked weaknesses. 
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Conclusions about Tactical Adaptation from Across the Case Studies 
Findings suggest several general conclusions about wartime tactical adaptation and 
its relationship with operational performance and outcome. Derived from the case 
studies, these conclusions lack universal applicability but to ignore them may invite 
unnecessary risks or costs. First, wartime tactical adaptation may enable operational 
success when adaptation addresses a specific, critical, decisive shortcoming. 
Differences between the First Arakan Offensive and Second Arakan Encounter 
exemplified how precisely tailoring solutions against high-priority problems may 
overcome challenges. After pushing multiple brigades against a 3,600-member 
defensive force and suffering over 5,000 casualties against the bunkers, British 
leaders, planners, and staff officers studied what went wrong.10 Subsequent 
adaptations in infiltration assault techniques and firepower coordination overcame 
the challenges of suppressing, closing with, and penetrating the IJA defensive 
bunker systems. New small-unit skills with patrols and assaults enhanced tactical 
abilities, with defensive boxes and the pivot system overcoming problems 
associated with IJA infiltration. These changes directly raised effectiveness, 
contributed significantly to success, and the second operation attained all objectives 
as planned. The British also suffered less. The larger operation cost 3,506 casualties 
across four divisions compared with the IJA’s 5,000.11 Wartime adaptation enabled 
British forces to overcome the slow, ineffective frontal assaults by using infiltration 
tactics supported by patrols, to penetrate the bunkers with coordinated infantry and 
armour, and to withstand IJA counterattacks through pivots and boxes.  
 Second, wartime tactical adaptation may contribute to operational success 
when forces are very closely matched. Imphal is the key example for this 
conclusion. Adaptation delivered relative gains across IV Corps and XXXIII Corps 
that accumulated to larger benefits and shattered IJA Fifteenth Army. During the 
critical first six weeks when elements of the IJA 33rd Division surprised and 
encircled the 17th Indian Division near Tiddim, the latter applied new defensive 
                                                                                                                
 10 British suffered 916 killed, 2,889 wounded, 1,252 missing. T.R. Moreman, The Jungle, 
The Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941–1945: Fighting Methods, 
Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 76, first published 2005. 
 11 Moreman, The Jungle, 122; William J. Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in 
Burma and India, 1942–1945 (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), p. 243, updated introduction 
with unabridged republication of the edition originally titled Defeat Into Victory published in 1956. 
   227 
boxes and small-scale counterattacks to endure the assault. Next, it broke the IJA 
roadblock and fought along the 160-mile road, coordinating battles, movement, and 
resupply back to the plain. There, the entire IV Corps was isolated, and its four 
divisions battled for three months. For the 5th Indian Division at Nungshigum Hill, 
the 20th Indian Division at Moreh against the 33rd Division Yamamoto Brigade 
Group, and at Kohima against the IJA 31st Division, forces effectively applied new 
tactics to withstand the critical opening assault when “crises might have slipped into 
disaster.”12 Several of the battles were quite close and could have ended differently 
without the relative advantages gained through the new tactics. 
 Third, tactical adaptation may contribute to larger effects in the operational 
realm and possibly beyond. An obvious way is for benefits and advantages to 
aggregate across the tactical level to produce broader, significant impact due to their 
sum. Seen in the British development of tactics to defeat the IJA bunkers, a few 
changes in firepower coordination and assault techniques delivered advantages that, 
essentially, overcame the few, key obstacles and consistently defeated the defences. 
In addition, examples suggest that tactical adaption may deliver more significant 
changes in effectiveness and capabilities than only a summation of advantages. In 
the Second Arakan Encounter, Imphal, and parts of the breakout to Meiktila, tactical 
adaptations increased British effectiveness and capabilities so that in some instances 
the effects appeared larger than simply aggregating. Rather, they combined 
synergistically and contributed higher-level impacts. At Imphal, relatively minor 
changes across a large force delivered critical advantages in numerous tactical 
engagements that, eventually, caused an IJA army to collapse. In contrast, the IJA 
shortcomings and setbacks cascaded from defeat into disaster. This finding would 
suggest that assuming tactical adaptation can never deliver more than minor 
contributions would be inherently flawed. 
 Fourth, change always entails some cost in time or resources, and often both. 
This lesson is obvious in the examples of shortcomings like the LRPG. The first 
operation pulled 3,000 personnel for over a year in a mission that failed to attain 
objectives and suffered 26% casualties with nearly all remaining members needing 
                                                                                                                
 12 Slim, 315. 
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significant recuperation.13 Then, by the second operation, Special Force had 
expanded to 20,000 personnel—nearly a corps—and this expansion meant that by 
1944 the LRPG held one-sixth of all infantry available for operations in Burma.14 
Yet successful adaptations entailed costs, too. The changes between the two battles 
across Arakan, which delivered possibly the greatest increase of abilities and 
effectiveness, all required time, resources, and human capital to develop and 
implement. The establishment of an Infantry Committee, the creation of new 
training centres, the change in personnel policy to deliver the infantry with 
improved recruits, the workshops and study sessions, the movement of existing units 
to the India–Burma theatre and retraining them in jungle warfare—in a doctrine 
which had to be developed—and then re-training them in-theatre, all required 
people, organizational capital, institutional support, resources, and time, before 
solutions to fairly straightforward problems appeared on the battlefield.15 These 
expenditures may prove to be a wise investment and save future costs—a conclusion 
supported when considering the Imphal operation and the IJA cascade into disaster. 
However, results are not assured. Therefore, the decision to implement changes 
during wartime must be considered relative to the costs required, likely outcomes, 
and risks of inaction. In some cases, the saved costs in resources and time may be 
more valuable than potential gains from change. 
 Fifth, in some cases tactical adaptation may be unnecessary. In Burma, this 
situation occurred when forces possessed the greatest difference in relative 
capabilities, seen in the initial IJA invasion and the final British push. These cases 
indicated how failure to adapt will not necessarily prevent success, but also how 
success relied on other factors. In these cases, the larger imbalances in skill meant 
that adaptations were unnecessary. During 1942, IJA 55th and 33rd divisions 
experience no significant setbacks against unready defenders and it seems unlikely 
that any IJA modifications or adjustments would have delivered significant 
                                                                                                                
 13 Time calculated as the 77th Indian Brigade formed in July 1942 through the end of first 
operation in June 1943.  
 14 S. Woodburn Kirby, The Decisive Battles, History of the Second World War United 
Kingdom Military Series Volume III, edited by James Butler (Uckfield, East Sussex: The Naval & 
Military Press Ltd, 2004), p. 443, originally published in 1961. 
 15 For a sense of time, the Infantry Committee formed in May 1943 and assembled in June; 
the new tactics first appeared in January 1944 as XV Corps moved down the Arakan with 5th and 7th 
Indian divisions revealing the new abilities during the early stages of the Second Arakan Encounter. 
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improvements. Similarly, the British push to Meiktila in 1945 required no tactical 
adaptation despite vulnerabilities in river crossings and city fighting that could have 
been addressed but proved unnecessary. When things are going well there may be 
no need to change. Militaries that fail to adapt may risk defeat, but it is not assured. 
 This point leads to a corollary implication about measuring effectiveness for 
the study’s sixth conclusion: that effectiveness may be most difficult to measure 
when forces are imbalanced. It might be particularly hard for winners due to 
overconfidence in existing techniques or inflated assessments of their performance. 
Without a thorough audit of combat to identify shortcomings, vulnerabilities may 
pass untested or unnoticed. This scenario could fail to identify the severity of 
vulnerabilities and lack a clear incentive for change. Hence, success may deliver 
inflated assessments of effectiveness and abilities. Assessing Fourteenth Army in 
the breakout to Meiktila suggests how fighting a weakened adversary may 
contribute some vagueness when evaluating performance. Until the determined 
resistance around Meiktila airfield, Japanese defence around the Chindwin and 
Irrawaddy rivers was intentionally light as the Burma Area Army repositioned 
southward to consolidate its forces and defend higher priorities. One result was that, 
when faced with new environments and new procedures while driving across the dry 
plains of central Burma, the advancing units moved relatively unopposed. Similarly, 
despite some fierce fighting among small units near the Irrawaddy River, the larger 
operation was largely unopposed. This scenario allowed XXXIII Corps and, 
critically, IV Corps crossers to overcome initial mistakes, setbacks passed relatively 
unpunished, and points of vulnerability passed untested. In Meiktila town the IJA 
garrison failed to employ a more determined defence tailored to exploit the town’s 
terrain, allowing 17th Indian Division to employ unchanged tactics. It remains 
unclear whether the British could have attained high performance had the Japanese 
challenged them sooner or harder. This outcome suggests that it is easier to appear 
highly skilled when one’s vulnerabilities are not tested and therefore forces may 
appear more effective in certain circumstances which are less applicable to others. 
This point may seem intuitive or even blatantly obvious—that things become easier 
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for an army when resisted less—but the point bears remembering when assessing 
battlefields since overlooking it may encourage incorrect assessments.16  
 
Hypotheses Results About Conditions and Types of Adaptation 
Findings supported the importance of the existence of conditions for information 
sharing and the role of human skill in wartime tactical adaptation, while the 
relationship between anticipation and improvisation was unclear. These conclusions 
derived from the three hypotheses that measured this study’s two secondary research 
questions: What conditions cause wartime tactical adaptation to be effective at 
changing operational performance? How do different types of adaptation cause 
different effects on operational outcome?  
 One conclusion is that tactical adaptation based primarily on a formal, 
centralized mechanism for storing, evaluating, and disseminating change is likely to 
increase effectiveness and result in operational success. One tentative conclusion is 
that a skill imbalance can be at least as dangerous as a technological imbalance, so 
that the need to adapt through training may be as valuable as increased resources, 
equipment, or technological sophistication. Another may be that while 
improvisation can assist in modifying tactics and adjusting procedures once fighting 
has begun, larger changes incorporated before fighting begins are most likely to 
deliver the greatest impact—good and bad. A final tentative conclusion is that 
anticipation may be more favourable for exploiting advantages, while improvisation 
may be necessary for reducing costs and preventing disaster. Specific results, listed 
in the tables on following page and discussed below, most strongly support H1 and 
H3 while H2 is neutral. For more distinction across these cases and categories, using 




                                                                                                                
 16 For example, one may argue that much analysis regarding the 1991 Gulf War and its 
implications for subsequent conflicts would have produced different conclusions or recommendations 
had the multinational coalition faced a more rigorous test. Consequences may have altered campaign 
planning during the 1990s, to include the 1999 NATO air operations in Kosovo, as well as 
assessments of U.S. military capabilities during the early stages of the U.S. Global War on Terror, 
particularly in Iraq. 
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Figure 10.1: Findings for Hypotheses Using Measurement Scale 
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Figure 10.2: Findings for Hypotheses Using Weighted Scale 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1) considered information mechanisms, movement, 
direction, and dissemination. H1 stated: “Tactical adaptation captured and 
disseminated through a centralized vertical mechanism is more likely to result in 
operational success than when shared across decentralized horizontal networks.” 
After its measurement across the case studies, H1 provided the paper’s most 
consistently-supported hypothesis as none of the cases contradicted it. Overall, the 
Indian Army’s ability to assess setbacks, devise solutions, and implement changes 
delivered increased effectiveness and contributed to operational success. 
 The strongest support for H1 came from the Second Arakan Encounter and 
Imphal operations, indicating how a centralized vertical information mechanism 
may prove critical. The Indian Army recognized a need to adjust practices in pursuit 
of improved performance, and derived solutions by assessing setbacks through 
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formal authority structures to determine, control, and revise doctrine. The 
development in 1943 of anti-bunker techniques and the pivot systems—applied so 
effectively during 1944—required a significant amount of personnel to function 
within a shared conceptual framework that was significantly different from before. 
This process was enabled largely by the central vertical information mechanism that 
facilitated solutions and incorporated them throughout the infantry and supporting 
elements. Led by the new Infantry Committee and Director of Infantry, with 
subordinate staffs directed to address operational requirements, ideas could be 
considered, evaluated, and refined, followed by formal tasking to follow the revised 
methods and to teach them throughout the organization. Other official 
correspondence, particularly the Army in India Training Memorandum, shared 
additional guidance and contributed to a larger capacity for standardized practices, 
concepts, and training. At Imphal, Fourteenth Army’s divisions and brigades 
repulsed the initial assault by countering Japanese infiltration tactics and roadblocks 
that had proved so devastating in 1942. Units also fought well in the jungle 
throughout the operation, cleared IJA bunkers, and employed the defensive pivot 
system developed the year before. These new combat techniques relied on a 
centralized vertical information mechanism to collect information for assessing 
challenges, comparing solutions, and disseminating new combat practices with the 
authority to task subsequent reorganization and training. As British forces outside 
the battlefield collected information, studied how to respond, and disseminated 
lessons, the elements closer to combat focused on training in the new skills rather 
than needing to seek new solutions on their own.   
 Four other cases provided evidence in support of H1. The 1945 breakout to 
Meiktila indicated how British collection, examination, and assessment of Japanese 
tactics had delivered appropriate solutions now incorporated across units with 
shared concepts and common training. A new foundation in small-unit infiltration, 
tactical combined-arms firepower led by infantry, procedures for clearing defensive 
bunker systems, and techniques for repelling Japanese attacks enabled Fourteenth 
Army to attain high effectiveness and to destroy two IJA corps. Having developed 
and implemented the new tactics, Fourteenth Army, and particularly IV Corps, 
experienced no significant setbacks while fighting in the plains, across the 
Irrawaddy River, and in Meiktila town. Other cases indicated the risks of lacking a 
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centralized, vertical information mechanism. Prior to the First Arakan Offensive, 
new ideas began to emerge that would prove correct in the future—increased 
patrolling, more aggressive small-unit tactics, and infiltrating behind IJA defences—
but the lack of organizational prioritization or training centres undermined their 
larger adoption. Units, often with limited time to decide or to implement changes 
due to ongoing operational requirements, took various ad-hoc actions and produced 
guidance that was frequently unclear or contradictory. This decentralized process 
contributed to the resulting low effectiveness. Both operations by the LRPG 
indicated how the absence of an external authority allowed concepts to develop 
independently within the unit and contributed to failure. Prior to the first operation, 
there was no comprehensive vetting of ideas outside the brigade, and the unit did not 
participate in any formal institutional mechanism for information collection, 
integration, evaluation, or assessment. LRPG trained independently and employed 
an intra-unit process that produced directives and guidance but failed to reconsider 
underlying concepts. Neither the failure of Operation LONGCLOTH nor the post-
operation assessments produced a significant change in core concepts or the method 
of assessing ideas, even as the brigade expanded to the 20,000-person Special Force. 
There remained no comprehensive vetting of ideas outside the unit with all 
assessments occurring internally but with limited staff review or evaluation. This 
process produced some new ideas in the stronghold concept, requiring forward-
positioned air bases, floater brigades, aerial insertion and resupply, and drawing IJA 
regiments into battle, but ideas remained rooted in concepts from the first operation. 
Like that operation, it also produced a failure, albeit a costlier one. 
 Thus, results supported H1. Findings revealed that tactical adaptation based 
primarily upon a formal and centralized mechanism for storing, evaluating, and 
disseminating new techniques, procedures, or methods is likely to increase 
effectiveness and result in operational success. H1 supports arguments for increased 
degrees of centralization as they may enable greater and more efficient exploitation 
of core competencies—tactics, techniques, or procedures in a military force.17 A 
                                                                                                                
 17 General tenets of organizational theory in military adaptation from Theo Farrell, 
“Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–
2009,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (August 2010), pp. 570-571. See also James 
G. March, “Introduction,” in J.G. March, ed., The Pursuit of Organizational Intelligence (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999), p. 5, cited in Farrell, “Improving,” 570, footnote 12. 
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centralized organization can prioritize desired competencies, allocate resources, and 
ensure compliance with formal authority over a sustained period of time. It enables 
focusing on organizational needs and avoiding changes based solely on local 
conditions or short-term solutions. 
 Therefore, H1 supports theorists arguing that a centralized vertical 
information mechanism may deliver superior quality of ideas with greater impact, 
due to the mechanism’s capacity for evaluating problems, devising solutions, and 
authoritatively disseminating new directives. First, results substantiated claims that a 
centralized vertical mechanism is uniquely effective at addressing large challenges 
and delivering appropriate solutions for broad change. This finding supports 
assessments that a centralized mechanism provides superior perspective for 
considering problems across a theatre of operations, combined with the 
organizational power to addressing them with thorough dissemination. As argued by 
Michael Doubler in his assessment of German and Soviet army learning during the 
Second World War, a “centralized and formal” technique allowed for study, 
dissemination, and implementation of new ideas with the advantage of addressing 
larger challenges beyond the capacity of smaller combat units.18 This study’s 
examination of British experiences corroborated how information mechanism 
shapes the capacity to overcome challenges and to impact battlefield performance. 
Second, findings from H1 demonstrate how centralized vertical mechanisms may 
deliver high-quality improvements due to formal, directed study and 
experimentation. This result supports analyses about learning by other forces at the 
same time as the British in Burma,19 with similar benefits in other ground forces that 
employed formal, centralized processes to adapt, to overcome setbacks, and to 
increase proficiency.20 The German army high command’s process for conducting 
                                                                                                                
 18 Michael D. Doubler, Closing With The Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 
1944–1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1994), p, 278. 
 19 Such as the Soviet General Staff during 1943. See Doubler, Closing, 276-279; David M. 
Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1995). 
 20 See Russell A. Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), pp. 195-218; Allan R. Millett and Williamson 
Murray, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), pp. 54-55; Williamson Murray, Experimental Units: The Historical Record, 
Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-3684 (Alexandria, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, 
2002); Williamson Murray, “The German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in 
Professionalism,” Armed Forces and Society. Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1981), pp. 285-298. 
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assessments, identifying needs, and implementing new training programs to address 
critical deficiencies in small-unit skills and tactical combined-arms coordination21 
were not completely different from the processes employed by British planners 
against the Japanese in Burma.22 As British planners collected information regarding 
Japanese tactics and operating concepts, the resulting examination, experimentation, 
and dissemination implemented new jungle tactics, infiltration attacks, and a 
defensive pivot system. Third, H1 supports claims that a centralized vertical 
information mechanism delivers high impact at a quick rate due to the ability to 
assemble a clear understanding of what must be accomplished. The British 
implemented new offensive and defensive tactics that proved successful as early as 
December 1943—less than two years after the invasion, and only eight months since 
the disasters in Arakan. This high impact in a relatively short time would appear to 
validate Stephen Rosen’s argument that the “more hierarchical and centralized the 
organization, the greater the impact of the innovation.”23 Examples from Burma and 
their subsequent impact on effectiveness support clams that once an organization 
has assembled a clear picture of need then a central authority is able to implement it 
with the quickness necessary for improving performance.24 
 Findings from H1 challenge notions that a decentralized horizontal 
information mechanism is essential or inherently superior for wartime adaptation. 
Early attempts to address shortcomings displayed in 1941 and early 1942 failed due 
to an uncoordinated, piecemeal process. Ideas developed across various units 
without thorough analysis or formal implementation, arising across the Indian Army 
at different locations, echelons, and units, but failed to take root and floundered 
before the First Arakan Offensive. This conclusion supports those who claim that 
decentralized mechanisms risks missed opportunities for larger learning, and may 
even lose solutions they do create. These conclusions challenge assessments that 
                                                                                                                
 21 For example, compared with German learning against Soviet armour, distances, terrain, 
weather, and overextension which “rendered existing doctrine inadequate” and required new 
defensive doctrine. Hart, 204, 214. The process also shared traits with how the Soviet army 
developed deep battle doctrine during the war. See Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed. For an 
examination of the intellectual development of deep battle, see Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military 
Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (Tel Aviv: The Cummings Center for Russian and 
East European Studies, 1997), pp. 10-14, reprinted in 2004 by Frank Cass. 
 22 Millett and Murray, A War to be Won, 54-55. 
 23 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 38-39. 
 24 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 39. 
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informal, decentralized information movement is vital for driving innovation with 
superior ideas and broad impact.25 In the cases from Burma, the lack of ideas or 
insufficient movement did not cause the larger shortcomings; rather, it was the lack 
of direction, prioritization, and institutionalization of new process that was missing 
in 1942 and early 1943. Afterwards, it was precisely this interference of higher, 
official authority that contributed to developing new tactics and increasing 
effectiveness.26 The cases corroborated claims that the ability to disseminate 
changes is vital—often supported by the capacity and authority of a formal, 
centralized system. In this sense, the development of new jungle doctrine, 
particularly in the fourth MTP9, and dissemination of updated ideas through 
AITMs,27  as well as training according to the new methods, would support the 
importance of centralized direction and, implicitly, the risk inherent to decentralized 
mechanisms and their reduced impact even when ideas are good.28  
 Hypothesis 2 (H2) considered adaptation type, specifically anticipation 
compared with improvisation. H2 stated: “Tactical adaptation based on anticipation 
will outperform tactical adaptation based on improvisation in delivering operational 
success.” Unexpectedly, H2 received the greatest variation in findings with four of 
the possible five ratings. This result did not derive from a lack of impact; rather, the 
range of impact varied from enabling success to contributing to failure. One 
tentative conclusion may be that while improvisation can assist in modifying tactics 
and adjusting procedures once fighting has begun, larger changes are most likely 
incorporated before fighting begins, which often deliver the greatest impact—good 
and bad. A second tentative conclusion may be that anticipation is more favourable 
for exploiting advantages, while improvisation may be necessary for reducing costs 
of setbacks and preventing disaster. 
                                                                                                                
 25 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 10, updated edition, 
originally published in 2002 by Praeger. 
 26 Nagl, 221-222. 
 27 Military Training Pamphlet No. 9 (India) The Jungle Book, Fourth Edition (Delhi: 
General Staff, India, September 1943). The shift to training for jungle fighting began, most 
substantially, with Army in India Training Memorandum, No. 21 War Series June 1943 (Delhi: 
Manager of Publications, 1943). 
 28 Niccolò Petrelli, “Deterring Insurgents: Culture, Adaptation and Evolution of Israeli 
Counterinsurgency, 1987–2005,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 5 (2013), pp. 666-
691; Rosen, Winning the Next War,130-147. 
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 The strongest example supporting H2 is the Second Arakan Encounter. 
Facing the known problems of IJA defensive systems and infiltration tactics, British 
planners devised solutions for breaking the bunkers and using new pivot defences. 
Both relied on a foundation of infiltration techniques and jungle tactics that were 
incorporated across units before the operation. Once prepared with these measures, 
British forces faced essentially no setback for which they were completely 
unprepared or unable to overcome. The 7th Indian Division responded as practiced 
when facing the critical IJA assault around the Admin Box, and the 5th Indian 
Division cleared the Razabil bunker system after minor adjustments between 
infantry and supporting firepower enabled them to close, consolidate, and repulse 
counterattacks. Combined with the skills gained through H1, units employed the 
new tactics and attained clear advantages over IJA units and situations which had 
presented significant challenges the year before. 
 Imphal also supported H2. British forces appropriately planned new tactics 
in small-unit combined-arms firepower, patrolling and roadblocks in the jungle, as 
well as defensive boxes with resupply and counterattack, and throughout the 
operation Fourteenth Army executed them effectively against Fifteenth Army. With 
this sound foundation, British units experienced no major setbacks or surprises to 
challenge their underlying concepts. Importantly, Fourteenth Army prevailed in 
several critical moments early in the operation when the new tactics proved essential 
for overcoming IJA attacks and shifted circumstances to favour the British. By mid-
April, units at Kohima, Nungshigum Hill, and further south against 33rd Division, all 
employed the new tactics to overcome significant threats. The extrication of 17th 
Indian Division from encirclement by 33rd Division likely avoided losing the unit 
and removed a critical threat to IV Corps. 
 In contrast, four cases challenged H2 and presented a key problem with 
relying on anticipatory adaptation: it can be wrong. Pre-war preparations in Burma 
for domestic internal defence and other preparations for open warfare against the 
Germans produced a force unready to fight the Japanese. The First Arakan 
Offensive indicated how relying on established tactics can exacerbate setbacks and 
cause costs to cascade. After initial encounters in January 1943, the 14th Indian 
Division consistently applied the same, ineffective tactics with the 123rd Indian 
Brigade, 55th Indian Brigade, 88th Indian Brigade, 71st Indian Brigade, and the 6th 
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British Brigade. Later, both operations by the LRPG indicated risks of anticipatory 
adaptation when expectations failed to meet reality. Against IJA offensive tactics 
and superior jungle movement in Operation LONGCLOTH, the resulting solution of 
penetration and harassment to force Japanese repositioning simply failed to produce 
that outcome. After these setbacks, the resulting idea of strongholds with floater 
columns proved either incorrect or too difficult to execute. The LRPG possessed 
insufficient firepower and were unable to hold the defensive positions—the core 
tenet of the new stronghold concept. LRPG also became easier to attack while losing 
manoeuvrability, previous strengths of the columns. In both cases, adaptation 
undermined core tenets of anticipation’s expected virtues: that enhanced perspective 
from more information, greater insight about current developments, and additional 
foresight regarding goals and actions, would deliver solutions tailored appropriately 
to overcome critical setbacks with crucial advantages for improving performance. 
These examples did support how anticipation may have significant impact, as 
anticipatory adaptation produced significant amounts of change across purposes, 
roles, and mission, and delivered substantial impact on performance and outcome. 
Unfortunately for the British, this impact undermined effectiveness, contributed to 
failure, and exacerbated costs. 
 Thus, results were neutral for H2. In some cases, anticipation was critical 
to overcoming setbacks and delivering success, but in others it reduced effectiveness 
and contributed to failure. These results suggest that further analysis may deliver a 
greater understanding about the nuances between improvisation and anticipation, 
and how they may combine for greater effects. Still, some conclusions are possible 
regarding theories about wartime change. Importantly, the cases indicated value in 
using anticipation and improvisation as distinct concepts for analysis even though 
they are related and likely interact in practice. Findings supported claims that 
anticipation may deliver high impact, while challenging notions that it will 
necessarily create superior ideas for effective adaptation—even though it can. 
British learning after the First Arakan Offensive and subsequent increased 
effectiveness in the Second Arakan Encounter, Imphal, and breakout operations all 
supported how the increased perspective, foresight, collaboration, and time to 
address battlefield problems may deliver solutions tailored specifically and 
appropriately for operational needs. Tactical reforms in jungle fighting, small-unit 
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infiltration, bunker tactics, and the pivot system reflected virtues of anticipatory 
adaptation, supported by events displayed elsewhere during war.29 These examples 
corroborated how higher staff and thinkers may possess a perspective uniquely 
suited for wartime adaptation due to greater insight of current developments, and 
additional foresight regarding future goals. However, the examples of LRPG 
indicated how anticipation is not guaranteed to deliver effective adaptation. The two 
operations may reflect claims that a prerequisite for effective anticipatory adaptation 
is a perspective higher than the unit engaged in combat.30 In Peter Mansoor’s 
analysis of Second World War U.S. Army infantry, he concluded that adaptation 
had to occur at the division since lower units “were too focused on the current 
battle.”31 A modification of this logic may deliver useful explanatory value to the 
failures of LRPG in that their perspective was too low. This point appears stronger 
when considering how, in cases of successful adaptation, the British division, corps, 
and army leadership often played roles refining and disseminating new ideas. This 
scenario would support arguments that higher input may be vital for improving 
combat performance.32 
 Hypothesis 3 (H3) considered the nature of change during tactical adaptation 
by comparing skill with technology. H3 stated: “Tactical adaptation based on new 
training or unit reconfiguration, rather than new or modified equipment, is more 
likely to result in operational success since it increases skill or reduces 
organizational barriers to employing existing technology.” One tentative conclusion 
from H3 is that a skill imbalance can be at least as dangerous as a technological 
imbalance. The need to adapt through training may be as valuable as increased 
resources, equipment, or technological sophistication.  
                                                                                                                
 29 Notably the German army preparations to counter Allied amphibious assault at Normandy 
and the Allied predictions of challenges with the assault. See Hart, 221-228; Millett and Murray, A 
War to be Won, 413. See also Japanese anticipation at Iwo Jima in Max Hastings, Retribution: The 
Battle for Japan, 1944–45 (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 264, originally published in United 
Kingdom as Nemesis: The Battle for Japan, 1944–45 (Harper Press, 2007). 
 30 Peter R. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry 
Divisions, 1941–1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1999), pp. 165-196. Mansoor 
concluded that adaptation had to occur at the division since lower units were focused on the 
immediate battlefield. See also Robert H. Scales Jr., Firepower in Limited War (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University, 1990), pp. 165-196. 
 31 Mansoor, The GI Offensive, pp. 153-154. 
 32 Mansoor, The GI Offensive, 154, 5. 
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 Across the cases, H3 received the highest positive rating in three of them, the 
most of all the hypotheses. During the Japanese invasion, IJA attackers exploited a 
significant skill imbalance as the less-equipped, less-advanced, numerically-even 
attackers attained clear success. Next, the First Arakan Offensive reinforced the 
importance of skill over technology as IJA defenders repeatedly repulsed a 
numerically-superior attacking force armed with more advanced equipment by using 
a relatively uncomplicated bunker system and small arms. After the British learned 
how to use their existing equipment through new concepts and training, the Second 
Arakan Encounter displayed how new tactics coordinating firepower and assaults 
produced a very different outcome. Also during that operation, XV Corps employed 
the new pivot system as part of a broader change in defensive concept that used 
boxes and mobile reinforcements. This reconceptualization, requiring units to 
withstand attacks while mobile assault teams countered, enabled British forces to 
repulse the IJA infiltration attacks which had been devastating in 1942. 
 Two other cases provided solid evidence supporting H3. Across Imphal in 
1944, British forces applied their new ability to counter IJA infiltration tactics, to 
fight through the jungle, and to counterattack IJA forces, employing three new 
tactics that relied almost exclusively on enhanced skills. In addition, the defensive 
boxes, breaking of IJA roadblocks, and clearing entrenched defenders, all used 
existing technology through improved coordination and a more effective 
application, rather than any new technological sophistication. The employment of 
these new tactics enabled decisive battlefield advantages during the critical early 
battles of April 1944, and then delivered devastating setbacks to the IJA throughout 
the next three months that gutted Fifteenth Army as a fighting force. Next, in the 
breakout to Meiktila, British forces consistently applied superior small-unit, 
infantry-led combined-arms firepower for significant impact, without any specific 
technological enhancement. The consistent, coordinated application of existing 
technology contributed to British advantages and IJA setbacks rather than any 
modernization or technological advancement. 
 Thus, results supported H3. Findings revealed that tactical adaptation based 
primarily upon increasing skill through reorganization or training is likely to 
increase effectiveness and contribute to operational success. Therefore, H3 supports 
theorists favouring skill as primarily important for wartime tactical adaptation. 
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Foremost is Stephen Biddle’s argument that human skill remains fundamental to 
understanding battle outcomes, warning about over-emphasizing the relevance of 
technological developments when assessing combat events.33 British improvements 
in Burma corroborate Biddle’s claim that how forces use equipment, weapons, and 
terrain, is more important that the technological modernization of equipment or 
material. Analyses examining only technological imbalances would be incomplete 
(and likely inaccurate) since they omit human skill and error which can be critically 
important.34 The failures of British defenders in 1942 and the flawed attacks in the 
First Arakan Offensive are obvious examples, as forces armed with equipment of 
greater technological sophistication were repeatedly out-fought and defeated. 
Imphal serves as a less-obvious but possibly more important example in support of 
Biddle’s argument, as British forces fought numerous closely-contested battles that 
required their new abilities to produce larger victory. These examples warn about 
overlooking human skill for employing technology, and the potential benefits of 
improving skill. They also support how assessments relying on a technology-centric 
narrative risk “serious misjudgment of states’ real military power.”35  
 H3 addresses part of a large topic in security studies, challenging a narrow 
subset of ideas and indicating larger questions to study. First, H3 challenges 
arguments claiming that technological advancements deliver the critical advantage 
for battlefield success and the key criteria for innovation, to include wartime 
adaptation. Whether the post-Gulf War Revolution in Military Affairs36 or the more-
                                                                                                                
 33 Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future 
of Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179; Stephen Biddle, 
“Explaining Military Outcomes,” in Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley, eds., Creating Military 
Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 
207-227; Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
 34 Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood,” 139. 
 35 Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood,” 140. 
 36 For the development of the concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), see 
Stephen Peter Rosen, “The Impact of the Office of Net Assessment on the American Military in the 
Matter of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 
(August 2010), pp. 469-482. For additional analysis, see Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, 
Future Transformations: What can the history of revolutions in military affairs tell us about 
transforming the U.S. military? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 
1999); Robert C. Martinage and Michael G. Vickers, The Revolution in War (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004); Barry D. Watts, The Maturing Revolution in 
Military Affairs (Washington, DC; Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011). 
   242 
recent Third Offset Strategy,37 the cases from this study suggest that prioritizing 
only technological advantages as decisive in warfare and relegating human skill as a 
low priority may contribute to unexpected costs on future battlefields. Non-material 
factors may be essential to recover from setbacks, justifying warnings about 
“technological utopians” that underestimate war’s human elements and 
unpredictability.38 Second, even more than the other hypotheses, H3 hints at larger 
categories for future analysis about how technological modernization combines with 
human agency for effective employment. The British and Japanese experiences in 
Burma deliver conclusions about only a small sub-set of this topic, leaving much 
more to study in these cases or across others. 
 
ACADEMIC IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER STUDY 
This project began with a puzzle about why some forces conduct tactical adaptation 
more successfully than others, and how this situation shapes operational 
performance and outcome. While unable completely to fill the existing gap between 
tactical adaptation and its relationship with operations, by building upon previous 
scholarship this research endeavoured to reduce it. The resulting implications regard 
how adaptation may be considered, how it may be tailored, and the value in using 
effectiveness as a measure of impact. These findings deliver new themes for 
analysis about unit relationships, technology, and military innovation. 
 
Adaptation as a Process Rather Than Outcome 
This analysis used a refined definition for tactical adaptation that enabled a more 
comprehensive assessment of the topic, and future analyses may benefit from its 
greater distinction. By considering tactical adaptation as “changed methods, 
techniques, or procedures to make people, units, or equipment suitable for new 
combat purposes or different combat conditions in a repeated or shared manner,” 
                                                                                                                
 37 Term introduced in 2014. See Robert Work, “The Third Offset Strategy and Its 
Implications for Partners and Allies,” speech delivered at the Willard Hotel (Washington, DC, 28 
January 2015), available at http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-
View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies. See 
also Shawn Brimley and Robert O. Work, 20YY Preparing for War in the Robot Age (Washington, 
DC: Center for New American Security, January 2014). 
 38 MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, “The Future Behind Us,” in MacGregor Knox 
and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050 (New York, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 179, Seventh Printing, originally published 2001. 
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this perspective focused earlier in the assessment process compared with some 
contemporary viewpoints.39 This reorientation allows to consider how forces 
examine problems and choose to devise solutions—or not—rather than using the 
result to determine if events constituted adaptation. 
 Specifically, considering adaptation to be a process rather than an outcome 
may avoid the “bad habit” of viewing events and working backwards which can 
make analysts “overlook roads not taken.”40 By considering adaptation as a series of 
decisions by people attempting to chart a course forward in times that are often 
uncertain or confusing, considering alternative options and failed initiatives may 
deliver new insights about how future forces may improve performance and find 
success. Particularly relevant is how it avoids focusing solely on successful 
adaptation, which risks overlooking mistakes or how inputs that deliver success in 
some circumstances may not provide the same result it others. The former can warn 
about actions to be avoided, while the latter may indicate how some solutions are 
inappropriate. This perspective enables an enhanced ability to understand the 
process of identifying needs, how different conditions and types of change influence 
solutions, crafting responses—to include no action—as well as the subsequent 
impact on battlefield events. This comprehensiveness in studying the adaptation 
process may also provide increased richness when seeking generalizable patterns of 
wartime change. Thus, examining adaptations that failed may deliver contributions 
to contemporary security studies as well as future decision-makers, comparable with 
those of effective wartime change.41 Combined with examining opportunities that 
                                                                                                                
 39 This conceptualization challenges those with a clear division between adaptation and 
change. For example: “One also has to distinguish between adaptation and change. Effective 
adaptation involves reforms that contribute to final victory or to enhanced military effectiveness, 
whereas change is modification that brings no discernible improvement in performance.” Hart, 4. 
Like most works since 2006, the definition used in this thesis builds upon the conceptual foundations 
laid by Adam Grissom and Theo Farrell, with slight alteration. Since Grissom is considering the 
broader topic of military innovation, this thesis includes his consideration of change but not his 
requirement for a significant increase in effectiveness, considered premature for this analysis. For 
Grissom, “a tacit definition of military innovation that is, approximately, ‘a change in operational 
praxis that produces a significant increase in military effectiveness’ as measured by battlefield 
results.” Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 29, No. 5 (October 2006), p. 907. Italics added. This definition may be compared with 
Farrell’s definition, “military adaptation is here defined as change to tactics, techniques or existing 
technologies to improve operational performance.” Farrell “Improving in War,” 569. 
 40 Williamson Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA,” in 
Knox and Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 156. 
 41 For example, Chinese Nationalist forces adapting to conduct small unit warfare against 
Japanese forces in 1938–1942 for the battles of Zaoyang–Yichang and Changsha; Chinese 
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were missed,42 the results may deliver enhanced understanding about wartime 
adaptation and an improved repertoire of choices for decision-makers when faced 
with uncertainty or setbacks during wartime. The ultimate contribution may be 
better decisions that reduce unnecessary costs in lives and resources. 
 
Purposeful Adaptation and Appropriate Evaluation 
This study also demonstrated the value in evaluating wartime tactical adaptation 
against operational goals using a relative measure of costs in their pursuits, with 
three implications. First, and most simply, this study confirms that operational 
setbacks and environmental challenges may be drivers of wartime adaptation 
although they do not necessarily cause forces to adapt.43 While a comprehensive 
analysis of what causes or inhibits wartime change lies beyond this project, it is 
worth noting that the most effective adaptations in this study specifically addressed 
battlefield problems relating to the adversary and environment. The least-successful 
changes addressed only general conceptualizations. In the face of clear operational 
challenges, the lack of adaptation risked larger disaster. This conclusion does not 
deny that many organizations face barriers to change;44 nor does it attempt to enter 
the larger debate concerning military-led versus civilian-led wartime innovation.45 
However, from these cases it is reasonable to conclude that operational and 
environmental problems may contribute to wartime tactical adaption, and therefore 
deserve consideration in future assessments of wartime change. 
 Second, the relationship between wartime tactical adaptation and operational 
outcome during mid-to-high intensity ground combat delivers insights into the 
                                                                                                                
Communist forces adapting to mobile warfare in 1940 for the Hundred Regiments Offensive; the 
Viet Minh’s struggles against the French in 1951, as discussed in the paper’s opening vignette. 
 42 For example, the Japanese in Burma from 1942–45. 
 43 Drivers from Farrell, Osinga, Russell, 8-10. 
 44 Recent examples include Caitlin Talmadge on how regime-type alters organizational 
priorities which shape military effectiveness; Michael Horowitz on how groups may integrate new 
technologies and practices; Sergio Catignani on how militaries lose new ideas. See Sergio Catignani, 
“Coping With Knowledge: Organizational Learning in the British Army?” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2014), pp. 30-64; Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010); Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: 
Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). 
 45 From Chapter One, this debate remains framed by analyses of Barry Posen and Stephen 
Rosen. Posen emphasized military-led change while Rosen argued the importance of civilians. See 
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World 
Wars (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984); Rosen, Winning the Next War. 
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phenomenon of wartime change, and indicates that a causal relationship may be 
discerned in some circumstances and under certain conditions. Critically, tactical 
adaptation possesses the capacity to enable success as measured by operational 
goals, seen in the Second Arakan Encounter, Imphal, and Meiktila operations. 
Additionally, the lack of adaptation may exacerbate setbacks and contribute to 
failure, displayed by the British during the invasion, First Arakan Offensive, and by 
the IJA across most of their operations. Finally, in some circumstances, tactical 
adaption may contribute to operational failure, like in the LRPG. These cases 
indicate how the relationship between wartime tactical adaption as measured against 
operational performance and outcome is relevant but requires additional study to 
gain a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship. An improved 
understanding may then deliver additional insights into the broader topics of 
military adaptation and innovation. This conclusion challenges assessments that 
consider tactical adaption in isolation without considering the subsequent 
operational implications. For example, an analysis of tactics for countering 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq after 2003 would be incomplete 
without assessing how the improved counter-IED efforts contributed to operational 
goals; a consideration of improved convoy protection in U.S. counterinsurgency 
campaigns may be incomplete without assessing how the improved movements 
contributed to enhanced battlefield performance; and an assessment of duelling 
sniper tactics in Afghanistan could be misleading about their relevance if analysed 
alone. Focusing solely on tactical improvements without considering their 
contribution to larger goals will produce incomplete and misleading accounts 
because they measure tasks removed from purpose. 
 Third, this analysis indicates how examining the impact of tactical 
adaptation on operational performance may be a prerequisite for understanding the 
larger question about how “bottom-up” adaptation can transmit to higher levels. 
How tactical changes transmit into larger advantages—or fail to do so—remains a 
significant question with academic and policy implications.46 While the link 
between tactics and operational goals is inherently limited in its perspective, this 
relationship maybe be considered a foundation for larger change. This conclusion 
                                                                                                                
 46 This question about the transition from bottom-up adaption into larger innovation 
discussed by Grissom in “The Future of Military Innovation Studies.” 
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would challenge assumptions that tactical adaption may bypass the operational 
realm to benefit strategic goals because this conceptualization would misalign 
tactics, operations, and strategy. Tactical changes that support the strategic level but 
not the operational one likely indicate a misalignment of methods, ways, and goals. 
In Burma, this problem could be observed in the LRPG as strategic interests 
supported adaptation despite failures at the operational realm. The outcome was 
additional costs and limited military value. Two warnings result. First, do not 
assume strategic spill-over from tactical changes that do not contribute at the 
operational realm. Second, if tactical adaptations impact the strategic realm without 
contributing to operations then goals, ways, and methods may need realignment. 
 
Case Study Theme for Further Study (1): Unit Relationships 
The cases indicated additional themes about wartime adaptation, from which more 
analysis may deliver improved insights and a greater understanding of change 
during warfare. The first theme regards what relationship of units delivers better 
opportunities and conditions for improving wartime performance, as several of the 
cases indicated how the relationship of units conducting adaptation may affect the 
quality of change and how it alters effectiveness or outcome. Specifically, whether 
units adapted better when working concurrently or in succession. The former would 
emphasize ideas moving across space, while the latter on changes across time.  
 In Burma, three operations suggested that a successive employment of units 
may improve tactical adaptation. For the Second Arakan Encounter, the arrival of 
new British divisions in a sequential process specifically enabled the new units to 
learn the updated tactics that would enhance future performance. At Imphal, all the 
British divisions were new apart from the 17th Indian Division which was 
substantially reorganized and retrained since 1942.47  While away from operations in 
Burma, the units had been retrained in accordance with the updated tactics that 
delivered improved effectiveness during the five months around Imphal. In the 
breakout to Meiktila, the addition of units from outside the area brought improved 
tactical skills from their training and reorganization in India. The Japanese, in 
                                                                                                                
 47 The 20th Indian Division was specifically created for the Burma–India–China theatre, the 
5th Indian Division had prepared previously for the Second Arakan Encounter, and the 6th British 
Division arrived from outside the theatre. 
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contrast, remained in-theatre for these operations, and their lack of adaptation would 
suggest that nothing about concurrently deployed units necessarily enables tactical 
adaptation. At Imphal, Fifteenth Army’s failure to adapt despite having experience 
in Burma since 1942 suggests that consistent unit experiences and shared setbacks 
across intra-army divisions does not guarantee successful adaptation.48 Prior to 
Meiktila, the Burma Area Army’s divisions remained in Burma for nearly the entire 
campaign but none of the BAA regiments, brigade groups, divisions, or armies 
conducted any meaningful adaptation before or during the Irrawaddy operation.49 
These examples suggest that a concurrent employment of units does not necessarily 
contribute to wartime adaptation. 
 Yet other cases were different. The First Arakan Offensive suggested that 
successive units can fail to adapt, as well as perform less effectively than concurrent 
ones. The attacking 14th Indian Division had arrived after the 17th Indian and 1st 
Burma divisions but integrated little information regarding their experiences.50 
Successive units employed unchanged tactics, displayed similar low effectiveness, 
and continued to fail in the same ways—all against IJA defenders that had remained 
in Burma since the invasion. The IJA 213th Regiment suffered no significant setback 
by their continued deployment, and the outnumbered defenders fought well against 
the larger and better-equipped attackers. The LRPG indicated how adaptations 
during sequential unit rotations may produce changes that are dangerous and deadly. 
After the failures of Operation LONGCLOTH, the LRPG had a clear opportunity to 
deliver lessons from the first operation to its new units through nearly six months of 
training. However, the resulting adaptations proved costly and contributed to failure.  
 Thus, the case studies inconclusively addressed this question while 
indicating potentially important issues for the future. One may ask: What kind of 
unit relationships are more likely to produce tactical adaptation that results in 
operational success, when they are primarily across successive units or concurrent 
                                                                                                                
 48 Fifteenth Army possessed 33rd Division, an original invading unit from 1942, joined soon 
afterwards by 31st and 15th divisions. One would expect to have seen different results if concurrent 
unit relationship played a decisive role in performance and outcome. Rather, all these divisions 
displayed similar shortcomings regarding inflexibility and an inability to overcome setbacks.  
 49 The IJA would re-fill divisions with replacement personnel rather than rotate the unit.  
 50 The division failed to incorporate the limited attempts to address shortcomings from other 
units in Burma and Malaya, beginning to be codified in the new edition of MTP9, an attempt to 
address jungle warfare in AITM14, a few lessons from Malaya in AITM15, and introducing 
infiltration tactics in AITM17.  
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ones? If regarding unit relationships and comparing successive (across time) versus 
concurrent (across space) then a tentative hypothesis may be: “tactical adaptation 
conducted among successive units is more likely to result in operational success 
than that conducted among concurrent units.” This hypothesis posits that successive 
units promote solutions to sustain and endure beyond the units’ presence and 
therefore may outlive their initial creation and prevent idea loss. Successive units 
may refine, improve, and evolve ideas due to additional time, experience, and 
perspective. In practice, battlefield adaptation may combine elements of sharing 
between concurrent and successive units, but forces’ personnel, missions, 
procedures, resources, and organizations regularly prioritize one type over the other. 
Examining the role of unit relationships and adaptation should deliver new evidence 
to help form probabilistic predictions regarding wartime change. It would also have 
practical relevance regarding the employment and sustainment of forces. 
 
Case Study Theme for Further Study (2): Technology 
The other theme may be considered a corollary of H3, which considered technology, 
reorganization, and training. Findings from this project’s case studies supported the 
role of skill compared with new technology, but the cases also suggested additional 
questions that the specific circumstances in Burma and India were unable to address. 
This scenario reveals two additional ideas about wartime change and questions 
about integrating technology with warfighting concepts.   
 First is the idea that technology creates new challenges. This notion posits 
that new or advanced equipment, weapons, or resources can create challenges 
through new requirements and disruption. These requirements may undermine 
wartime effectiveness due to the challenges or due to insufficient time to address 
their effects. New things require new knowledge, and more complicated equipment 
often requires greater specialization. The degree of these changes and their impact 
may be significant, surprising, and undesirable. Technological complexity may 
create new or unpredicted requirements for military units that can be “devastating if 
the organizational is not ‘internally receptive.”51 The more frequent the changes in 
                                                                                                                
 51 Chris C. Demchak, “Coping, Copying, and Concentrating: Organizational Learning and 
Modernization in Militaries (Case Studies of Israel, Germany, and Britain),” The Journal of Public 
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equipment or personnel then “the higher the level of unknowns is likely to be.”52 As 
technological complexity increases, so does the number of interactions vulnerable to 
minor variations which can cause unexpected outcomes and increase the probability 
of battlefield surprise.53 Therefore, technology-driven changes may create new 
burdens and responses may risk lowered effectiveness.54 As a result, one tentative 
hypothesis for future testing may be: “tactical adaptation based primarily on 
introducing new equipment is less likely to result in operational success because it 
disrupts organizations and the operating environment.” If the perspective 
emphasizing disruptions is correct, then findings should reveal that adaptations 
based solely upon new or modified equipment is unlikely to result in operational 
success. This outcome would be because new technology brings challenges which 
cannot be fully corrected during warfare. 
 Second is the idea that incorporating new equipment or technology appears 
less costly if it fails to challenge fundamentally a military’s concepts of warfare.55 In 
this case, introducing new or modified equipment still delivers challenges and costs 
as the technological advancements often require new basic skills and organizational 
integration. However, these challenges may be overcome through training and 
reorganization which ultimately may enable skilful integration and mitigate costs. 
This notion is supported by analysis of First World War technical infantry tactics,56 
as well as examples of modified U.S. convoy equipment in Vietnam and Iraq.57 
Following these considerations, a tentative hypothesis may be: “tactical adaptation 
based primarily on modified equipment is likely only modestly to impact 
                                                                                                                
Administration Research and Theory: J-Part, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 1995), pp. 346; Chris Demchak, 
Military Organizations, Complex Machines (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
 52 Demchak, Military Organizations, 169. 
 53 Demchak, Military Organizations, 4. 
 54 Demchak’s assessment of U.S. Army incorporation of M1 ABRAMS battle tank 
concluded that surprises caused people to respond by increasing greater control over practices. This 
reaction reduced flexibility and increased rigidity, contradicting a core tenet of Army doctrine and 
creating ad-hoc adaptations that delivered new costs. Demchak, Military Organizations, 41-61, 169. 
 55 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 
1916–18 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1994); Joh T. Hoffman, ed., A History of 
Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace (Washington, DC: Center of Military History 
United States Army, 2009); David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the 
U.S. Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
 56 Griffith. 
 57 Nina Kollars, “War’s Horizon: Soldier-Led Adaptation in Iraq and Vietnam,” The Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (3 January 2015), pp. 1-25; Nina Kollars, “Military Innovation’s 
Dialectic: Gun Trucks and Rapid Acquisition,” Security Studies, 23 (2014), pp. 787-813. 
   250 
operational effectiveness since it poses minimal disruptions and operates in 
accordance with known tactical methods, requiring only retraining or 
reorganization.” If the perspective emphasizing incorporation with minor 
disruptions is correct, then analysis should reveal that adaptation based on modified 
equipment that fails significantly to challenge known methods is likely to increase 
effectiveness and to contribute to success. 
 
Case Study Subjects for Further Study 
Japanese and Chinese forces in Burma were both under-represented in this study. A 
better understanding of their experiences and processes is likely to benefit future 
analyses of wartime adaptation and effectiveness. For the Japanese, barriers to 
information availability and accessibility proved more significant than anticipated 
which resulted in omissions, some that may be corrected while others are likely to 
remain unknown. A more comprehensive analysis would benefit by incorporating 
the Japan Defense Agency’s 102-volume official history of the Second World 
War.58 Despite parts being more than 50 years old and “somewhat uneven in 
quality,” the series still would be a useful source to consider for an improved 
examination of the Japanese experience in Burma.59 For tactical analysis, the 
twenty-volume Association for the Study of the History of Land Warfare series 
could be a useful source, particularly the two-volume Inpharu saksusen about 
Imphal.60 Granted, understanding Nihongo, haragana, katakana, and kanji may not 
necessarily release a trove of high-value information. IJA war records do not exist in 
the same volume or format as in England or India. In addition, IJA reporting, when 
it occurred, was limited in several ways compared with the British military. 
Directives and reports tended to be short, factual, and avoided personal 
assessments.61 However, researching the process of IJA assessment and its impact 
on operations remains an opportunity that this project failed to explore fully. 
                                                                                                                
 58 Japan, Boeicho, Boei, kenshujo, Senshi shitsu (War history office, National defense 
college, Defense agency) Senshi sosho (Official Military history) series. In Edward J. Drea, In the 
Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2003), p. 272. 
 59 Drea, 273. 
 60 Inpharu sakusen (The Imphal operation) (Tokyo: Rikusenshi kenkukai, 1969). Drea, 273. 
 61 For more on Japanese language sources, see Drea’s bibliographic essay, 271-284.  
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 The role of Chinese forces and the Northern Combat Area Command 
(NCAC) also presents several opportunities. As a SEAC sub-command for ground 
operations in northern Burma, the NCAC combined nationalist Chinese troops, 
American trainers, advisors, commanders, and British resources, to produce two 
large forces despite limited battlefield impact or experience. As part of the initial 
retreat out of Burma, Chinese forces that entered India became X-Force and grew to 
five divisions with over 75,000 personnel. Using U.S. advisors and British material, 
several of these units later fought the Japanese in China. Another group, Y-Force, 
remained in China near Yunnan and Kunming, with Chinese forces trained to fight 
in Burma and reopen the Burma Road. Y-Force grew to 15 divisions with 175,000 
troops,62 and in late 1944 elements fought the IJA 56th Division (Thirty Third Army) 
in Burma along the Schweli River. This experience of partnering and building forces 
presents another opportunity to deliver an enhanced understanding of wartime 
change and its impact on performance. 
A comparison among British forces across different operational theatres also 
may provide valuable new insights about wartime performance, change, and 
outcome, particularly those gleaned from comparing British Army with Indian 
Army forces. Both forces fought and learned in ways that, as discussed briefly in 
Chapter Two, remain contested regarding effectiveness, efficiency, and impact. A 
more comprehensive comparison between 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe 
and Indian Army forces in either Southeast Asia or the Middle East could enable a 
greater understanding about wartime change, effectiveness, and outcome. Findings 
could also raise new topics for future analysis regarding military adaptation and 
innovation, particularly about the roles of commanders and now to manage an 
organization’s officer corps, since several commanders moved between forces and 
units while nearly all of the troops remained within the same organisation. Tracing 
how lessons were shared formally, informally, developed, or failed to do so, may 
warrant future exploration and benefit the larger field of military innovation studies. 
 
                                                                                                                
 62 With a planned strength for Y-Force by June 1943 of 350,098 total personnel across 
eleven corps-sized units. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World 
War II, China–Burma–India Theater: Stillwell’s Mission to China (Washington, DC: United States 
Army Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 298-300, first printed in 1953. 
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Adaptation Topics for Future Research 
This assessment emphasized how the subfield of wartime adaptation contains 
numerous topics for additional study. Air innovation appears particularly opportune, 
as preliminary findings suggest that airpower innovation is “poorly understood” by 
many, and entails distinct elements that make it occur differently compared with 
armies or navies.63 Relatedly, aside from a few analyses, contemporary adaptation 
studies focus largely on ground-based operations.64 This scenario delivers numerous 
opportunities to examine other services such as maritime forces, marine forces, 
service-based special operations forces, or hybrid forces.65 Also useful may be 
moving beyond a service-based perspective to military-civilian organizations, joint 
units like those employed by Special Operations Command, or ad-hoc task force 
arrangements. In addition, contemporary joint warfighting arrangements and 
institutions entail core expectations about future warfare, to include multi-national 
coalitions, but this topic with clear practical relevance has been largely 
overlooked.66 This study’s example of British forces pushing to Meiktila also 
highlighted how the subfield of wartime adaptation may be incomplete without an 
improved understanding of adaptation at the operational level. Some authors have 
                                                                                                                
 63 Adam R. Grissom, Caitlin Lee, and Karl P. Mueller, Innovation in the United States Air 
Force: Evidence from Six Cases (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2016), p. viii. Specifically, the 
authors examined the U.S. Air Force, concluding that “the Air Force innovates differently than other 
military organizations,” and that “airpower innovation, as a distinct phenomenon, is poorly 
understood outside the Air Force.” Grissom, Lee, Mueller, vii-vii. 
 64 Notable exceptions are the maritime analyses of Frank Hoffman, past examinations of 
U.S. submarine warfare by Stephen Rosen, and emerging airpower analysis led by Adam Grissom 
and RAND. See Francis G. Hoffman, “The American Wolf Packs: A Case Study in Wartime 
Adaptation,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 80 (1st Quarter, January 2016), pp. 131-139; Francis 
Hoffman, “How We Bridged a Wartime ‘Learning Gap,” Proceedings, Vol. 142, No. 5 (May 2016), 
pp. 22-29; Rosen, Winning the Next War, 130-148. For an overview of USAF adaptation, see 
Grissom, Lee, and Mueller. For a case study, see Nina A. Kollars, Richard R. Muller, and Andrew 
Santora, “Learning to Fight and Fighting to Learn: Practitioners and the Role of Unit Publications in 
VII Fighter Command 1943–1944,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 39, No. 4 (August 2016), 
pp. 1044-1067. For some recent analyses continuing to emphasize ground operations, see Torunn 
Laugen Haaland, “The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the 
Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vo. 39, No. 7 
(July 2016), pp. 999-1022; Raphael D. Marcus, “Learning ‘Under Fire’: Israel’s Improvised Military 
Adaptation to Hamas Tunnel Warfare,” Journal of Strategic Studies (April 2017), pp. 1-27; Olivier 
Schmitt, “French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War: Looking Inward or Outward?” Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (August 2016), pp. 577-599. 
 65 Term selected to denote organizations within a service with capabilities often associated 
with joint operations, like U.S. Marine Corps air-ground task force or UAE Presidential Guard. 
 66  Aside from a few examinations that include Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning, and Terry 
Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain, France, and the United States, 
1991–2012 (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Schmitt, “French 
Military Adaptation.”  
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initiated analyses on this topic but many questions remain unaddressed.67 Lastly, 
this examination failed to deliver comprehensive analysis on a topic it sought to 
address more fully: bottom-up innovation. It would seem that, even a decade later, 
there remains “an entire class of bottom-up innovations that have yet to be explored, 
understood, and explained.”68 The subfield will be richer from these analyses. 
 
SHORTCOMINGS AND OMISSIONS 
This work contains several shortcomings and omissions. Most glaring may be the 
failure to answer, fully, two considerations underlying this project’s research design. 
First: When does tactical adaptation fail to cause a corresponding increase 
operational effectiveness? This consideration about how adaptation may fail to 
increase effectiveness was displayed in two operations by the LRPG, showing how 
wartime adaptation does not necessarily improve effectiveness even when 
increasing capabilities. The new skills and technology incorporated by LRPG 
clearly delivered new abilities, notably increasing tactical reach, mobility, and 
small-unit autonomy, but the units failed to achieve their goals. These cases 
suggested that the types of adaptation and the conditions under which they occur—
with semi-autonomy, select political endorsement, and without external evaluation 
of ideas or concepts—may deserve additional analysis to avoid similar future 
expenditures in lives and resources in excess of gains. This topic still requires 
additional research and evidence before making specific prescriptions about how, 
why, or when adaptation may fail to improve performance—or even reduce it.  
 The second consideration was addressed even less. One must ask: When 
does adaptation increase effectiveness yet fail to deliver operational success? 
Essentially no example across the cases in Burma and India revealed adaptation 
increasing effectiveness while failing to deliver success. This shortcoming resulted 
largely from the selection of case studies. It was expected to find more examples of 
IJA adaptation and increased effectiveness during 1944 and 1945 without attaining 
success, as well as British adaptations in 1942 and 1943 that proved insufficient to 
succeed. These expectations were wrong. Neither the Japanese nor British 
                                                                                                                
 67 For one assessment of adaptation at the strategic and operational level, see Farrell, 
Osinga, and Russell, Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. 
 68 Grissom, 930. 
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conducted any significant adaptations that increased effectiveness but remained 
insufficient to alter outcome. If removing the independent variable of adaptation to 
concentrate solely on the intermediate variable of effectiveness and the dependent 
variable of outcome, then the comparison of IJA forces between Imphal and 
Meiktila initially appears to address this question but fails upon closer 
examination.69 In future examinations, either improved criteria for measuring 
effectiveness or additional case studies may deliver new insights regarding this 
important consideration about how forces that improve performance still may lose. 
 Third, case selection inherently limited the findings of this examination and 
their applicability due to the nature of operational challenges posed by the IJA and 
the specific environmental challenges across Burma. The battlefield challenges were 
difficult but not inherently complex, novel, or innovative. IJA attackers surprised 
defenders by moving through terrain considered impassable, but nothing was 
inherently mysterious or unidentifiable in the notion of tactical infantry infiltration 
and hooking around defensive positions. Similarly, the defensive bunkers seen first 
in Arakan were difficult to overcome but were not fundamentally incomprehensible. 
The problems were clear. Therefore, the way to find answers was also relatively 
straightforward: assess, research, test, evaluate, disseminate, apply, and refine. 
These problems were simpler and more easily rectified than could have been, and as 
others faced during the same period, such as the puzzles of combined-arms warfare 
faced by British forces fighting Germans across North Africa and Europe.70 The 
problems and solutions in Burma also remained largely tactical.71 Related to these 
traits, challenges in Burma and India did not rely on major innovations from 
                                                                                                                
 69 According to ratings in chapters eight and nine, IJA forces did show low effectiveness at 
Imphal then intermediate at Meiktila but a close examination reveals problems with expanding this 
conclusion due to specific details between these units. The low effectiveness displayed by Fifteenth 
Army by the end of Imphal was more of a temporary decrease due to setbacks incurred during the 
operation, and therefore cannot be considered constant throughout the operation or with other forces. 
Additionally, there is a problem of continuity between Fifteenth Army at Imphal and the Burma Area 
Army at Meiktila since many of the latter forces that displayed intermediate effectiveness did not 
participate in the Imphal operation and may be considered a separate force. As such, they largely 
avoided the temporary slip into low effectiveness and therefore reflected the unchanged tactics and 
intermediate effectiveness displayed across most IJA units throughout the campaign.  
 70 For example, see Hart, Clash of Arms. Of course, the development of ground tactics was 
more closely related than tactical developments in other areas such as submarine warfare. See Rosen, 
Winning the Next War, 130-147. 
 71 Unlike, for example, the broader challenges of linking multiple operations as learned by 
the Soviets during the same period. See Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed. 
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between the wars, challenges which may require significant developments in 
technological capability, new concepts, and organizational integration.72 
Furthermore, when addressing these problems, British forces possessed time and 
space to learn. Located beyond Japanese control with refuge in India and often 
protected by the monsoon, British forces had an area to reorganize and to learn, 
supported by the larger base in India. These circumstances indicate how the findings 
from Burma and India may have reduced applicability to some other scenarios.  
 Fourth and finally, the research suffered from incomplete information due to 
limitations in source availability and accessibility, and this scenario likely 
influenced the analysis. Nearly all primary source material derived from 
contemporary British records which likely skewed the analysis, albeit within a range 
that is believed to have retained sufficient analytical objectivity. This outcome 
partially is due to practical considerations, as the United Kingdom possesses a 
significant amount of records at the British Library, The National Archives, Imperial 
War Museum, School of Oriental and African Studies, and Liddell Hart Centre for 
Military Archives, all of which are accessible. Essentially all these items were in 
English, as were the materials received from India. The British and Indian armies’ 
commitment to routinized record-keeping and rather candid reporting meant that 
there was a significant amount of material available. Of course, winners also write 
much of history, and tend to retain more of it, both contributing to an imbalance of 
information. Thus, as this project unfolded, the analysis tended to emphasize British 
actions and actors. This perspective was primarily because the British conducted 
most of the variables this study aimed to examine, and therefore proved the key 
actors for assessing the phenomenon of wartime tactical adaptation. However, the 
availability of information did shape this project and its ultimate form. 
 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
On 9 August 1945, the attack which Japanese planners had anticipated since 1939 
finally began.73 The USSR invaded Manchuria with over 90 divisions and 1,500,000 
                                                                                                                
 72 Such as those required in larger innovations like aircraft carriers and carrier battlegroups. 
See Horowitz, 65-97. 
 73 For many years, Japanese planners and IJA doctrine considered fighting the USSR in 
Manchuria their primary threat, most likely adversary, and expected location for battle. However, the 
period after the 1939 conflict at Nomonhan/Khalkhin-Gol may be considered distinct since “the IJA 
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personnel against the 713,000-member Kwantung Army.74 After just eleven days the 
Red Army pushed nearly 1,000 kilometres into Manchuria, with forward elements 
as far as northern Korea, and compelled Japanese surrender in “a masterpiece of 
maneuver warfare.”75 Considering this clash of unchanged Japanese techniques with 
Soviet innovations in deep battle, one obvious conclusion is how the failure to 
change risks future defeat. Another is the significant capabilities possible through 
wartime change. Both are themes throughout this project. To the contemporary 
reader, this example’s relevance may be easy to dismiss since these lessons seem 
clear. To overlook such obvious lessons about the dangers of stasis and the virtues 
of adaptation would unnecessarily court future costs in blood and resources. 
 Sixty-two months later, and again in Manchuria, forces crossed the Yalu 
River to attack American and Korean defenders. Using penetration attacks and 
infiltration tactics to bypass units and isolate defenders—not significantly different 
than those used by the Japanese in Burma—light infantry divided the defending 
force and expelled both Eighth Army and X Corps from the peninsula. The attacking 
Chinese consistently isolated and compartmentalized U.S. defenders, smashed ROK 
and U.S. forces, and several units began to fall apart. In particular, the experience of 
Eighth Army has been called “the essence of adaptive failure.”76 This example 
reinforces how evidence of problems may be insufficient for incorporating 
solutions, and how past learning may be insufficient to retain knowledge—as the 
U.S. certainly had experience fighting against Japanese small-unit tactics like those 
displayed in Korea. In addition to the importance of wartime adaptation to overcome 
immediate setbacks, retaining those lessons may be critical for preventing needless 
deaths on future battlefields. Pity those who are forced to repeat avoidable mistakes.
                                                                                                                
regarded Khalkhin-Gol as their first exposure to modern combined arms warfare.” Edward J. Drea, 
“Tradition and Circumstances: The Imperial Japanese Army’s Tactical Response to Khalkhin-Gol, 
1939,” in Drea, 1. 
 74 The Kwantung Army’s 713,000 also included 170,000 Manchukuoan and 44,000 inner 
Mongolians, while in Manchuria the Soviets brought 1,577,725 troops supported by 5,556 tanks and 
self-propelled guns. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 279, footnote 10. 
 75 David M. Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, February 1983), p. xviii; 
Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, 278-280.  
 76 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War 
(New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 161, updated with new afterward, originally published 1990. 
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